


# LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL GUIDE

James L. Busey

\$2.00

Fifteenth Edition

The Guide summarizes the environment of politics, recent political history, political movements and leaders, structures and processes of government, and leading political problems, in the twenty republics of Latin America. There is a section on the international relations of Latin America, including relations with the United States and Communist blocs, Latin American foreign policies, the Organization of American States and inter-Latin American relations.



The Guide is designed to keep the student and general reader informed on current political developments and issues in all the republics of Latin America. It is used in courses in political science, history, and Latin American affairs.

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
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by

**James L. Busey**

University of Colorado  
Colorado Springs

**Fifteenth Edition**



**Manitou Springs, Colorado**

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## LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL SUMMARY

The Guide has long contended that it is important whether or not Latin America makes progress toward the achievement of viable constitutional democracy. We do not hold to the view that such democracy conduces inevitably to perfect prosperity and happiness for everyone; but do contend that popular constitutional government emerges out of precisely the same combinations of favorable socio-economic conditions that also promote the material and cultural advancement of populations. Conversely, episodes of imposition of authoritarian force, suppression of public debate and minority opinion, or meaningful political contest, are often accompanied by a corresponding decline in standards of living and material opportunity, and deterioration in the norms of education and civilized behavior. Also, experience in dictatorship and the loss of practice in the arts of democratic constitutional government may well prepare a people for forms of tyranny which offer nothing in the way of economic or social amelioration.

We argue that socio-economic and political structure and process are all of the same piece, and only divided artificially by scholars for ease in conducting their investigations. In real life they are not actually separated into neatly divided categories. Democracy is both cause and effect of the success of socio-economic achievement; and socio-economic achievement is both cause and effect of the accomplishment of viable democracy. Therefore, we contend that the achievement of functional constitutional democracy is a sign of the maturation of a polity in the direction of material and cultural opportunity for the largest possible numbers of people.

What do we mean by democracy? We are aware that there are scholars who contend that because the word is used variously according to political predilections of moment or place, scholarship cannot produce a definition of it. Whatever might be the various popular or ideological usages of the term, the Guide contends that the idea of democracy has evolved in the western world for over two thousand years and that we of the West, where the word first originated, should have some foggy idea about its meaning; that a word so primordial to political science should not beg for a definition. At least, the Guide knows that when it uses the word democracy, it means the following:

A social-political condition where the maximum possible numbers of people enjoy (1) individual rights and freedom of choice, (2) security under the rule of law, and (3) meaningful participation in decision-making, during the maximum possible time.

To use the ancient Greek term, a tyranny would be a regime

wherein the above elements are lacking, and where one or a very few self-chosen individuals impose their will as the totality of the decision-making process. By the arbitrary criteria established by the Guide, at least a decade of democratic stability must pass before we can place a country in the "relatively stable democracies" category. Measured by our definition, and in the full expectation that many individuals will quite rightfully complain about features of our paradigm, this edition of the Guide would range the Latin American republics in about the following order, from the most to the least democratic:

1. Relatively stable democracies (Costa Rica, Venezuela, Chile) .....	3
2. Democratic, with some authoritarian features (Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, El Salvador) .....	5
3. Authoritarian, with some democratic features (Dominican Republic, Brazil, Argentina) .....	3
4. Tyrannical or highly authoritarian (Nicaragua, Paraguay, Ecuador, Peru, Honduras, Bolivia, Panama, Haiti, Cuba) .....	9
	<hr/> 20

Costa Rica remains steadfastly in the first category, and today may be regarded as the most successful functioning democracy in Latin America. After ten years of democratic development, Venezuela joined our first category in 1969. Chile, while undergoing severe threats to the stability of her institutions of civil democracy, has not clearly violated the strictures of our definition, and so remains where she has been since long before the Guide began publication.

