


LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL GUIDE

James L. Busey

Seventeenth Edition
1980

The *Guide* summarizes the environment of politics, recent political history, political movements and leaders, structures and processes of government, and leading political problems, in the twenty Latin American republics and Puerto Rico. There is a section on the environment of Latin American politics and another on the international relations of Latin America. The *Guide* is used as a supplement to textbooks in courses in political science, history, and Latin American affairs.



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
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THE ENVIRONMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS

In the United States it is often forgotten, or not even understood, that people in other countries cannot simply choose and have the sorts of political systems that we or even they would like them to have. Political conditions such as constitutional democracy, dictatorship, stability or chaos, exist in large part because of the socio-economic systems wherein politics occur. Other important causal factors include historical experience, patterns of culture, levels of education and types of available leadership. These are by no means all the factors responsible for the prevalence of this or that set of political practices, but they serve to illustrate our point.

If the land and other property of a nation is distributed among a large number of independent proprietors (as in Costa Rica), there is a good basis for the development of considerable egalitarianism and political democracy. If on the other hand the economy of a country is monopolized by a few families (e.g., traditionally in most of Latin America), there is no possibility that constitutional democracy will flourish. This is true for a very simple reason: A few families, made powerful by their command over the economy and therefore the society, are not going to permit the rest of the population to vote them out of their positions of control. On the other hand, systems of distributed proprietorship (not collective systems, where power is actually monopolized by a clique of bureaucrats) encourage the emergence of democratic habits because the many owners of property see to it that their economic influence is translated into roughly egalitarian terms.

If the history of a country has been filled with violence and hateful rancor among leading families or economic segments or ideological movements, those conditions cannot be easily transformed into friendly cooperation, sweetness and light. The political fury now raging in El Salvador will lead to more of the same. The hatreds created by forty-six years under the repressive Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua will not be forgotten tomorrow.

General patterns of culture also play their roles in determining the political character of a country. Where there are egalitarian cultural habits and economic relationships, egalitarian political habits are encouraged, as in Costa Rica and some of the valleys of Colombia. It hardly needs to be argued that a nation whose population is well educated has a better chance for constitutional democracy than does one whose people are kept in slothful ignorance, or only taught in an ideologically distorted manner. In most of the republics of Latin America, illiteracy still afflicts one third or more of their populations; but literacy is only the beginning of education. In many nations, including the United States, very large numbers of people are able to read and write, but actually read only rarely, or read materials of very low educational quality. This is also true in most of Latin America.

It is the view of the *Guide* that in the search for the socio-economic variables that influence political systems, social scientists too often neglect the factor of leadership. In Venezuela in 1958, almost none of the elements conducive to constitutional democracy were present. If that republic during the past twenty-two years has practiced a degree of political democracy and has mustered together the factors essential for its preservation, credit must be given to the leadership of President Rómulo Betancourt and other responsible presidents who followed him. The comparative political success of Uruguay for seventy years (1903-1973) cannot be understood if one does not know about the contributions of José Batlle y Ordóñez (president, 1903-1907 and 1911-1915). If during 1946-1961 Ecuador enjoyed somewhat more success than usual with constitutional democracy, this must be attributed in large measure to the determination of Dr. Enrique Galo Plaza Lasso (president, 1948-1952). Mexico would have been better off politically if she had more leaders of the calibre of Benito Juárez and fewer like General Antonio López de Santa Anna. One of Argentina's problems is that Domingo Faustino Sarmiento lived in the nineteenth century and Juan Domingo Perón in the twentieth, instead of vice versa.

All the above factors, and many more, are inextricably intertwined with one another. Costa Rica has an excellent educational system because her early presidents saw to its establishment. It is probable that if there had not already been an unusual socio-economic egalitarianism on her *meseta central*, the educational system would not have been established. Without the educational system, Costa Rica would not have produced some of her greatest presidents, such as Cleto González Víquez (1906-1910 and 1928-1932) or Ricardo Jiménez Oreamuno (1910-1914, 1924-1928, 1932-1936), of whom any nation would be proud. Her social system produced less bloodshed, less internecine rancor, than is usual in Central America; and her more peaceful development contributed to her habits of compromise and constitutional order.

Our point is that constitutional democracy is not something that can just be conjured out of any kind of society, no matter what its economy, social arrangements, history, cultural habits, educational levels or types of available leadership. We may wish that human rights and democratic practices could prevail everywhere, though even this wish may be induced by more ethnocentric attachment to our own institutions than we care to admit. At any rate, there are places in the world where constitutional democracy, to put it quite bluntly, is impossible. Because of the surrounding conditions, it cannot happen. In many such places, most of the people don't want it to happen, and they consider our dismay at this state of affairs to constitute an insufferable intrusion into their cultural and political ways of life.


Many if not most of the republics of Latin America are in this condition. It happens that the *Guide* considers constitutional democracy to be the best type of polity. Democracy was not invented in the

United States. It has roots in ancient Greece, it is practiced successfully in many widely separated parts of the world, and is held up as an ideal almost everywhere, including Latin America. However, it only emerges in certain environments where very favorable factors are present, and sometimes not even then (e.g., Nazi Germany). In summary, then, we propose that (1) U.S. leadership demonstrate more patience with Latin American regimes that do not match up with our expectations, but (2) offer all the help (not necessarily financial) that it can to aid Latin Americans in their struggle for democracy.

In previous editions, the *Guide* categorized Latin American republics according to their achievement or non-achievement of constitutional democracy. We do not stress that point here because it may seem to some to offer a pejorative judgment couched in our own values. Suffice it to say that the condition of democracy in Latin America is about the same as it was in 1975. We still list three countries (Costa Rica, Venezuela, Colombia) as being relatively stable democracies. Others, such as Ecuador, Peru and the Dominican Republic, seem to be moving in that direction, but at least ten years of democratic stability must elapse before we can add them to our list.

We would make another observation, somewhat related to the above: Socio-economic-political conditions of a country may be absolutely unrelated to the presence or absence of resources, density of population, type of climate, topography, or any number of other factors so often cited in this connection. Except for fish and steam fumaroles, Iceland has essentially no resources at all, very little good soil, and an abominable climate. Yet Iceland enjoys a per capita income (\$7,401) which is at least seven times the Latin American norm—itsself misleading because income in Latin America is so badly distributed. Denmark has little except rich soil, but enjoys one of the highest standards of living in the world. Resources of the Netherlands are equally sparse, and the country is twice as densely populated as Haiti or El Salvador; but her per capita income (\$6,989) is about fourteen times that of El Salvador (\$500) and twenty-eight times that of Haiti (\$248).

What does seem to matter in the success of socio-economic systems, and therefore in the viability of the political systems that grow out of them, is the way they are organized. This takes us back to the matter of distribution of ownership with which we opened this essay. Almost without exception, the highly successful socio-economic systems of this globe are based on widely distributed proprietorship, and we think that responsible leadership in Latin America would be well advised to introduce such arrangements into their countries.



MEXICO

AREA: 761,601 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 67,000,000.

PRESIDENT: José López Portillo, civilian, took office December 1, 1976, for a six year term.

In territorial size, Mexico is the fifth country of the hemisphere, being exceeded by Canada, the United States, Brazil and Argentina. She is the third in population, behind only the United States and Brazil. Though possessed of rich soil on her central plateau, much of the country is mountainous or tropical, and about half of it is arid desert. Her mineral resources are plentiful, especially in silver, gold, copper, lead, zinc, molybdenum, coal and numerous others. She is a heavy producer of oil and natural gas. However, widely distributed proprietorship has not been achieved throughout her economy, and much of her socio-economic life is dominated by a quasi-monopolistic political system that is riddled with corruption. Therefore, it would appear that Mexico cannot presently sustain a population density higher than that of the United States (Mexico, 85 per square mile; continental U.S., 72). This accounts for the pervasive poverty as well as the almost massive emigration, illegal and legal, that flows to the United States.

Mexico's people are largely *mestizo* with important numbers of Indians and fewer people of unmixed European descent. With the exception of a few outlying Indian tribes the population is fairly well integrated into a common Mexican culture. If other favorable factors were present, this could be advantageous to development of constitutional democracy. Another positive element is that during the past few decades illiteracy has been reduced to about 18 per cent.

With overthrow of Dictator Porfirio Díaz in 1911, it was hoped that a long era of chaos (most of 1822-1867) and tyranny (1876-1911) had finally terminated. But the Revolution, or rather a period of violent struggle among contending forces, had only begun. It was not until 1917 that a new constitution was adopted and some semblance of order was introduced into Mexican political life. The aims of the Revolution, as the constitution of 1917 expressed them, were effective suffrage, no re-election, thorough social reform, anti-clericalism, and mass education.

Since 1920, Mexico has gone through the formalities of electing her presidents in an increasingly orderly manner, though with no hope for opposition candidates. Certain presidents (notably Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940 and Adolfo López Mateos, 1958-1964) have stressed agrarian reform, betterment of working conditions and broad educational programs. The previous president, Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970-1976) engaged in radical rhetoric and frightened away investment. He pursued monetary and other economic policies that left a shambles for his successor, José López Portillo (1976-1982), former Minister of Economy and a close friend of Echeverría but of a far more responsible

turn of mind, and more determined to undertake measures beneficial to his country. President López Portillo is trying to stimulate the Mexican economy at the same time that he maintains independence from foreign pressures without driving off investment.

Constitutionally, Mexico has thirty-one states and one Federal District which includes the huge city of Mexico, whose metropolitan population, about 12 million, places it slightly ahead of Tokyo as the second largest city in the world. Both constitutionally and politically, the states and the Federal District are much dominated by the national government, the official party, and specifically the president. Political autonomy of states and municipalities is mostly a figment of Mexican mythology. The president is made doubly powerful by (1) a lavish assignment of constitutional powers and (2) his control over the all-pervasive official party. He serves for a six-year period or *sexenio*. This pattern of regular succession has been followed since 1934, with each new president running the party and the country pretty much according to his predilections. No candidate in opposition to a regime in power has ever come to office by election.

Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) is the dominant official party which always holds the presidency and all state governorships, and almost all seats in municipal councils and state legislatures. The PRI is organized around popular, labor and agrarian sectors which include, at least potentially, virtually the entire working population of the country. The party is inextricably intermixed with all levels of government, and its political rallies and demonstrations are highly fabricated affairs, as much organized and sustained by governmental assistance as by work of the party itself.

In addition, there are also several small "opposition" parties.

Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) is a conservative and leading opposition party which does function, offers candidates, and is of some importance in the Federal District, Monterrey, Chihuahua, Mérida, and some other urban areas around the country.

Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) is a Marxist party founded thirty years ago by Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who died in 1968. It originated as a faction that split from the Partido Comunista Mexicano. PPS has not put forward its own presidential candidate since 1952, and always endorses the PRI candidate.

As a result of recent reforms which liberalized rules of registration, three additional parties are now allowed to participate in the electoral process: *Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores* (Socialist Workers' Party, PST), which is Trotskyite; *Partido Demócrata Mexicano* (PDM), conservative; and *Partido Comunista Mexicano* (PCM), a traditional type of pro-Soviet communist party formerly barred from the electoral process. By the time this appears, one or more additional small parties may also have been registered.

PAN usually elects from none to six deputies from the constituencies to the Chamber of Deputies. There is official awareness of the need for democratization (but not too much) of the Congress. The Chamber of Deputies has three hundred regularly elected members, plus up to one hundred "proportional" deputies, elected at the rate of five for each 1.5 per cent of the national vote secured by their parties to a maximum of twenty-five each, such deputies to be drawn from regional lists for each of five multimember districts into which the country is divided for this purpose. Thus, each of the small parties is likely to have some "proportional" members of the Chamber of Deputies, invariably led by PAN with up to twenty-five. Tiny parties are usually assigned a few seats regardless of exact proportion of votes they achieve. Membership of the sixty-four member Senate (two from each state and the Federal District) is 100 per cent PRI, so debates are never marred by rancorous disputation.

Though the big daily newspapers usually follow an uncritical line relative to government policies, considerable freedom of speech and press does prevail in Mexico. Because of increasing literacy levels, books and other publications are very widespread.