We place Mexico in the second category because it provides certain noted freedoms but not the reality of meaningful political contest; Colombia, because the *alternación-paridad* formula which is to prevail until next year closes the political system to completely free popular choice; Guatemala, because its system, while including much political contest and free expression of opinion, has not been sufficiently tested to prove its durability; and El Salvador for the same reasons as Mexico. We are saddened that the specter of military imposition forces us to drop Uruguay from her long-standing place among the more fully developed democracies, and we hope that future events will prove our judgment to be wrong.

There is too much authoritarianism and continuismo in the Dominican Republic to permit us to place it any higher than the third category on our spectrum. We place Brazil there instead of in No. 4 because there is an opposition, the MDB, which does function in the Congress and in its committees, and does have a voice, anemic though that voice might be. We only


move **Argentina** up from the tyrannical category because she has at least held a free national election, whatever the ultimate outcome of that test is going to be.

A decade ago, in its seventh edition, the Guide listed four countries (Cuba, Haiti, Paraguay, Nicaragua) as being in the "tyrannical" class. Now there are nine, which according to the judgments we rendered in our introduction to this summary, bode ill for the prospects of maturation in Latin America. It may be that responsible authoritarianism might help to lift the people of **Peru** out of their morass of poverty and ignorance, and the same could be said about **Brazil**. In another, **Panama**, tyranny prevails despite the maintenance of a certain modicum of material and cultural welfare, and these latter elements may ultimately contribute to the reestablishment of democratic norms. For the other seven countries that we place in the "tyrannical" category, the Guide offers no hope for an amelioration of their depressing social, economic, or political conditions.

The Guide has said before, and repeats again, that the evidence is overwhelming that possession of rich resources, favorable climate, optimum population density, fine soil, and the like, are quite irrelevant either to the improvement of material condition or the development of the institutions of secure popular government. If it were otherwise, Bolivia would not be one of the poorest and worst governed countries on earth and Iceland one of the most prosperous and democratic.

Rather, it seems clear that the requisites for development of Latin American constitutional democracy as well as solution of her pressing social and economic problems include (1) education of populations and leaders with resultant appearance of a larger number of responsible, socially conscious leaders, (2) land distribution and rational taxation of all land values, combined with removal of fiscal burdens from productive labor and capital, with consequent emergence of a large middle class of independent proprietors, and (3) economic, ethnic, and geographic integration, by means both of programs of education and development of networks of highways, railroads, and air routes to touch every city, town, and village of the various republics.

Some of the elements that Latin America does not need are (1) foreign subversion by ideological appeal or violence, (2) irresponsible demagoguery whose baneful effects endure for years afterwards, (3) myopic reactionary resistance to reform, (4) personalist factionalism, (5) more monopolization of economies by either inept bureaucracies or domestic or foreign trusts, (6) ignorance and incompetence in high office, and (7) more systems of proportional representation which fragment political parties and paralyze effective democratic government.



## MEXICO

Area: 760,000 sq. mi.

Population: 52,000,000.

President: Luis Echeverría Alvarez, civilian, took office December 1, 1970, for a six-year term.

In territorial size, Mexico is the fifth country of the hemisphere, being exceeded by Canada, the United States, Brazil, and Argentina; and she is third in population, behind only the United States and Brazil. Like most large nations, Mexico possesses poor, dry soil as well as productive lands, with most of the latter being found on her volcanic central plateau. Her mineral resources are plentiful, especially in silver, gold, copper, lead, zinc, molybdenum, coal and numerous others. She is a heavy producer of oil and natural gas.

Most of Mexico's 52 million people, who are largely mestizo with important numbers of Indians and fewer of unmixed European descent, live in the central and southern highlands of the country. Because of her exotic Indian cultures, many U. S. travellers consider Mexico to be among the most "foreign" of Latin American countries.

Mexico is divided by her precipitous geography and by ethnic variety. However, most parts of the republic are increasingly linked by a network of highways and railroads as well as by airlines. Mexico relies heavily on her nationalized railroads for the carrying of both freight and passengers. In contrast to the United States, which despite Amtrak seems about to become the only civilized country on earth without adequate passenger service by rail, Mexico is served by a close-knit and tolerable railroad passenger service.

By way of ethnic integration, governments since the Revolution of 1910-1917 have succeeded notably in bringing the Indian into meaningful contact with Mexican national life.

With overthrow of Dictator Porfirio Díaz in 1911, it was hoped that a long era of chaos (most of 1822-1867) and tyranny (1876-1911) had finally terminated. But Francisco Madero, the revolutionary president, was assassinated in 1913 and it was not until 1917 that a new constitution was adopted and some semblance of order was introduced into Mexican political life. The aims of the Revolution, as expressed in the Constitution of 1917, were effective suffrage, no re-election, thorough social reform, anti-clericalism, and mass education.

Since 1920, Mexico has gone through the formalities of electing her presidents in an increasingly orderly manner, though with no hope for opposition candidates. The administration of

Lázaro Cárdenas stressed agrarian reform, nationalization of oil resources, betterment of working conditions and bargaining powers of working people, and an educational program designed to lift Mexico out of illiteracy. Other presidents (Adolfo López Mateos, 1958-1964; Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, 1964-1970; and the current Luis Echeverría Alvarez) have undertaken to continue various aspects of the same program with varying degrees of vigor; while others (Manuel Avila Camacho, 1940-1946; Miguel Alemán, 1946-1952; and Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, 1952-1958) have carried on more conservative programs.

According to the Constitution of 1917, Mexico is divided into 29 states, two territories (Baja California Sur and Quintana Roo) and one Federal District, which includes the city of Mexico. The facts are that, both constitutionally and politically, the states are much dominated by the national government and official party, and that political autonomy of the states and municipalities is mostly a figment of constitutional mythology. The president, who is made doubly powerful by (1) a lavish assignment of constitutional powers and (2) his control over the all-pervasive official party, serves for a six-year period or *sexenio*. This pattern of regular succession has been followed since 1934, with each new president running the party and the government pretty much according to his predilections.

Mexican political parties include one dominant official party and some small ineffective "opposition" parties.

**Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)** is organized around popular, labor and agrarian sectors which include, at least potentially, virtually the entire working population of the country. PRI shifts its own people in and out of the presidency, the governorships, and almost all other elective posts. The PRI is inextricably intermixed with all levels of government. Political rallies and demonstrations for the PRI and its candidates are highly fabricated affairs which are as much organized and sustained by governmental assistance as by work of the party.

**Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana (PARM)** is a tiny organization of old revolutionaries which is hardly distinguishable from the PRI and endorses PRI candidates in all elections.

**Partido Acción Nacional (PAN)** is a conservative and leading opposition party which does function, offers candidates, and is of some importance around the country.

**Partido Popular Socialista (PPS)** is a pro-Communist party founded twenty-five years ago by Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who died in 1968. It originated as a faction that split from the **Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM)**. PPS has a large enough

membership (some 75,000) to permit it to participate in political elections; but PCM and other Communist factions and sub-factions too small to be worth mentioning do not qualify for electoral activity. PPS has not put forward its own presidential candidate since 1952, and endorses the PRI candidate in each election.

In Mexico, no candidate in opposition to a regime in power has ever come to office by election. In the presidential election of 1970, Luis Echeverría Álvarez was endorsed by PRI, PPS and PARM, and won over 85 per cent of the votes, with almost 14 per cent going to Efraín González Martín, candidate of the PAN. PAN usually elects from none to six deputies from the constituencies to Congress and holds some seats in municipal *ayuntamientos* (councils) as well as some rare mayorships but almost no other offices. At present, PPS holds the mayorship of the important port city of Tampico, and scattered minor offices elsewhere in the country. Occasionally one or two PAN or PPS members may be found in the small state legislatures. Aside from the Chamber of Deputies, whose unusual composition we will explain below, all other elected offices, including especially all the state governorships, are controlled by the PRI.