Government programs since the Revolution have stressed state intervention in the economy, nationalization of petroleum and utilities industries, a large admixture of Mexican with foreign investment, and agrarian reform including distribution of lands among private holders and cooperative *ejido* units. Improvements have definitely occurred in many aspects of Mexican life, particularly in terms of education, modernization of central cities, and better standards of living in urban and even some rural areas. Continuing problems include failure to establish visible norms of sanitation in rural Mexico, or to mitigate intense poverty that still prevails in city slums and in much of the countryside, or to effectively solve problems of inflation, unemployment, and public corruption. Nor have governments been able to fully control guerrilla violence and terrorism sponsored by dissident forces, usually of the extreme Marxist left.



GUATEMALA

AREA: 42,042 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 6,700,000.

PRESIDENT: Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia, military, took office July 1, 1978, for a four-year term.

The most densely populated part of Guatemala is precipitous, volcanic, and beautiful. Many isolated Indian communities retain much of their original cultures and speak native tongues. Though the population is overwhelmingly Indian, the Indians play but small part in Guatemalan politics. Rural *ladino* (non-Indian) land owners, military officers and middle-class urban elements dominate political activity.

Until fifteen years ago, the political history of Guatemala was characterized by long periods of heavy-handed dictatorship punctuated from time to time by shorter intervals of chaotic "democracy". The last long-term dictator was Jorge Ubico (1931-1944), a reactionary tyrant of the public-works type. During 1944-1954, Guatemala was ruled by the increasingly radical regimes of Juan José Arévalo (1945-1951) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951-1954). In June, 1954, the Arbenz government was overthrown by Guatemalans under leadership of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who enjoyed some help from the United States. The Arbenz regime was a favorite of communist and other left-wing circles around the hemisphere and world, and they have never reconciled themselves to its departure from power.

The period from 1957 to 1966 was marked by considerable political confusion, but subsequent presidencies have succeeded each other in apparently constitutional order. An enlightened civilian, Julio César Méndez Montenegro, served from 1966 to 1970. Thereafter, military officers (Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio, Eugenio Kjell Laugerud García, and now Fernando Romeo Lucas García) have served during legally established four-year terms.

A number of ephemeral *personalista* parties and coalitions flit across the Guatemalan political stage. The more durable parties are the following:

Partido Revolucionario (PR) is now democratic-reformist and since its founding under Juan José Arévalo in 1945, has moved from left to center of the Guatemalan political spectrum. In the last election it collaborated with military elements in the election of president Lucas García.

Partido Institucional Democrático (PID) represents a conservative-military point of view which recognizes the need for social reform and at least a modicum of constitutional legitimacy.

Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN) is a conservative, anti-communist party formed in 1954 around the figure of Carlos Castillo Armas. Though it has collaborated with Presidents Arana and Laugerud, in elections of 1978 it supported the candidacy of Colonel

Enrique Peralta Azurdia, who served as president by force during 1963-1966.

In 1979, a new *Central Auténtico Nacionalista* (CAN) was formed under leadership of Colonel Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio, a popular president during 1970-1974. A *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC) is badly split by factionalism of the left and the right.

Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (Guatemalan Labor party, PGT) is an illegal, pro-Soviet type of communist party which flourished openly during the Arbenz regime. Though its central committee renounces resort to violent civil war, a unit within the party is called *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias* (FAR), is led by a "military coordinating committee" and undertakes to tear apart the fabric of the society.

Indeed, since 1954, violence in Guatemala has taken on horrendous proportions, with extremists of both left and right responsible for widespread killings, kidnappings, robberies and general mayhem. The FAR is joined in its efforts at social destruction by the *Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo* (Guerrilla Army of the People, EGP), *Organización del Pueblo Armado* (Organization of the Armed People, ORPA), and other violent groups which emerge and disappear from time to time, often under leadership of rebellious adolescents seeking outlets for youthful exuberance but having little or no understanding of socio-political systems or ideas.

Since 1966, presidents have understood that suppression of terrorism must be accompanied by meaningful social reforms which include grants of land, credit and technical assistance to Indians, more schools, large scale land reform, attacks against inflation, and nationalization of certain foreign-owned firms. The Arana administration was especially lauded for these efforts. However, the success of such measures in creating a basis for democratic stability is obstructed by (1) myopic conservative elements which protest vehemently and violently against all forms of social improvement, and (2) fanatic Marxists, encapsulized in their own dogma and securing some psychological satisfaction from violence and disorder, who would not agree to a truce no matter what social reforms were accomplished.

Because of the violence and counter-violence in Guatemala, and the failure of its governments to solve basic social problems, one hears very little good about Guatemalan government today. Probably a political system more appropriate to the country is needed — such, for example, as one drawn from Indian tribal practices and including large numbers of Indians in its leadership. Nothing so appropriate is going to appear in the foreseeable future. So, Guatemalan government and society will continue to be at odds with each other; and under the circumstances, governments may be performing about as well as one may reasonably expect.

EL SALVADOR

AREA: 8,260 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 4,300,000.

PRESIDENCY: Five-member *junta* (three civilians, two military) presently led by Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez, military, after army troops seized power October 15, 1979.

In territorial size, El Salvador is the smallest country in Latin America. Aside from Puerto Rico she is the most crowded, with a population density of about 500 per square mile. Material and cultural levels are low. Per capita income is reported as about \$500 annually, and illiteracy afflicts almost half the population. By Central American standards, however, both highway and railroad links are fairly well developed.

Traditionally a few families have owned most of the national territory and have combined with military elements to dominate the political scene. From 1931 to 1944 the country was ruled by the harsh and bizarre dictatorship of General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, who combined the arts of political repression with those of theosophy and witchcraft. During the past third of a century, Salvadoran politics were somewhat stabilized in a pattern of quasi-democracy under guidance of military presidents who were dedicated to programs of moderate social reform.

Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN) was the official military party from 1962 to 1979. It carried on a somewhat socially conscious program of reform which it inherited from preceding military regimes of 1950-1960 and even encouraged a degree of political democratization. *Unión Nacional Opositora* (UNO) was a coalition whose major component was *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC), the second party of El Salvador, led by Napoleón Duarte, more than once the mayor of the capital city, San Salvador. In addition to PCN and UNO, there were the less important *Frente Unido Democrático Independiente* (FUDI), a *personalista* party; and the *Partido Popular Salvadoreño* (PPS) which was rightist and nationalist.

All this is now overshadowed by subsequent events. In presidential elections of February 20, 1977, PCN put forward General Carlos Humberto Romero; and UNO, Col. Ernesto Claramount Rozeville. Romero was officially declared to be the winner. UNO claimed immense fraud and victory for its candidate. Despite the bitter violence that followed what appeared to be thoroughly crooked elections, Romero was dutifully inaugurated on July 1, 1977.

The violence, which began as a protest against fraudulent elections, was soon joined by extremist revolutionary units of the Marxist left, known by such names as *Bloque Popular Revolucionario* (BPR), *Frente de Acción Popular Unificada* (FAPU), *Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero* (LP-28), *Fuerzas Populares de Liberación "Farabundo Martí"* ("Farabundo Martí" Popular Forces of Liberation, FPL, named after a national hero), *Fuerzas Armadas de la Resistencia Nacional* (FARN)

Ejército Revolucionario de los Pobres (Revolutionary Army of the Poor, ERP), the *Partido Comunista Salvadoreño* (PCS), and others that emerge and disappear with bewildering rapidity.

On October 15, 1979, the incessant chaos prompted army troops to dislodge President Romero and establish a *junta* which came to include two military officers and three civilians. As of this writing, two of the civilians are of the PDC, one of them being Napoleón Duarte. The two military officers are Colonels Adolfo Arnoldo Majano and Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez. In May, 1980, the arrest of Major Roberto d'Abuisson on charges of plotting created a major crisis, and officers of the armed forces voted to replace Colonel Majano as commander-in-chief with his colleague, Colonel Gutiérrez.

After some months of indecision, the *junta* apparently decided that if it is to save El Salvador from Marxist totalitarianism, it must finally undertake really profound social reform. On March 6, 1980, it expropriated about 2 million acres of the best farmland of the country, to be distributed to peasants individually. Then it nationalized the private banks, long inextricably tied in with the tiny knot of parasitic families owning and running the country. The government then put itself in charge of all foreign trade.

These efforts of the *junta* may well be too late. El Salvador is now gripped by an appalling terrorism from the Marxist left and the reactionary right, neither of which accepts the policies of the *junta*, much less each other. Assassinations of distinguished citizens, including the reform-minded Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero, government ministers, and scores of others, have become commonplace. Attacks on embassies, indiscriminate murder of civilians, marches and counter-marches, assaults and counter-assaults by Marxist terrorists on the one side and right-wing death squads on the other, kidnappings, occupation of public buildings and mindless bombings, are the order of the day. There are times that the streets of downtown San Salvador and even the churches are littered with the dead and dying, and the stench of death is unbearable. Not without reason, Colonel Gutiérrez denounces Cuban and Nicaraguan support for a large part of this unending horror. Blame can also be placed on the shoulders of a myopic ruling caste which refused too long to permit El Salvador to enter the twentieth century.



HONDURAS

AREA: 43,277 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 2,900,000.

PRESIDENT: Policarpo Paz García, military, seized power August 7, 1978, presumably to rule as head of a military *junta* until establishment of constitutional government.

Honduras is a mountainous but fertile country. Though there are rich minerals (gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, iron, coal), these are almost uniformly neglected in favor of agricultural and pastoral products. Internal communications are few and of poor quality. Many Honduran towns are without modern road connections with each other. There is no railroad transportation except along the Caribbean coast, where a short line hauls bananas to port. Poverty is widespread, with an average annual per capita income of \$392.

Except for a widely distributed proprietorship among numerous poverty-stricken farmers in the highlands, where there is a sort of egalitarian sharing of destitution, Honduras has none of the socio-economic elements necessary for emergence of constitutional democracy. Much of the economy depends on export of bananas, an industry dominated by U.S. interest. At least half the population is illiterate. Except during the presidency of Dr. Ramón Villeda Morales (1957-1963) and possibly that of Juan Manuel Gálvez (1949-1954) Honduran leadership has generally failed to contribute notably to the cultural, socio-economic or political development of the country. It may be advantageous that Hondurans do not have a reputation for violence, and even her military dictatorships are usually less bloody or repressive than others in Latin America.

Numerous dictatorial regimes, revolutions and *golpes de estado* have followed each other in rapid succession. Most of the time the leading parties, *Liberal* and *Nacional*, have competed for power by force or rarely by elections — most recently, 1948 and 1971. *Partido Nacional* is the more conservative of the two, and has collaborated with most of the military regimes in recent times.

During 1932-1948 the dictatorship of General Tiburcio Carías Andino, *Partido Nacional*, ruled Honduras. The moderate, conservative constitutional government of Juan Manuel Gálvez prevailed during 1949-1954. Then, after a period of dubious constitutionality under Lozano Díaz, in 1957 a constitutional assembly declared Dr. Ramón Villeda Morales, *Partido Liberal*, to be president.

President Villeda tried desperately to extricate the country from the afflictions of underdevelopment. On October 3, 1963, a military cabal headed by Col. Osvaldo López Arellano headed off presidential elections by seizing power. In 1965 an elected constitutional assembly, under leadership of the *Partido Nacional*, wrote a new constitution and elected López (by now promoted from colonel to general) to be the next president.

Unable by terms of his own constitution to succeed himself in 1971, López arranged that there would be elections but that he would continue as commander in chief of the armed forces. In the first free elections since 1948, Dr. Ramón Ernesto Cruz of Partido Nacional was chosen over the Liberal candidate, was inaugurated June 6, 1971, and proceeded to rule under direction of General López. However, this did not save him from being overthrown by López on December 4, 1972.

The period of López Arellano came to an ignominious conclusion when a U.S. congressional probe discovered that he had accepted a bribe of \$1,250,000 from United Brands Company, allegedly for reduction of the export tax on bananas and other favors. In defense of the national honor, General (then Colonel) Juan Alberto Melgar ejected López from power on April 22, 1975, and took over the presidency himself. In an internal military *golpe* of August 7, 1978, Melgar was replaced by General Policarpo Paz García.

As such dictatorships go, the Paz García regime is a rather mild affair. On April 20, 1980, Hondurans elected a new constitutional assembly. To the dismay of the military leadership, it turned out to have thirty-six Liberals and 32 Nationals, plus three delegates from a new *Partido de Innovación y Unidad* (PINU).

Following practices established previously by both parties, the Liberal-dominated constitutional assembly threatens to select a new president, Roberto Suazo Córdoba; and the Partido Nacional declares that it (and the military forces) can only accept a president elected directly by the people. So, Honduras now prepares itself for a familiar scenario.

As though the political afflictions of the country were not already great enough, a new left-wing faction of the Liberal Party, calling itself *Alianza Liberal del Pueblo* (Liberal Alliance of the People, ALP) has now emerged; and a *Frente Morazanista de Liberación Nacional* (Morazán Front of National Liberation, FMLN, named after Francisco Morazán, an early Central American-Honduran liberator) is modeled on the Nicaraguan *sandinista* front and repeating the usual Marxist slogans. It hopes to accomplish the same kind of destruction of Honduran society that similar groups have achieved in El Salvador.

In the case of Honduras, one detects in the highlands some features of shared poverty, egalitarianism and non-violence that remind one of Costa Rica during the first decades of the last century. However, Honduran leadership never educated her citizenry sufficiently to enrich her cultural base, and military officers have generally ruled by force, thus depriving Hondurans of experience in stable civilian government. Now it is nearly the end of the twentieth century instead of the beginning of the nineteenth, and fanatic ideological forces may forever prevent Honduras from following anything like the Costa Rican path.

NICARAGUA

AREA: 57,143 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 2,400,000.

PRESIDENCY: Five-member *junta* (Moisés Hassan Morales, Daniel Ortega Saavedra and Sergio Ramírez Mercado of Sandinista Front; and two non-*sandinistas*, Rafael Córdorba Rivas and Arturo Cruz Porras). *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN) overthrew President Anastasio Somoza Debayle July 17, 1979, and assumed power July 19.

In Nicaragua, a *mestizo* republic of Central America, socio-political conditions have long been among the most depressing in the hemisphere, and are now compounded by the effects of a terrible earthquake in 1972 and a revolution which became especially bitter during 1978-1979. At least half of the population over ten years of age are illiterate.

The Somoza family ruled the country from 1933 to 1979. The dynasty enriched itself to the extent of hundreds of millions of dollars, secured ownership over a quarter of the cultivable land, and came to own the national airline and steamship company, plus eighty-five other industrial establishments. Anastasio Somoza García founded the political dynasty in 1933 and first occupied the presidency in 1936. He either ruled through puppets or as president until he was assassinated in 1956. In the same manner and under various ruses his two sons, Luis Anastasio Somoza Debayle (civilian) and then Anastasio Somoza Debayle (military), managed to keep the family in power until finally dislodged by revolution.

The revolt was initiated by the *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (Sandinista Front of National Liberation, FSLN, named after the Nicaraguan national hero, Augusto César Sandino, 1895-1934). FSLN began as a small guerrilla force in 1961. Assassination by Somoza goons of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, courageous anti-Somoza editor of the conservative *La Prensa*, January 10, 1978, brought essentially all sectors of the Nicaraguan population to the side of the revolution.

Now the country is ruled by the FSLN. A five-member *Junta del Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional* (JGRN) is the official governing body, but pretty much takes its orders from the nine-member Directorate of the FSLN. In April, 1980, the two non-*sandinista* JGRN members (Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, widow of the slain editor, and Alfonso Robelo, a business entrepreneur) withdrew from the *junta*, and Robelo has subsequently taken to denouncing the Marxist, pro-Cuban, pro-Soviet thrust of the regime. They were replaced by the two non-*sandinista* moderates named above.

The three *sandinista* members of the JGRN all espouse the rhetoric of Marxism. One of them, Daniel Ortega, is brother of the Minister of Defense, Humberto Ortega, who is also a Marxist and a powerful figure in the FSLN Directorate. The most persistently influential

figure of the regime seems to be Tomás Borge Martínez, Marxist Minister of the Interior and also a member of the FSLN Directorate. An appointed 47-member Council of State was formed on May 4, and is supposed to be a quasi-legislative body representing major sectors of the society and economy, but is heavily weighted in favor of the FSLN.

Parties do exist, but without elections they subsist on little more than hope and manifestos. The *Partido Liberal Independiente* (PLI) is an old Somoza opponent and presently indistinguishable from the FSLN. *Partido Conservador Democrático* (PCD) inherits the mantle of the old elitist anti-Somoza conservative party, and because of its widespread support among middle-class elements essential to the regime, is tolerated. The *Partido Social Cristiano* (PSC) has been most outspoken in its criticism of the *sandinista* regime, which does its best to discourage its existence. A new *Partido Social Democrático* (PSD) is barely tolerated, but the middle-road *Movimiento Democrático Nicaragüense* (MDN), led by Alfonso Robelo, is too influential to be ignored. The *Partido Socialista de Nicaragua* (PSN) is an oldtime pro-Soviet communist party, suppressed under Somoza, which collaborates closely with the *sandinista* regime.

Policies are overwhelmingly Marxist, pro-Cuban, and pro-Soviet. The rapacity of the Somozas made it easy for the *sandinistas* to confiscate their property and therefore a large portion of the economy of Nicaragua. All banking, insurance and wholesale commerce is now nationalized, as are all foreign trade and natural resources. On various pretexts, much land in addition to that owned by the Somozas has now been expropriated and most of it is administered by the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (INRA), named after its Cuban counterpart. There is a constant flow of Nicaraguans to Cuba and Cubans to Nicaragua, including 1200 Cubans now helping with the literacy campaign. Labor is almost entirely organized under the *Central Sandinista de Trabajadores* (Sandinista Workers' Center, CST). Nicaraguan citizens are kept under the watchful eyes of the *Comités de Defensa Sandinista* (CDS), equivalent to the Cuban Committees for Defense of the Revolution (CDR). Nicaragua has entered into detailed trade and cultural treaties with Cuba and the Soviet Union. Except for *La Prensa*, which nobody seems able to suppress except temporarily, almost all the media express unswerving loyalty to the regime. After the Somozas and the U.S. Marine occupation that preceded them (1912-1933), all this may be understandable; but it is questionable whether all the opponents of Somoza expected things to turn out exactly this way. At the same time, Nicaragua provides an excellent example of the dictum of Salvador de Madariaga, that right-wing dictatorships provide the best preparation for regimes of the totalitarian left.

COSTA RICA

AREA: 19,653 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 2,110,000.

PRESIDENT: Rodrigo Carazo Odio, civilian, took office May 8, 1978, for a four-year term.

Costa Rica is a very pretty and comparatively advanced country with deep green rolling hills, active volcanoes, very fertile valleys, and a central plateau characterized by numerous individually owned plots of land, pleasant towns, many small pastoral villages, and the quite civilized capital city of San José. Throughout the central plateau, where most of the people live, there is pure drinking water, electrification for everyone, and numerous brightly painted individual houses. It is said that the people of the country live better than those of the city, which even if only partly true would be exceptional for Latin America. Though conditions of life away from the *meseta central* are not so idyllic, they are better than those of other countries of Central America. Highway communications are good, and efficient railroad lines carry both passengers and freight between San José and both coasts.

Costa Rica has a well developed educational system, with a literacy rate (89 per cent) among the highest in Latin America. Her per capita income (\$1,366) is the fifth highest in Latin America, after Puerto Rico, Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil—and in Costa Rica this is meaningful because of more equitable distribution than elsewhere.

During most of her history Costa Rica has been governed by civilians, with only three military men having ever held the presidency. Many of her presidents were outstanding individuals of good education and a high sense of civic responsibility, who from an early time contributed notably to the development of the Costa Rican school system.

For Latin America, this is a highly unusual state of affairs, and arose in large measure because Costa Rica has no precious metals that could be of interest to Spanish *conquistadores*. Also, her Indians were nomadic and ferocious—not organized sedentary types such as were found in Mexico, much of the rest of Central America, and western South America. They refused to be enslaved, or if captured soon died. Because of lack of wealth or slaves, the Spaniards in Costa Rica had to perform their own labor and be content with the small plots of land they could manage by themselves. To this day, the proportion of proprietors of land to the total population is much higher in Costa Rica than in any other part of Latin America.

In other words, Costa Rica has a firm socio-economic basis for political democracy, which she does enjoy—and by comparison with the rest of Latin America, has enjoyed since at least 1889, with only two interruptions, in 1919 and 1948.

Costa Rican parties focus on leading personalities, but do have some recognizable ideological tendencies.

Partido Unificación Nacional (PUN), the party of President Carazo,

centers around several conservative, traditional and *personalista* elements. Another PUN leader, José Joaquín Trejos Fernández, served as president during 1966-1970. PUN grows out of an earlier Partido Unión Nacional, which held the presidency with Otilio Ulate (1949-1953) and Mario Echandi (1958-1962). PUN holds a plurality of seats in the current 57-member unicameral Legislative Assembly.

Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN), led by José Figueres (president, 1953-1958 and 1970-1974) has held the presidency and led the country during seventeen of the past thirty-one years. Despite its ominous name it is a democratic reformist-socialist party. Since its founding in the late 1940s it has been the most effectively organized party in the country, but at present its coherence is affected by the advancing age of its leadership and internal friction.

The oldest party in the country is *Vanguardia Popular*, a pro-Soviet communist type of party led by veteran Manuel Mora, and presently holding three seats in the Legislative Assembly. *Vanguardia Popular* enjoys strident support among university groups. Its vociferousness is out of proportion to the votes it receives around the country. Other parties, such as *Partido Demócrata Cristiano*, have but little foothold in the Costa Rican political system, or are ephemeral *personalista* groups which come and go with each election campaign.

The Costa Rican legislature is very powerful and the Constitution of 1949 contains so many ingenious protections against abuse of authority that the president can only play a strong role if he enjoys a comfortable legislative majority. Also, many executive functions are performed by numerous autonomous bodies outside the scope of presidential control.

Current problems include a decrease in personal security against assaults and thievery, large numbers of immigrants fleeing from Nicaragua and El Salvador, and pressures from radical elements emanating from elsewhere in Central America. One would expect Costa Rica to be more appealing than Cuba as a model for social reform, but the country does not fit Marxist dogma and therefore does not attract fanatic revolutionaries. Instead, the *Guide* predicts that in future years they will try to destroy it.



PANAMA

AREA: 29,306 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 1,850,000.

PRESIDENT: Aristides Royo, civilian, took office October 11, 1978, for a six-year term.

Panama is of Hispanic and Caribbean-African population. Though most of the population is Spanish-speaking, a large portion of city dwellers, especially on the Caribbean side, speak English as their first language. Panama began as a province of the republic of Colombia. Though national pride prevents most Panamanians from discussing the subject rationally, the United States was almost singly responsible for the success of the Panamanian secession from Colombia in 1903, and has played a major role in the economic sustenance of the republic ever since.

Until 1968, Panamanian politics were usually marked by periods of quasi-democratic government intermixed with occasional outbreaks of violence and short episodes of dictatorial rule. On October 12, 1968, the national guard threw out elected President Arnulfo Arias, a colorful demagogue who had taken office only twelve days previously. General Omar Torrijos, popular commander of the national guard, emerged as strongman of the new regime.

Popular "elections" of August, 1972, set up a 505-member People's Assembly which approved a new constitution proposed by Torrijos, named him "maximum leader of the Panamanian revolution" and granted him extensive powers as "chief of government" for the next six years.

To the surprise of many, Torrijos followed the rules as set forth in 1972. A new National Assembly, elected August 6, 1978, chose Aristides Royo to be president and in accordance with the constitutional plan Torrijos stepped down as chief of government, though retaining his all-important position as head of the national guard. Royo collaborates with Torrijos but also serves as effective president of the republic. Torrijos has withdrawn from the center of the political stage.


With indirect election of the president and a National Assembly dominated by the Royo-Torrijos alliance, Panama enjoys only a very limited democracy. The Royo-Torrijos party is now called *Partido Revolucionario Democrático* (PRD). To be legally recognized, other parties must present names of one hundred founders, five from each province, and have at least 30,000 members, and to stay on the ballot must obtain at least 5 per cent of the vote at any election. A new *Partido Liberal* is now recognized by the Electoral Tribunal as being a legal party. Others, which are pro-Soviet communist, Trotskyite and conservative agrarian, are in various stages of development toward official recognition and may have achieved legal standing by the time of publication of this *Guide*. Prior to the Torrijos epoch, parties were highly personalist and coalesced around candidates at times of presidential elections. One of the more persistent was the *Partido Pana-*

meñista, led by nationalistic Arnulfo Arias.