There is official awareness of the need for democratization (but not too much) of the Congress. Under constitutional reforms of 1963 and 1972, the Chamber of Deputies adds opposition members (*diputados de partido*) over and above those elected from the constituencies in the regular manner (*diputados por mayoría*). Opposition parties are assigned up to 25 seats each at the rate of five for each 1.5 per cent of the total national vote they secure. At present, the Chamber does not have any *diputados por mayoría* from the minor parties. Consequent to addition of *diputados de partido*, its current membership is as follows: PRI, 178; PAN, 20; PSP, 10, and PARM, 5. However, membership of the 60-member Senate (2 from each state and Federal District) is 100 per cent PRI, and debates are never marred by rancorous disputation.

Though most of the big daily newspapers follow an uncritical line relative to the policies of the government, freedom of speech and press does exist in Mexico. Opposition parties publish and broadcast, and the government now provides free time for all parties on radio and TV. In Mexico, the availability of very attractive, illustrated popular journals with a wide variety of news and opinions, is wider than in the United States. Book publishing flourishes, and surprisingly large and well stocked bookstores are to be found in many medium sized cities whose

counterparts in the United States would be likely not to have any such bookstores at all.

Improvements are definitely occurring in many aspects of Mexican life. There are schools all over the country. Though their physical facilities are simple, they are turning out a generation of alert and very literate young people. The conditions of most of the cities, including especially Mexico City and the state capitals, have improved vastly, and many of them are more secure and more beautiful than most U. S. cities of the same size. Mexican people today are better educated, better fed, and better clothed than ever before. Public transportation, including availability of bus and rail facilities, and the remarkable underground metro of Mexico City, surpass standards in the United States. Continuing problems include failure to establish visible norms of sanitation in rural Mexico or to mitigate the intense poverty that still prevails in many areas.

Government programs since the Revolution have stressed state intervention in the economy, nationalization of petroleum and utilities industries, a large admixture of Mexican with foreign investment in private industry, and agrarian reform including distribution of lands of former great haciendas among private holders and especially among officially sponsored, co-operative *ejido* units.

Chinks are developing in the more or less constitutional order that has prevailed in Mexico during the past several decades. Since 1967 there have been increasingly violent student and other demonstrations, with violent confrontations on the campuses of the National Autonomous University in Mexico City and several of the state universities. Some guerrilla activity and terrorism have appeared, especially in the state of Guerrero, whose other claim to fame is possession of the Pacific resort city of Acapulco, where the excesses of luxury meet the excesses of devastating misery. Thus far, the authorities have been able to keep most such outbreaks under control or at least under sufficient wraps so they do not threaten the stability of the interminable *continuismo* of the PRI. Interminable or not, the Mexican combination of authoritarianism and freedom seems to be particularly relevant to the historic experiences and democratic aspirations of Latin American people.





## GUATEMALA

Area: 42,050 sq. mi.

Population: 5,200,000.

President: Carlos Arana Osorio, military, took office July 1, 1970, for a four-year term.

The most thickly populated part of Guatemala is precipitous, volcanic, and beautiful. Many isolated Indian communities retain much of their original cultures. Though the population is overwhelmingly Indian, the Indians play but small part in Guatemalan politics. Rural *ladino* (non-Indian) land owners, military officers and middle-class urban elements dominate political activity.

Until quite recently, the political history of Guatemala has been characterized by long periods of heavy-handed dictatorship punctuated from time to time by shorter intervals of chaotic "democracy". The last long-term dictator was Jorge Ubico (1931-1944), a reactionary tyrant of the "public works" type. During 1944-1954, Guatemala was ruled by the increasingly radical regimes of Juan José Arévalo (1945-1951) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951-1954). In June, 1954, the Arbenz government was overthrown by Guatemalans under leadership of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who enjoyed some help from the United States, but whose revolution succeeded because the Guatemalan army refused to support the pro-Communist regime of Jacobo Arbenz. The period from 1957 to 1966 was marked by considerable political confusion, wherein the longest constitutional term was enjoyed by President Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes (1958-1963), ultimately overthrown near the end of his term.