Prior to settlement of the canal question, much of the Torrijos rhetoric was borrowed from Marxist and revolutionary Third World expression. Also, it was feared by some that the leftist tendencies of the former education minister, President Aristides Royo, 40, would move the country close to the Soviet-Cuban sphere; but after ratification of the canal treaties Panama appears to be taking a more moderate course than was anticipated in some quarters.

THE CANAL. The former Canal Zone, five miles on each side of the Panama Canal, cut directly through the heart of the republic and was a ready-made source of misunderstandings and nationalist, left-wing political agitation. After violent 1964 riots, which broke out over a flag question, the two countries agreed to negotiate new agreements. Two treaties, signed in 1977, ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1978 and in effect as of October 1, 1979, provide for (1) immediate U.S. transfer to Panama of sovereignty over the zone, (2) operation of the canal to January 1, 2000, by a U.S. *Panama Canal Commission* comprised of five U.S. and four Panamanian citizens with a U.S. administrator to the end of 1989 and a Panamanian administrator after that, (3) complete transfer of the canal to Panama as of January 1, 2000, and (4) in place of the previous \$2.3 million annual payment to Panama, new grants to the republic totaling \$30 million annually, plus a share in tolls which should come to \$40-\$50 million per year. Other agreements call for various credits from the United States to Panama which should total about \$345 million. After termination of U.S. control over the canal, only Panama is to operate it or maintain military forces or installations within its territory.

Though there is no immediate threat of Cuban-Soviet intrusion into the area, critics of the treaties argue that Marxist elements are prominent in the Panamanian political scene and that unpredictable political upsets could introduce such a possibility. Also, some doubt is expressed as to whether or not the small Panamanian population can produce enough accomplished technicians to guarantee smooth operation of the canal. On the other hand, it is clear that a change in U.S.-Panamanian canal relationships had become inevitable.



CUBA

AREA: 44,218 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 9,750,000.

PRESIDENT: Fidel Castro Ruz, civilian, seized power January 1, 1959; took office as President of Council of State, December 3, 1976.

Cuba is the largest island of the West Indies. Her beauty is enhanced by mountainous regions at the western and eastern ends, by some forests, and by the many harbors that indent its 2500-mile coastline. The people are of European, African and mixed descent, and the economy is dominated by plantation products, chiefly sugar and tobacco. Her per capita income is reported to be \$840 annually, which is about the same as that of the Dominican Republic, but the Cuban poverty is more evenly distributed. Some 83 per cent of the Cuban people are literate.

Cuba has never known prolonged constitutional order. Until 1959 private American investment prevailed in much of the economy and U.S. diplomats collaborated closely with reactionary dictators such as Gerardo Machado (1925-1933) and Fulgencio Batista (officially, 1940-1944, 1952-1954, 1955-1959). However, there was somewhat more individual proprietorship than in many Latin American countries, and Cuba enjoyed economic and cultural standards that were among the least depressed in Latin America. On January 1, 1959, after a dramatic struggle that captured the fancies of many idealists around the world, the forces of Fidel Castro overthrew the dictator Batista and shortly afterward ushered in a pro-Soviet communist state.

Under a Constitution of 1976, there are 169 elected municipal assemblies. These choose fourteen provincial assemblies, which in turn select a national Assembly of People's Power. The National Assembly is represented between sessions by a 31-member Council of State which it selects; and the Council of State in turn chooses a president (Fidel Castro) and a vice president (his brother, Raul Castro) as well as the Council of Ministers. This process of step-by-step indirect elections following choice of municipal assemblies is supposed to occur every five years, and last took place during October-December, 1976. In a major reorganization in January, 1980, it was decided that Fidel Castro should directly supervise the Ministries of the Armed Forces, Interior, Public Health and Culture.

The constitution went into effect on February 24, 1976, after being approved nine days previously by 97.7 per cent of the Cuban voters. It commits Cuba to socialism and communism and prohibits any speech, writing or action against Marxism-Leninism. It condemns imperialism (i.e., the United States) as the "principal force of aggression and war and the worst enemy of the peoples". It recognizes the justice of "wars of national liberation"—i.e., pro-Soviet wars. The constitution further provides that Cuba intends to join with other countries of Latin America in "one large community of nations" against

imperialism—that is, a combination of Soviet satellites in this hemisphere.

The *Partido Comunista Cubano* (PPC) is the only legal party, and for all practical purposes is run by Fidel Castro, who is its First Secretary, though he functions under considerable Soviet pressure. Article 5 of the constitution calls the PCC “the highest leading force of the society and of the state”.

The Cuban economy is highly collectivized. Great *haciendas*, called “people’s farms” and monopolized by an office of the state called the *Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria* (INRA) are the characteristic units of production. Almost everyone works for the state, which is run by Fidel Castro and his associates under close Soviet supervision. Professor Alfred G. Cuzán reports that from 1960 to 1976 the per capita GNP “grew” at an annual rate of —.4 per cent. Almost all production has declined below that of pre-Castro days, and almost all consumer goods are rationed, with people forming long lines everywhere, as is customary in collectivist societies. The work-week is set at forty-four hours, but is increased because of official pressures to work longer hours, often “voluntarily” without pay. According to Castro, there are intense problems with production, transportation, agriculture and industry, all of them compounded by stifling bureaucracy, and lack of labor discipline. To try to correct these deficiencies, a large governmental reorganization was undertaken in 1980. However, there have been no steps to distribute proprietorship more widely. For ideological reasons unrelated to facts, the Soviet model is preferred to the Costa Rican or the Puerto Rican.

On the other hand, illiteracy has been reduced, though Cuba (as under Batista) still stands fifth or sixth in Latin America. Many services, including public transportation and recreational facilities such as access to beaches, are now freely available to all, and housing costs are kept very low.

In 1978, Cuba drew up a trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. whereby trade between the two countries would grow from 800 million to 4 billion rubles per year. The Soviet Union invests heavily in Cuban industry, including an atomic power plant, nickel industry, railroads, etc. According to Castro, Soviet daily aid to Cuba now comes to \$10 million; the U.S.S.R. is working out an economic plan for future close integration of Cuba with the Eastern bloc; and Cuba is to be developed under Soviet supervision. During 1980-1985 the Soviet Union is to deliver 12,200,000 tons of oil per year, at less than world prices; and Cuba is to send 3,500,000 tons of sugar annually to the Soviet Union at prices higher than world market prices. In November, 1979, Castro announced that he hopes to send 10,000 Cubans to cut timber in Siberia, for use in both Cuba and the U.S.S.R. Presumably, the most enthusiastic supporters of the regime would not be included in this project. Castro lauded Siberia as a place which Cubans would find to be not “so hot” as Cuba, which is a fact of meteorological life.

Meanwhile, Cubans are active elsewhere. Jamaica, Guayana, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Grenada are developing improved and closer relations with Cuba. Those with Jamaica, Nicaragua and Grenada are especially close, with Cuban technical teams, hospital and educational personnel assisting them. Cuban engineers recently constructed a showy airport on the island of Grenada. For activities in Nicaragua, see pp. 15-16.

Cuban efforts in Africa and the Middle East are even more impressive. About 48,000 Cuban troops are presently in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and elsewhere. Cuban stone masons are working in Angola, Guinea, Lybia and Ethiopia. Castro calls these activities a “magnificent example of proletarian internationalism in action.”

The summit conference of so-called non-aligned states which met in Havana August 28 to September 10, 1979, selected Fidel Castro to be the president of the organization until the next meeting. Many of the participants questioned the role of Cuba as “non-aligned”, but the event added further to the influence of the Soviet bloc in the Third World.

The Cuban surrogate association with the U.S.S.R. is no different from that of any historic or contemporary colony with its mother country, whether ancient Rome (Spain, Gaul, Greece), Britain (India, the North American colonies, Kenya, Uganda), France (North Africa) or Spain (Mexico, Peru, Cuba), where the colony provides political, military and often economic support for its master in exchange for administrative supervision and if necessary some economic sustenance. Because of Cuba’s proximity to the United States, this relationship is especially important to the U.S.S.R., which deploys naval, aerial and army units in Cuba, and in 1962 established missile bases which if undiscovered could have blown the eastern United States off the map. Proximity of Cuba to the United States undoubtedly explains the largess that the U.S.S.R. pours into her client state.

Meanwhile, the United States maintains an “interest section” in Cuba, but for full diplomatic relations the two sides make demands that neither is willing to meet. During April-June, 1980, the flight of 10,000 Cubans to the grounds of the Peruvian embassy in Havana, followed by some 115,000 to the United States, provided important evidence about conditions of life in Cuba.



HAITI

AREA: 10,714 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 4,900,000.

PRESIDENT: Jean Claude Duvalier, civilian, took office April 21, 1971, as president for life.

Haiti, which occupies the western third of the island of Hispaniola, is the second smallest Latin American republic in area, being larger only than El Salvador; and after El Salvador (499 per sq. mi.) is the most densely populated with 444 persons per square mile. However, it should be noted that the associated free state of Puerto Rico is over twice as densely populated, with about 980 persons per square mile; and Puerto Rico's per capita income of about \$2,500 per year is over ten times that of Haiti, \$248.

Haiti is undoubtedly the most wretched republic in Latin America. The poverty and general misery of almost the entire population are beyond belief. About 90 per cent of the people are illiterate. The official language is French, but people not in the aristocracy speak a creole or *patois* dialect that combines early Norman French with elements of African tongues and Spanish. A tiny, parasitic elite dominates political affairs.

Haiti has never known orderly constitutional government. Chaos alternating with harsh dictatorships has been the political rule. Except for very short periods, as during her struggle for independence under the inspired leadership of the remarkable Touissant-Louverture (died in prison, 1803), Haitians have had no reason for political hope. The country has had twenty different constitutions, has only rarely abided by any of them, and only one Haitian president ever completed his term in a constitutional manner. Several have extended their terms beyond constitutional limits, some have been forced to resign and one or more (e.g., Vilbrun Guillaume Sam) have been literally butchered to death while in office.

By various ruses, (medical) Dr. François Duvalier, who had taken power in 1957, prolonged his term to 1964, at which time a new "constitution" proclaimed him to be president for life. There followed a period of unbelievable tyranny, wherein order was kept by Duvalier's sadistic goons (*tonton macoute*), there were mass executions, individuals disappeared without trace, and the population was thoroughly terrorized.

In January, 1971, "Papa Doc" named his son, Jean Claude Duvalier, then 21 and a large chap not known for his brilliance, to succeed him as "president for life". François got the Haitian Congress to adopt a constitutional amendment lowering the minimum presidential age from 40 to 20. Then, April 21, 1971, "Papa Doc" died at age 64 and "Baby Doc" was raised to the presidency by "demand of the chiefs of the armed forces and with the clamor of the people".

Except for a so-called *Parti Duvalieriste*, political parties are

unknown in Haiti. There is no freedom of expression and illiteracy is so widespread that few could read political views if their publication were permitted. After some leniency following the death of François Duvalier, government is now closing in on any signs of dissent. A new press law of October, 1979, expressly prohibits criticism of government officials. Those insulting the president or his mother are to be subject to three years in jail and fines of \$1000, while insults to other government functionaries are to lead to imprisonments of one year. The reason Baby Doc's mother is singled out for this special mention is that, along with the Minister of the Interior, she is running the country. One to three years in a Haitian jail are not to be taken lightly, but may be preferred by some to being thrown to the sharks, which was a device used by the *tonton macoute* to silence critics of Papa Doc.

Some attempts are being made to improve the economic and cultural lot of the hapless Haitian people. Official corruption continues, but it is no longer common for civil servants to fail to receive any paychecks at all. Of course in the Haitian context the word "corruption" would have no meaning because absorption of public funds by officials for their private use is the norm. At this moment, the best thing to say about Haiti is that conditions are becoming less worse.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

AREA: 18,704 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 5,150,000.

PRESIDENT: Antonio Silvestre Guzmán, civilian, took office August 16, 1978, for a four-year term.

The Dominican Republic occupies about two-thirds of the island of Hispaniola. The country is dominated by a plantation economy. Its conditions of life, while at a low level, are not nearly so appalling as those of Haiti. Her per capita annual income is reported as \$818, or \$22 less than that of Cuba, but is less evenly distributed.

From 1795 to creation of the Dominican Republic in 1844, the country was periodically overrun by French, Spaniards and Haitians. The latter ruled the country from 1822 to 1844, and Spain reannexed the country from 1861 to 1865. Between 1866 and 1930 most of her political experience was quite wild. The U.S. Marines occupied the country from 1916 to 1924.

From 1930 to 1961 the Dominican Republic was ruled by "Generalísimo" Rafael Leónidas Trujillo. His was one of the most stifling tyrannies on record. After his assassination, May 30, 1961, the next five years were filled with turbulence and illegal political imposition. On April 25, 1965, rebels overthrew an illegal civilian *junta* and civil war broke out between leftist "constitutionalists" and rightist "loyalists". On the grounds that Communists were taking over the "constitutionalist" forces, U.S. Marines began landing on April 28, 1965. With grudging OAS approval, over 40,000 Marines were joined by

1200 Brazilian troops and token contingents from a few other Latin American countries. Finally, after many months of violence, agreements were reached for a provisional government and presidential elections were won by Joaquín Balaguer, puppet president at the end of Trujillo's reign. Balaguer was reelected in 1970 and 1974. He undertook economic and social reforms, but seemed determined to perpetuate himself in office *à la* Trujillo.

Finally, in elections of May 16, 1978, police stopped the voting when it appeared opposition candidate Antonio Silvestre Guzmán, a wealthy, democratic-minded rancher, was getting ahead. Possibly under U.S. pressure, Balaguer called off the police. Guzmán wound up with 842,867 votes to 682,830 for Balaguer.

Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) is the party of President Guzmán and has a checkered history beginning with its first leader, Juan Bosch, president for seven months in 1963. PRD is torn by personal factionalism, and President Guzmán is opposed by José Francisco Peña Gómez, secretary general of PRD. The party enjoys a majority in the Chamber of Deputies though not in the Senate, but its chaotic internal disorder renders such facts meaningless.

Partido Reformista (PR) is Balaguer's party, and at present has a slight majority in the Senate.

Other parties include the *Partido Quisqueyista Dominicano* (PQD; Quisqueya, Indian name for the region), an extreme right-wing party led by hard-nosed General Elías Wessin y Wessin, now of declining influence; *Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano* (PRSC), a non-violent party of Christian Democratic persuasion; and on the left, the *Partido Comunista Dominicano* (PCD) and a new *Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionario* (Movement of the Revolutionary Left, MIR). Juan Bosch has broken with his PRD and is leading a *Partido Liberación Dominicana* (PLD).

Guzmán, 69, is apparently a strong supporter of constitutional representative democracy, and is governing as well as can be expected in the Dominican Republic. If he concludes his term in a constitutional manner and does not try to establish himself as president in perpetuity, he will have helped his country to turn an important political corner.

Balaguer's regime broke up some huge estates and increased the number of individual proprietors. Educational conditions improved so that 68 per cent of the people are reported to be literate. Some improvement has occurred in rural life. Guzmán is continuing these and similar policies. Thus, the Dominican Republic may be painfully building the socio-economic base on which political democracy becomes possible.

PUERTO RICO

AREA: 3,435 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 3,360,000.

GOVERNOR: Carlos Romero Barceló, civilian, took office February 2, 1977, for a four-year term.

With about 980 persons per square mile, Puerto Rico is by far the most densely populated political unit in Latin America. Puerto Rico's per capita income, now about \$2,500 per year, is low by U.S. standards but is the second highest in Latin America and three times that of Cuba (\$840). Literacy is almost universal.

Since 1952 Puerto Rico has been known as an *estado libre asociado*, or free associated state, which is more accurate than the term "Commonwealth" commonly used in the United States. Under her Constitution of 1952, she exercises full authority over her internal affairs, including election of her bicameral Legislative Assembly, all local councils, and governor. Her elected commissioner to the U.S. House of Representatives may debate, vote in committees, but not vote on the floor. Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens who may vote for President when in residence on the mainland, but not in Puerto Rico. The United States collects customs but deposits them in the Puerto Rican treasury. No federal income tax is levied on residents for income earned in Puerto Rico. The island shoulders most costs of internal improvements. U.S. currency and postal service are utilized.

Partido Nuevo Progresista (New Progressive Party, PNP) is linked with the U.S. Republican Party of the United States, is conservative, and favors statehood. Governor Romero, elected on November 2, 1976, is of the PNP, as are majorities in both legislative houses.

Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) was founded by the late Luis Muñoz Marín, governor from 1949 to 1965. Much of Puerto Rico's internal progress is to be attributed to the work of the dynamic governor, who undertook measures to encourage investment, break up big estates, promote low-cost housing, extend communications, advance education and clean up politics. PPD is associated with the mainland Democratic Party and favors continuation of the present relationship with the United States.

A movement for independence is represented by the *Partido Independientista Puertorriqueño* (PIP), *Movimiento Pro-Independencia* (MPI) and miniscule communist or *fidelista* groups. In elections and plebiscites of 1967, 1968, 1971, 1972 and 1976 no more than 7 per cent of the voters have ever supported the idea of Puerto Rican independence from the United States. Neither this fact nor the relatively high economic standards enjoyed by Puerto Ricans in comparison with those of most other Latin Americans can dissuade pro-independence elements from engaging in considerable agitation and violence, some of it sponsored by elements serving foreign powers.

ARGENTINA

AREA: 1,072,067 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 26,400,000.

PRESIDENT: Jorge Rafael Videla, military, officially turned "civilian"

August 1, 1978, seized power March 24, 1976 and sworn in March 29, 1976, for a five-year term.

Though concentration of rural land ownership and a half century of repeated military interventions prevent Argentina from having all the elements necessary for development of a stable constitutional democracy, she does have other advantageous features. The *pampa*, which occupies a great arc to the north, west and south of Buenos Aires, is about the size of Texas and contains some of the richest black soil on earth. Literacy, 93 per cent, is the highest in Latin America. Even in bad times, Argentines enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the hemisphere. Severe problems of cultural assimilation do not afflict the country.

However, oligarchic families who monopolize the land are satisfied to use it inadequately, often for extensive cattle grazing. Consequently, this huge and fertile country contains less than 27 million inhabitants, and metropolitan Buenos Aires includes almost one third of the national population.

Between 1829 and 1852, Juan Manuel de Rosas, *caudillo* governor of the province of Buenos Aires, was the ruthless dictator of the provinces. After his overthrow, a constitution was drawn up in 1853. From 1862 to 1930, Argentina was governed by a succession of presidents who were chosen under electoral forms in some instances made important contributions to education, internal development, and civilian constitutional government.

In 1930, with overthrow of the decrepit government of 78-year-old Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922 and 1928-1930) Argentina began a descent into a political maelstrom from which she has never emerged. The regime of irresponsible and corrupt General Juan Domingo Perón and his wife "Evita" (d. 1952) from 1946 to 1955, left a legacy of demagoguery and fiscal irresponsibility from which the nation never has recovered. After overthrow of Perón in 1955, military impositions alternated with ineffective civilian administrations. Finally, in an incredible turn of events, Perón returned from exile on June 20, 1973, accompanied by a new wife, María Estela ("Isabelita") Martínez de Perón, whom he had met while he was in exile and she was a dancer in a Panamanian cabaret. A special election of September 23, 1973, gave 62 per cent of the votes to Perón for president and "Isabelita" for vice president; but on July 1, 1974, the 78-year-old President Perón died of a heart attack and his widow was inaugurated as President of the Republic.

She did the best she could. She had been a tool of her *muy macho* husband, but was on the way to becoming a charismatic and heroic leader with increasing popular appeal. However, she had her limita-




tions in terms of preparation for the presidency and had to be advised by individuals who had their own interests at heart. Her administration was put under siege by the violent left wing, represented by the terroristic *montoneros*, who declared war on the regime. There was an unceasing wave of brutal murders, kidnappings, and assaults on persons and property. Retaliation was undertaken by the *Alianza Anticomunista Argentina* (AAA) which went about the business of murdering all available real or suspected leftists.

Finally, March 24, 1976, the armed forces seized power, arrested the beleaguered president, and five days later installed General Jorge Rafael Videla in her place. Videla shut down the congress, suspended all political activity, removed all governors and municipal officials, undertook a general program of repression, and crushed terrorism; but he says he intends to return Argentina to constitutional government under the justly famous constitution of 1853 as modified by military specifications. The exact form for normalization of Argentine political life remains vague, except that the armed forces are to exercise preeminent power in areas of national strategic action, national security and the defense of the constitution. The plan is that at the end of Videla's announced term, March 29, 1981, another military officer is to serve for at least three years during which there will be a slow process of return to civilian government.

Certain parties are allowed to exist. The *Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR), led by veteran Ricardo Balbín, is a traditional liberal party founded early in the century but during the 1950s and 1960s so torn by internal factionalism that its civilian presidents could not govern. *Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo* (Movement for Integration and Development, MID), is led by Arturo Frondizi (president, 1958-1962). Of course there are the *peronistas*, under various names depending on faction.

Meanwhile, nobody seems to care that Perón's widow remains confined by the military regime, on charges but without trial for alleged corruption and embezzlement. No movement for women's rights has taken up the case of this victim of an obvious male chauvinist pig, Juan Domingo Perón.



URUGUAY

AREA: 72,000 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 2,860,000.

PRESIDENT: Aparicio Méndez, civilian, took office September 9, 1976, for a term which is to end March 1, 1981.

Most of Uruguay is flat or gently rolling and pastoral in appearance. Though there are small properties near Montivideo, these give way to large estates or *estancias* farther from the capital. Despite fertility of the soil, about 85 per cent of the land is used for stock raising and is very sparsely populated. Over half the population lives in Montevideo and environs. Railroads and highways radiate from Montevideo to the borders of the republic. Educational levels are high, with literacy reported to be 91 per cent.

Beginning with the first administration of José Batlle y Ordóñez (president, 1903-1907 and 1911-1915) and ending with termination of the constitutional system in 1973, Uruguay enjoyed seventy years of social reformism, pluralistic political democracy, and one of the highest standards of living in Latin America.

After about 1965 it became evident that the expensive programs of social welfare and state intervention in almost every sector of the economy had outstripped the capacities of the productive system. Uruguay suffered increasingly from runaway inflation, declining production, trade imbalance, unemployment, strikes, corruption, over-centralization, multiparty factionalism induced by proportional representation, and socio-political disorder. For a time the republic's most terrible problem was posed by a dangerous Maoist-Castroite terrorist organization, called *tupamaros* or *tupas* after the name of an eighteenth century rebellious chieftain, Tupac Amaru II. Finally the government unleashed the armed forces and crushed the *tupas*. As a result of their role in suppressing terrorism, military officers became alert to social and political problems plaguing the country, and moved into center position on the Uruguayan political stage.

On June 27, 1973, elected President Juan María Bordaberry closed down the Congress, imposed rigid press censorship, and undertook a campaign of suppression unknown since the beginning of the century. On December 1, 1973, the regime declared all parties, labor unions and student organizations that participated in the opposition during the last elections to be illegal.

Subsequently, on June 12, 1976, the armed forces announced their lack of confidence in President Bordaberry. On September 9, 1976, Aparicio Méndez, civilian, was named by the military forces for a presidential term to end March 1, 1981. Méndez, 76, long a supporter of various right-wing and fascist-style causes, is strictly a tool of the military sector and is not to be taken seriously. He calls himself a "delegate of the armed forces".

Prior to establishment of the present military-civilian dictatorship, the two principal parties were the socially minded *Partido Colorado*

and the conservative *Partido Nacional* (popularly called Blanco). The Colorados held the executive office during all but one term of the present century, and were responsible for the programs of social welfare and mixed state-private economy. Because of extreme factionalism induced by proportional representation, both parties (especially the Colorado) were rent into a great number of *personalista* and ideological sub-groups which did nothing to help stabilize the political system.

Now, there is a Council of State, composed of twenty-five civilian members and a Council of the Nation which includes the Council of State plus twenty-eight officers of the military branches. Of course both of these as well as the president, are appointed with approval of the armed forces. Law is enunciated through a series of institutional acts on the Brazilian model.

The new constitution, to go into effect at the end of 1980, originates in a political commission of the armed forces. All security matters are to remain under control of the military, and there is to be but one presidential candidate, to be nominated by the two leading parties and after approval by the military to be confirmed by a popular plebiscite on November 30, 1980.

Uruguay provides an example of a nation whose bases for constitutional democracy were only imperfectly established. High educational levels were achieved, and at least during the administrations of José Batlle y Ordóñez, excellent standards of political responsibility were put into effect. Largely because of public largess, standards of living were of a high order for Latin America. However, except for the environs of Montevideo, property ownership was never widely distributed. A complex system of proportional representation was almost guaranteed to produce unmanageable party factionalism. Experiments with a plural executive (1952-1967) diminished the possibility of responsible leadership. Governmental expenditures could not be economically sustained. Finally came chaos, terrorism, and the collapse of the constitutional system.

Thus, some excellent civilian leadership provided Uruguay with many elements conducive to the emergence of constitutional government. However, the borrowing from Europe of bizarre or inappropriate political devices, plus elaborate social welfare programs whose costs exceeded the financial limits of the Uruguayan economic system, combined with intrusion of Marxist fanaticism to bring about the ruin of a functioning constitutional democracy. At its best, popular government is a fragile enterprise which may not be sustained forever even when all the favorable elements seem to be in place. In the case of Uruguay, some of those elements never were established, and some negative or disruptive factors were introduced. For those who know something about the workings of socio-political systems, the results are not surprising.

CHILE

AREA: 286,396 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 10,900,000.

PRESIDENCY: Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, military, seized power September 11, 1973, for an indefinite term; serves as "Supreme Chief of the Nation" and head of military-police *junta*.

Despite her elongated shape, the various parts of Chile are well integrated by highway and rail communication. About 90 per cent of her population are literate, but per capita income is not over \$700, or about half that of Costa Rica.

Until recent decades, government was a plaything of members of the parasitic landed oligarchy, who monopolized public affairs like everything else but more or less adhered to constitutional norms. The military services were usually respectful of constitutional rules, but did undertake uprisings in 1851, 1859, 1891, 1924 and 1931.

In presidential elections of September 4, 1970, (medical) Dr. Salvador Allende, longtime leader of the extreme-left Socialist Party which had joined in a Popular Union with the more moderate pro-Soviet Communists and several other Marxist or neo-Marxist parties and factions, secured the presidency with a small plurality and only 36.3 per cent of the popular vote.

The Allende government tried, unsuccessfully, to secure approval for a new "Workers' Constitution" which would replace the bicameral Congress with a unicameral "Assembly of the People" and set up a system of courts subject to legislative control. The regime announced plans to get the press under control. Most important industries, including banking, were in advanced stages of governmental monopolization. Allende's "land reform" proposed to put big and small private farmers out of business entirely and turn all agrarian workers into employees of the state. Production declined precipitously, inflation was rampant, and long queues were to be seen everywhere.

During 1972-1973 there were widespread strikes and disorders and the country fell into a pattern of unrelieved deterioration. Suddenly, September 11, 1973, the military forces undertook to overthrow the government. In the brutal battle that followed, the distinguished Marxist president, Salvador Allende, was either killed or committed suicide.

Now, Chile is ruled by what is probably the most hard-nosed and ruthless regime in her history. Congress is dissolved, mayors and aldermen have been replaced, and there have been thousands of arrests and untold numbers of killings and disappearances—at least 900, according to the Conference of Chilean Bishops in 1977. There are hair-raising tales of acts of brutality against political prisoners, but the wave of repression seems to have diminished during the past two years.

All Marxist parties are illegal and other parties have been put "in recess" for the duration of rule by the military *junta*. During more normal times, Chilean parties included the *Partido Demócrata Cristi-*

ano, in recent years the largest, led by Eduardo Frei, president during 1964-1970; *Partido Nacional*, formed in 1966 as a right-wing combination of the old Conservative and Liberal Parties; *Partido Radical*, an old Chilean party of the moderate left; and the *Partido Socialista* and *Partido Comunista*, of which the former was the more extreme; and several other small parties and factions.

In 1978 there was a so-called "plebiscite on Pinochet" wherein 75 per cent of the voters indicated their support. However, the question was worded in such a manner that an affirmative vote not only supported Pinochet, but also national sovereignty and the dignity of Chile while a negative vote could be interpreted to favor international aggression against the country. One could place a "yes" vote under the Chilean flag, or a "no" vote under the black flag of anarchism.

The regime refuses to announce any firm dates for a return to constitutional government. In 1976, Pinochet said that traditional parties will have no place in the future of Chile; and in 1979, that the military will stay in power until at least 1983. In April, 1978, General Gustavo Leigh, head of the Air Force and a member of the ruling *junta*, advocated return to institutionalized civilian government. He was removed from both the *junta* and his air force command.

Submission of a new constitution to a plebiscite was to occur in 1979, but has been delayed because of differences of view in the military-police junta, the Council of State that advises it, and between them and the constitutional commission which drafted it. The document calls for an elected president with an eight-year term, a bicameral legislative branch, exclusion of Marxist parties, voting age to be raised from eighteen to twenty-one, presidential power to dissolve Congress and call for new elections once during a term, a mixed civilian-military security council to watch over the preservation of the country's institutions, judicial power to prohibit publications contrary to public order or national security, and prohibition of organizations against the family or favorable to terrorism.

An astounding feature of contemporary Chile is that a nation so accustomed to constitutional stability should have produced such a repressive dictatorship. One argument is that this occurred because the military forces had been so long entirely divorced from political affairs that they have no understanding of civilian democracy. Military command and rule by force are their only qualifications. Also, it should be remembered that the extremist Marxist regime of Allende was contrary to all previous Chilean experience, and frightened all the traditional elements out of their wits. Finally, we must note that an important basic element for constitutional democracy was always missing. That was the element of widely distributed property. Most of the land was always monopolized by a few. Seen in this light, the wonder is that forms of popular government survived as long as they did.

VENEZUELA

AREA: 352,143 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 13,200,000.

PRESIDENT: Luis Herrera Campins, civilian, took office March 12, 1979, for a five-year term.

Venezuela, a rich and varied country on the north coast of South America, has important resources including iron, copper, gold and especially oil. There are fertile lands used both for intensive and extensive agriculture and grazing. A great river system centers around the Orinoco, second only to the Amazon. Per capita income is \$2,622, the highest in Latin America, but is distorted by income from oil and is not evenly distributed.

Until 1958, Venezuelan political history was characterized by long periods of brutal dictatorship punctuated by short periods of confusion or fleeting "democracy". The two most well known recent dictators were General Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935), famous as the "tyrant of the Andes"; and General Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1952-1958), a rather nondescript ruler of the corrupt public-works type.

On January 23, 1958, combined democratic and leftist forces overthrew the dictatorship. Elections, a rarity in Venezuela, were held on December 7, 1958, and produced a plurality for Rómulo Betancourt, civilian leader of Acción Democrática (AD), a democratic socialist party. When Raúl Leoni was inaugurated as president on March 11, 1964, it was the first time in Venezuelan history that one elected president peaceably followed another one. Venezuelans passed another political test when, December 1, 1968, they elected Rafael Caldera of the opposition Social Christians and inaugurated him March 11, 1969, then repeated the process in reverse by inaugurating Carlos Andrés Pérez of AD on March 12, 1974. Finally, Luis Herrera Campins of the Social Christians was inaugurated on March 12, 1979.

Venezuelan politics feature many parties and changing blocs and fronts, formed out of both *personalista* and ideological elements.

Partido Social Cristiano (called COPEI because of an earlier name, Comité Organizador Pro Elección Independiente) is the Christian Democratic party of President Herrera. In elections of December 3, 1978, Herrera's candidacy was also supported by *Unión Republicana Democrática* (URD), a leftist socialist party presently directed by Ramón Tenorio Silfontes and originally formed in the early 1970s by Jovito Villalba as a split from Acción Democrática.

Acción Democrática (AD), the party of Presidents Betancourt (1959-1964), Leoni (1964-1969) and Andrés Pérez (1974-1979), is in many ways the founding party of modern day Venezuela, for which much credit must be given to the responsible and socially conscious leadership of Rómulo Betancourt. AD is a democratic-reformist, semi-socialist party which has much in common with Liberación Nacional of Costa Rica, Popular Democrático of Puerto Rico, Liberal of Hon-

military forces. Hopefully, Roldós is to serve for a five-year term; but he is already faced with a bitter internal struggle within his own party.

The Ecuadorian party system offers a picture of bewildering confusion, in that in the last election twelve parties ran some 1200 candidates for the sixty-nine seats in the unicameral congress, called the National Chamber of Representatives. The old *Partido Conservador* and *Partido Liberal* have virtually disappeared. The most persistent political force is the *Concentración de Fuerzas Populares* (CFP), normally led by Assad Bucaram of Guayaquil but which in the last elections put forward Jaime Roldós when the military ruled that Bucaram could not be president because of his Lebanese, non-Ecuadorian origin. Now, Bucaram is president of the one-house congress as well as of the CFP and an intransigent opponent of President Roldós.

In the last run-off elections, the Roldós candidacy was supported not only by CFP but also by a left-wing coalition called *Democracia Popular* which now plays an important role in the current congress. The supporters of Durán called themselves the *Frente Constitucionalista*. The *Partido Liberal*, a mere shadow of its former self, put forward Raúl Clemente Huerta; and the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano*, Osvaldo Hurtado.

Marxist interests, whether pro-Soviet or otherwise, are promoted by no less than four different parties or movements led by the *Partido Comunista* and *Partido Socialista Revolucionario*. Organized Ecuadorian labor as represented by the *Confederación de Trabajadores de Ecuador* (Confederation of Workers of Ecuador, CTE) is heavily Marxist.

The new Constitution of 1978 gives the vote to illiterates and established both the unicameral system and a five-year term for president. Many military and civilian leaders are making sincere efforts to assure continuation of civilian constitutional democracy. The *Guide* doubts that the land is sufficiently distributed among large numbers of proprietors, or that there are enough civilian leaders of proven integrity and responsibility, or that educational levels are sufficiently high or cultural assimilation adequately achieved, to accomplish this goal for an appreciable length of time.



PERU

AREA: 496,222 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 16,900,000.

PRESIDENT: Fernando Belaúnde Terry, civilian, took office July 28, 1980, for five-year term.

Peru typifies all the physical and ethnic characteristics and problems of much of Latin America. At least half the population is Indian, only poorly assimilated into the Hispanicized Peruvian elite culture. Peru is afflicted by physical dissection, poverty, low productivity, and illiteracy affecting about a third of the population.

Beginning with her first head of government, the famous José de San Martín (1821), Peru has been ruled by sixty different heads of state or juntas during 159 years of independent history, or an average of one each 2.6 years. A famous dictator was Augusto Bernardino Leguía, 1919-1930. A more recent dictatorship was that of General Manuel Odría, 1948-1956. Subsequently, two civilian constitutional presidents, Manuel Prado (1956-1962) and Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1963-1968) were thrown out of office by military force just before completing their terms, but Belaúnde has the satisfaction of having returned to the presidency by election in 1980.

After the overthrow of Belaúnde on October 3, 1968, the new military regime was first headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975), then by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez, who has now turned the government back to newly elected Belaúnde. Under Velasco the dictatorship nationalized the mining and other properties of foreign corporations, established an elaborate network of "industrial communities" and "enterprises of social property" and otherwise took over operation of mining and refining, railroads, telecommunications, export trade, production of cement, chemicals, paper, and almost all banking activities. "Land reform" distributed 25 million acres, not primarily to individual proprietors but to officially approved cooperatives and semi-public agencies. In a move the military successors to Velasco later admitted to have been a huge mistake, the dictatorship expropriated the leading newspapers of the country, including *El Comercio* and *La Prensa*, and turned them over to labor unions subservient to the regime—but then turned them back to their owners in 1979.

In their zeal to turn the productive system upside down, the military regime managed to wreck an economy which, while fraught with deep problems, was not the worst in Latin America. In 1977, devaluation of the Peruvian *sol*, previously a relatively stable currency, resulted in bloody riots. By 1979, inflation had reached 70 per cent annually and over half the labor force was unemployed.

By 1978 the government of General Francisco Morales, who was more moderate than his predecessor General Velasco, decided the

military forces had better return to the barracks. An elected assembly, meeting during late 1978 and early 1979, drew up a new constitution. In elections of May 18, 1980, the first in seventeen years, voters chose Belaúnde to be president and also selected sixty senators and 180 deputies.

Partido Aprista Peruano (PAP) is a famous Peruvian party. The term *aprista* is drawn from APRA, for *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*, long the terror of Peruvian government and especially of the military forces, simply because of the immense support APRA enjoyed among Peruvian intellectuals, workers and peasants, including Indians. In fact, the armed forces finally decided the best way to defeat the *apristas* would be to adopt their radical program. APRA followed the leadership of the late Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, famous throughout Latin America for his innovative solutions to hemispheric problems, his dynamism and his courage. Haya was elected more than once to the presidency of Peru, but each time was prevented by military force from taking office. During the first few months of the constitutional assembly of 1978-1979 he served as its presiding officer, but had to withdraw because of failing health, and died on August 2, 1979, at age 84. Had he lived, despite his age he would probably have been elected to the presidency following retirement of the military regime.

Partido Acción Popular (AP) is the party of President Belaúnde, 68, an architect-politician with a moderate point of view and previous experience in the presidency of his country. Before 1968, AP had adopted large parts of the quasi-socialist *aprista* program; but observation of the application of such principles by the military *junta* has caused the party to become more enthusiastic than previously about widely distributed private property. President Belaúnde says he will examine the reforms of the past twelve years and feel at liberty to revise them if necessary.

In elections of 1980, *Partido Popular Cristiano* spoke for the right-wing point of view, and holds some seats in the Congress. The *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* continues on from years prior to the 1968 military takeover. A *Frente Obrero, Campesino, Estudiantil y Popular* (Workers', Peasants' and Students' Front, FOCEP) enjoys considerable support from the Marxist left, as do numerous other small but vociferous political groups, including the *Partido Comunista Peruano* (PCP).

Peruvian political institutions are borrowed from U.S., European and foreign ideological models, and have little relationship to the indigenous character of most of the Peruvian people and their society. Traditions of military imposition and authoritarianism are strong. Economic and educational levels are not conducive to stable popular government. Peruvian leadership will find it an uphill task to establish long-run constitutional government.

BOLIVIA

AREA: 424,000 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 5,200,000.

PRESIDENCY: As this writing, held by General Luis García Meza, whose followers seized power July 17, 1980.

Bolivia is almost twice the area but has about one tenth the population of France. The South American republic has rich resources in minerals and in the fertile soil of her temperate and subtropical regions. A large portion of the population lives on the bleak Andean *altiplano* at altitudes over 10,000 feet and depends mainly on employment in the tin mines. Over half the Bolivian people are Indian. Two thirds of the population are illiterate.

Despite her great natural wealth, Bolivia is among the most backward and poverty-stricken countries in Latin America, with an annual per capita income of \$415. Over half the working force is unemployed. The Indian population has been kept in numbed destitution by generations of *conquistadores*, feudalistic *patrones*, tin barons and military strongmen.

Also, Bolivia has the dubious distinction of being the most chaotically governed republic of Latin America, a fact of life which is both an effect and one of the causes of the misery of her people. General García Meza (if indeed he is president when this appears) is the twenty-third president in 28 years.

About the most constitutionally stable years were 1952-1964, after the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria* (MNR) seized power and began a sort of Mexican-style social revolution. Victor Paz Estenssoro (1952-1956 and 1960-1964) and Hernán Siles Zuazo (1956-1960) served as president for constitutional terms. The tin mines were expropriated and began a predictable decline in production from which they have never recovered; but a sweeping agrarian reform did create a new class of numerous small proprietors and gave thousands of Indian agriculturalists a new lease on life.

Then President Paz cajoled the congress into amending the constitution so he could succeed himself in office. He was then reelected for the term 1964-1968 and promptly thrown out by Vice President General René Barrientos Ortuño, who had been put on the MNR ticket to placate the armed forces. General Barrientos turned out to be a popular and able president. He was elected constitutionally in 1966, but killed in a plane accident in 1969.

A summary of subsequent events may give the flavor of political conditions in Bolivia: (1) 1969, Barrientos was followed in office by Vice President Luis Adolfo Salinas. (2) Same year, President Salinas was thrown out of the presidency by General Alfredo Ovando Candía. (3) 1970, General Juan Torres seized power, set up a Marxist-type regime, and scared conservative military and other elements out of their wits. (4) In 1971, Torres was overthrown by General Hugo

Bánzer, who set up a right-wing dictatorship which at least provided some stability until 1978. (5) Elections of 1978 were annulled with agreement of General Juan Pereda Asbun, the victorious candidate, as being fraudulent. (6) Two days later, July 22, 1978, General Pereda overthrew General Bánzer. (7) November 24, 1978, the Army toppled Pereda because of agitation over promised elections, and installed General David Padilla Arancibia as president. (8) Elections of July 1, 1979, produced no majority for either Víctor Paz Estenssoro or Hernán Siles Zuazo. Congress could not decide, so selected Walter Guevara Arce, who was inaugurated August 8, 1979, to hold the office provisionally for one year pending elections. (9) November 1, 1979, Colonel Alberto Natusch Bush of the right wing overthrew Guevara. (10) In the face of riots, demonstrations and a general strike, Colonel Natusch resigned two weeks later. (11) November 16, Congress elected Lidia Gueiler Tejada, president of the senate, to serve provisionally for one year. (12) Elections of June 29, 1980, produced seventy-one registered parties, fifteen candidates for president (chiefly Hernán Siles Zuazo, *Unidad Democrática y Popular*, and Víctor Paz Estenssoro, *Alianza del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*, and hundreds of candidates for the two-house congress. (13) Siles Zuazo, leading coalition of leftist parties, won a plurality of 34 per cent, but (14) before the victor could take office on August 6, 1980, the armed forces overthrew President Gueiler and installed right-wing General Luis García Meza as president. Previously, when President Gueiler had tried to demote García Meza as commander in chief, he was dissuaded from overthrowing her only because she appointed his nominee to the post.

In addition to those named above, a durable party of the right is the Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB), led by Carlos Valverde Barbery. Walter Guevara Arce leads the *Partido Revolucionario Auténtico* (PRA), a *personalista* faction which split years ago from the MNR. Hugo Bánzer Suárez, the dictator from 1971 to 1978, has his own very conservative *Alianza Democrática Nacionalista* (ADN).

One important factor in current Bolivian instability is that the country is locked in a bitter struggle between conservative elements on the right and determined forces of the left, ranging from the recent Siles Zuazo coalition to the powerful Marxist mining unions led by Juan Lechin Oquendo, to say nothing of assorted parties such as the *Partido Comunista Boliviano* (PCB, pro-Soviet) and extremely violent factions whose names and composition change with kaleidoscopic rapidity.

The mines are monopolized and mismanaged by an inefficient government and the mining unions are monopolized by the Marxist left. Half or more of the population is not assimilated into the official Hispanic culture, and economic misery is the order of the day. In the view of the *Guide*, successful government in Bolivia on any U.S. or European model is absolutely impossible.

PARAGUAY

AREA: 157,047 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 2,900,000.

PRESIDENT: Alfredo Stroessner, military, first took office 1954; inaugurated August 15, 1978, for a sixth five-year term.

Paraguay suffers from some of the worst afflictions of underdevelopment to be found in Latin America. Modern capitalism is virtually unknown. The population is overwhelmingly a homogenized *mestizo* blend of European and guaraní Indian. Though Spanish is the official language, the guaraní tongue is heard everywhere. Despite the grim economic conditions of the republic, Paraguayans have a reputation for a national pride not equaled in many other parts of Latin America. There are landscapes of pastoral beauty, there is a rich and unusual guaraní culture, and untapped resources include iron, oil, and vast stands of timber. The regime is collaborating with Brazil on development of a hydroelectric complex on the Paraná River which is designed to electrify the entire republic. Other projects are underway to raise educational levels and build much needed roads.

Political history is characterized by long periods of dictatorship punctuated from time to time by stimulating outbreaks of rebellion. Notable early dictators were (1) the austere and cruel Dr. José Gaspar Rodríguez Francia, 1813-1840, who made Paraguay a virtual prison, (2) Carlos Antonio López, 1844-1862, who was relatively humane and progressive for his times and place, and (3) Francisco Solano López, 1862-1870, sadistic son of Carlos Antonio, who involved his country in the War of the Triple Alliance against Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay (1865-1870). It is reported that the war reduced the population from 525,000 to 221,000, of whom only 28,746 were males.

After a military coup on May 5, 1954, General Alfredo Stroessner was elected to the presidency as the only candidate. Subsequently, he was reelected in 1958 and every five years thereafter. Now, Stroessner's son Gustavo is emerging on the scene as a possible successor.

Partido Colorado is a traditional party which dates from the 1870s and is the official party of the regime. *Partido Liberal Unido* combines the old *Partido Liberal* and *Partido Liberal Radical*, is more or less tolerated, and has a few seats in the congress. Other parties, mostly in exile or existing primarily on paper, are the *Revolucionario Febrerista* (Revolutionary February), *Demócrata Cristiano*, *Movimiento Popular Colorado* and *Liberal Radical Auténtico*.

Under the 1967 Constitution the congress consists of two houses, a 30-member senate and a 60-member chamber of deputies, but was previously unicameral. Much of the constitutional system is quite overtly authoritarian in tone.

BRAZIL

AREA: 3,286,470 sq. mi.

POPULATION: 120,000,000.

PRESIDENT: João Baptista Figueiredo, military, took office March 15, 1979, for a five-year term.

In the Western Hemisphere, Brazil is the third largest country in area (slightly behind the United States and Canada) and the second in population. In much of her territory the country is a beautiful land of irregular rolling hills, winding rivers and green forests. At least two thirds of Brazil is a semi-temperate or subtropical plateau region, suitable for settlement and development. Yet, though the nation has great mineral and agricultural resources, she is plagued by poverty, inflation, underdeveloped health standards, monopolistic or chaotic land ownership patterns, and indecision regarding her basic political institutions. Recent governments are attempting to overcome inadequate communications by criss-crossing the country with highways. Illiteracy afflicts at least a third of the Brazilian population.

It is important that Brazil is not Spanish. Her heritage is Portuguese and African and she has a reputation (tarnished since 1964) for being rather more relaxed than her neighbors. Brazil's political history is marked by periods of apparent quietude and constitutional order in an atmosphere of elitist quasi-democracy, punctuated by episodes of disturbance and profound constitutional change.

Prior to the present period of military rule, Brazilian political history included the following: (1) Constitutional monarchy under Pedro I and the great Pedro II, 1822-1889, (2) republican form, managed by ruling patronal elements within constitutional formalities, 1889-1930, (3) revolution and dictatorship in populist-fascist style by Getúlio Vargas, 1930-1945, (4) resumption of the democratic style, 1945-1964. During the latter period, Vargas returned to power as an ineffective constitutional president in 1950 and committed suicide in 1954; and President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) began construction of Brasília, the new interior capital. The sudden and irresponsible resignation of President Jânio Quadros, August 25, 1961, brought Vice President João Goulart, follower and admirer of Vargas, into the presidency. Thereafter, in an atmosphere of monumental corruption and infiltration by significant numbers of revolutionary Marxist elements, Goulart moved steadily toward a left-wing version of a Vargas-style demagogic dictatorship.

The present epoch of military rule began with a lightning revolt which drove Goulart from office on April 1, 1964, and placed commanders of the Brazilian armed forces in power. The new government ruled through a series of *atos institucionais* and *atos complementares* which effectively altered the constitutional order. The sixth constitution of Brazil, a highly authoritarian document, was approved by a puppet congress and promulgated January 24, 1967, but has already been amended extensively.

The Brazilian armed forces did not even follow their own constitutional precepts in selection of their first three presidents (General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, 1964-1967; General Artur da Costa e Silva, 1967-1969; a military junta after death of Costa e Silva, 1969; and General Emílio Garrastazú Médici (1969-1974). However, a constitutionally established electoral college composed of congressmen plus delegates selected by state legislatures did select General Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) and incumbent president, General João Baptista Figueiredo.

The present constitution, which like its predecessor of 1946 is extremely detailed and complex, provides for a very strong presidency. Both in fact and in constitutional essence, the government is carried on by presidential dictatorship. The Chamber of Deputies (apportioned by population) and the Senate (three from each of the 22 states) are mere shadows of their former voluble and irresponsible selves. Though Brazil is constitutionally "federal" and though regionalism and distances do impose some distinctions among the various parts, the realities of politics combine with the content of a centralizing constitution to make most of the states into appendages of the central government.

Parties and the party system change with each new constitutional transformation. Parties active before 1964 have disappeared. From then until recently, the military party was called *Aliança Renovadora Nacional* (National Renovating Alliance, ARENA) and the officially tolerated opposition, *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (MDB); but in congressional elections of November 15, 1979, MDB got over half the votes. On October 18, 1979, President Figueiredo submitted a party reform bill to congress. The proposed law provided for extinction of the current parties and registration of new ones only if they could (1) obtain support of six senators and forty-two deputies or win 5 per cent of votes for the Chamber of Deputies in 1982, with (2) a minimum of 3 per cent of the votes in each of nine states. After passage of the bill the parties would have eight months to become organized, but at time of preparation of the *Guide* their configurations are unknown.

Also by 1982, present indirect elections at all municipal, state and federal levels except the presidency are to become popular and direct.

Until now, the military presidents have talked about resumption of more democratic processes and then at times of confrontation with the congress or in the face of strong public opposition they have reverted to authoritarian practices by shutting down the Congress or undertaking violent repressive measures. However, it now appears that President Figueiredo means what he says about an early return to "democratic normalcy". Just before the beginning of his term, and apparently with his approval, the congress passed a constitutional amendment which diluted presidential authority. Though the press must use discretion, official censorship has ended. Numbers of illegal

arrests and reports of torture are much diminished. Bands of off-duty police (the Death Squadron) no longer make it a regular practice to wipe out real or alleged leftists.

This partial return to more merciful practices may be explained in part by the fact that terrorists have been pretty successfully eliminated. Troublesome former leaders have been silenced by removal of their political rights, or have gone into exile (Leonel Brizola in Lisbon, Luis Carlos Prestes in Moscow), or have died, or are becoming too old to cause much trouble for the regime.

Governments since 1964 have undertaken programs for the improvement of the economy, though these have been subject to the criticism that they benefited only a small minority. Measures encourage individual investment both domestic and foreign, and attempt to free the economy of controls and subsidies. One purpose is to increase production and restrict the explosion of currency arising from excessive governmental intervention. For a time, runaway inflation exceeding 150 per cent annually under the ham-handed Goulart government, was reduced to about 15 per cent, but has now shot up again to at least 40 per cent annually. For various reasons related to a relaxation of governmental self-discipline, world economic dislocation, and the price of oil, the boom which followed the 1964 revolution seems now to have dissipated.

As a consequence of (1) trade and assistance pacts with her many surrounding neighbors, (2) agreements with Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay for development of a hydroelectric complex on the Paraná River, (3) construction of an east-west trans-Amazon highway plus another from Manaus to Venezuela, and (4) a vigorous foreign policy, Brazil is becoming a dominant power in South America. In the Latin American context, the present Brazilian semi-constitutional, semi-dictatorial system seems to steer a course somewhere between the extremes of chaotic anarchy and brutish tyranny, and with modifications may provide a sort of model for those countries whose socio-political foundations are not prepared for more sophisticated democracy.



LATIN AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Relations with the United States. Periods of U.S.-Latin American relations have been of three different types, and a fourth is now emerging:

1. The most well known periods have been those that are typical of relations between very powerful national states and their weaker neighbors. There were diplomatic interventions and military occupations, exaggerated support for investment interests, undue chumminess with hated tyrants, and seizures of territory by aggression (Mexico, 1846-1848; Puerto Rico, 1898). U.S. interventionism reached its peak from 1898 to 1934, with the Spanish-American War (1898), the Panama episode (1903), military occupation of Cuba (1898-1902, 1906-1909, and intermittently to 1922), Nicaragua (1912-1933), Haiti (1915-1934) and the Dominican Republic (1916-1924); as well as incursions into Mexico under direction of the morally inspired President Woodrow Wilson (1914-1917). In response to real or alleged Communist-bloc threats, active U.S. intervention or quasi-intervention has also appeared in more recent years (Guatemala, 1954; Bay of Pigs, 1961; Dominican Republic, 1965).

2. There have been periods during which the United States has stressed respect, forbearance and friendship in her relations with Latin America. For example, there was the epoch of Latin American independence and enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, 1810-1823. The Monroe Doctrine (1823) was designed to preserve the national security of the United States from European encroachment in the hemisphere and the independence of the new Latin American countries from the same danger, but later its concepts were "extended" or twisted to justify U.S. expansion (1848, 1898) or interventionism (1898-1934). Another such period was that of the Good Neighbor Policy, 1933-1945. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles combined idealism with alarm over Axis aggression to inaugurate this epoch of good feeling. The policy was inexpensive and effective. It emphasized mutual respect, Latin American self-determination, and non-intervention in Latin American internal affairs. In the view of the *Guide*, it was the most successful hemispheric policy ever undertaken by the United States.

A recent epoch of active U.S. friendship toward Latin America was that of the Alliance for Progress. The idea was first proposed by President Juscelino Kubitschek of Brazil, who suggested in 1958 that an Operation Pan America might be established to funnel funds into the social and economic regeneration of Latin America. Under the inspiration of President John F. Kennedy, a conference at Punta del Este, Uruguay, August 17, 1961, gave the project the name, Alliance for Progress. Countries of the hemisphere (U.S., 20 per cent; Latin America, 80) were to provide \$100 billion over the decade beginning in 1961, to be made available to those republics that provided national

programs for education, housing, land reform, taxation and fiscal improvement, economic integration and inflationary controls. The Alliance was supposed to induce peaceful social change and reform, and also to strengthen democracy in Latin America. In reality, it accomplished none of these objectives, and indeed Latin America suffered a retrogression on all those fronts. The Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress was abolished in July, 1974.

3. There have been times when the United States has seemed to be unaware of the existence of Latin America. This occurred between the U.S. Civil War and opening of the First International Conference of American States in 1889, and during the years just after World War II. During the Nixon-Ford administrations (1969-1977) stress was placed on a "low profile" or "less visibility" for the United States in Latin America. Usually this has simply meant inattention. Considering the former strident U.S. presence in Latin America, much can be said for this; but on the other hand, it smacks of neglect and disdain, which many proud Latin American leaders can hardly brook.

4. More recently, the United States seems to have descended into policies which cannot be easily defined, but which alternate periods of weakness and neglect (e.g., unchallenged Soviet role in Cuba and Cuban activities in the Caribbean and Nicaragua; relinquishment of the Panama Canal; more attention to Europe and Asia than to Latin America) with intermissions of fury and applications of economic or diplomatic sanctions because Latin American attention to human rights, internal political practices or fiscal probity do not correspond closely enough with our own precepts. While rejection of outrageous brutality can be easily justified in the light of certain minimal world standards, such U.S. reactions seem to many Latin Americans to display a sort of combination of cultural imperialism with ethnocentric ignorance of internal Latin American elements which spawn the conditions we try to punish. Latin Americans are likely to be schizophrenic about evidence of U.S. weakness. They resent U.S. intrusions of the past and seem generally pleased that the U.S. is withdrawing from the Panama Canal; but weakness is definitely not admired in Latin America. A show of strength, as for example against Soviet intrusion into the western hemisphere, might meet with as much admiration as admonition.

Latin American Foreign Policies. Though during the nineteenth century European powers such as Britain, Spain and France intruded into the affairs of nations all over Latin America, and though today the U.S.S.R. is the master of Cuba and Cuba exercises an important influence over Nicaragua and Caribbean islands such as Grenada and Jamaica, and though both the Soviet Union and Cuba help to foment terrorism and social destruction in many parts of Latin America, most Latin American foreign policy constitutes a reflexive reaction to past U.S. interventionism. During 1846-1848 and from 1898 to almost the present day, U.S. diplomatic, economic and often military intrusion into northern Latin America was a persistent pheno-

menon which the Hispanic republics either cannot or do not want to forget. Not much of this sort of thing occurred in South America, but as fraternal republics they are acutely sensitive to the history of U.S. interventionism. The memories of these events might normally fade away with time; but extremist nationalistic leaders seeking political advantage from xenophobia, as well as elements of the left inspired by the "anti-imperialist" slogans of the U.S.S.R. and Cuba, will do all in their power to keep the bitter memory alive far beyond the time when it should have expired.

Consequently, certain elements are in one degree or another common to the foreign policies of the Latin American countries:

1. *Self-determination and non-intervention.* Most of the republics stress self-determination and non-intervention to the point of obsessed fanaticism. Inter-American pacts, including the OAS Charter and many others, make repetitious reference to Latin American rejection of intervention. To the Latin American, "non-intervention" means, specifically, non-intervention by the United States. It is only quite recently that some leaders have demonstrated comprehension that intervention might also come from other quarters and in subtle forms unlike the landing of the U.S. Marines. This is occurring in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, where it seems to some to be a form of intervention when Soviet-Cuban-inspired terrorists, some of them trained and armed by Cuba, threaten to tear apart the fabric of their societies. When Fidel Castro proclaims repeatedly that Cuba has never abandoned its revolutionary activities throughout the hemisphere and has no intention of doing so, there are other Latin Americans who see this as a form of interference in their internal affairs. Such clarity is by no means common throughout Latin America, and it is U.S. intrusion that they most vehemently reject.

2. *Nationalism.* As in many developing nations, those of Latin America are heavily imbued with large doses of nationalism. Strong feelings of *mexicanismo*, *panameñismo*, *bolivianismo*, *ecuatorianismo*, and so on, provide credos to substitute for present distresses and memories of past humiliations. Cultured elites of Europe, Canada or the United States might scorn the symbols and strident slogans of nationalism; but nationalism is a very real and meaningful doctrine in the developing countries, including those of Latin America. In Nicaragua, for example, a strident and vitriolic nationalism combines with bitter hatred against the United States to maintain support for a regime that might otherwise be desperate for public support.

3. *Nationalization.* In their zeal to eject all vestiges of foreign interposition, several Latin American republics have undertaken nationalization or governmental expropriation of resources and industries held by elements from abroad, especially the United States. Nationalization replaces the foreign owner with government monopoly but does not usually distribute ownership among native proprietors, and may in fact result in a worse condition for the nation; but

nationalization has strong emotional roots of self-realization, and cannot be discussed on rational grounds of economic benefit or loss. No matter how badly governments might mismanage industrial monopolies in Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Mexico or Venezuela, it would be unthinkable that they would ever again be run by foreigners.

4. *Recognition.* Though sometimes inclined to withhold recognition from especially loathsome tyrannies, most Latin American republics follow variants of the Estrada doctrine (from the Mexican foreign minister, Género Estrada, 1930), which insists that recognition or non-recognition not be used as a device to bring internal pressure to change the policies or forms of Latin American regimes. This is essentially the same as the old Jeffersonian *de facto* policy of recognition, which simply noted existence of governments whether we liked them or not, and served the United States quite well for over a century.

5. *Peaceful settlement.* Latin American nations have little force upon which they can rely. Their economies and budgets are so fragile that the few wars in which they have engaged (notably, Paraguayan War, 1864-1870; War of the Pacific, 1879-1883; Gran Chaco War, 1932-1935; El Salvador-Honduras War, July 1969) have almost wiped out all their budgets and armed forces. Hence, they put great store by the strengthening of international law and the devising of instrumentalities for peaceful settlement. However, because the United States has occasionally used the Organization of American States for promotion of its own interests (e.g., Dominican Republic, 1965), the present mood of the Latin American republics is to transform the OAS into a socio-economic organization to channel financial assistance from north to south.

NOTE ON SOURCES

Information in the *Guide* is drawn from numerous sources, including especially newspapers and news journals. Data are checked with almanacs, statistical reports, encyclopedias, atlases and the like.

Certain publications which the *Guide* especially utilizes include the biweekly *Times of the Americas*, an excellent source which we recommend to everyone; the Mexican weekly *Tiempo*; and the Nicaraguan daily *La Prensa*. We have also drawn material from the *Miami Herald*, the daily *Nación* of Costa Rica, the splendid monthly *Opiniones* of Coral Gables, Florida, as well as from other publications too numerous and too infrequently consulted to mention here. In many instances the author draws from his own observations over many years in Latin America.

The author is much indebted both to the sources mentioned and to many others to which he does not make specific reference above. However, where there are errors, it is the author, and the author alone, who is at fault.

— J.L.B.