President Arana has the distinction of being the only president of Guatemala to receive his office peacefully from a freely elected predecessor of a different party. President Julio César Méndez Montenegro (1966-1970), a civilian, was only the third constitutional president in Guatemalan history to complete his allotted term, the previous ones having been Manuel Lisandro Barillas, military (1886-1892) and Juan José Arévalo, civilian (1945-1951).

Guatemalan parties play an increasingly effective role in the political process.

**Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN)** is the party of President Arana, and was formed in 1954 around the person of Castillo Armas. It is conservative, moderately democratic, and vigorously anti-communist.

**Partido Institucional Democrático (PID)** represents a conservative-military point of view, supported the Arana candidacy in the last elections, and was founded originally around a military junta which ruled from 1963 to 1966. Since 1970 an MLN-PIR alliance (called *Coalición Nacional Anticomunista*) has put forward candidates for Congress and presidency, and it appears that General Eugenio Kjel Lauguerud will be the MLN-PIR candidate for elections of March, 1974.

**Partido Revolucionario (PR)** is democratic-reformist and has been led by civilian liberals since the days of Juan José Arévalo. President Méndez Montenegro was of PR. At this writing, PR is badly split by factionalism.

**Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC)**, also called *Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca*, is a conservative type of Christian Democratic party. Like PR, PDC is currently torn by factionalism and unable to agree on a 1974 candidate. There is talk about formation of a *Frente Unido Revolucionario*, to put forward the candidacy of Manuel Colom Argueta, presently alcalde (mayor) of Guatemala City.

**Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo** (Guatemalan Labor Party, PGT) is an illegal, pro-Soviet type of communist party which functioned openly during the Arbenz regime. A unit within the party is called *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias*, but PGT policy does not call for extreme acts of terrorism.

**Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR)** and **Movimiento Revolucionario Trece de Noviembre** (Revolutionary November 13 Movement; MR-13) are two dangerous terrorist organizations that take care of interests of certain Communist-bloc countries, particularly Cuba and its Maoist-type approach to world affairs, and collaborate with each other on occasion. The fortunes of MR-13 have declined since its leader, Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, was killed in 1970.

During the years since 1954, violence in Guatemala has taken on horrendous proportions, with extremists of both the left and the right (the latter including a socially unconscious group called the *White Hand*) responsible for widespread killings and kidnappings. It is reported that during 1971, 959 individuals were killed and 365 were either kidnaped or simply disappeared. Since that year, the Arana government achieved some diminution in the wanton violence that has afflicted the republic.

Since becoming president, Arana has combined a no-quarter campaign against terrorism with a surprising program of social reform which includes grants of credit, technical assistance and land to Indians, multiplication of schools, and nationalization of certain foreign-owned firms such as the 60-year-old Central American Power Company.

## EL SALVADOR

Area: 8,260 sq mi.

Population: 3,600,000.

President: Arturo Armando Molina, military, took office July 1, 1972, for a five-year term.

In territorial size, El Salvador is the smallest country in Latin America. She is also the second most crowded (436 persons per square mile), being exceeded in this respect only by Haiti (470). Material and cultural levels are low, and illiteracy afflicts at least 50 per cent of the population; but despite an almost utter lack of non-agricultural resources, the economic and social problems of the country are no more severe than those of less thickly populated and much better endowed neighbors. Under prodding by recent programs of land reform, electrification, educational improvement and industrialization, some betterment of social conditions is occurring. By Central American standards, both highway and railroad links are well developed. Unfortunately, the brief but costly war with Honduras (July, 1969) had a very adverse effect on the economy.

Traditionally a few families have owned most of the national territory and have combined with military elements to dominate the political scene. Until about 1950 much of Salvadoran politics was characterized by alternating periods of military authoritarianism and revolution, with some exceptional civilian dictatorships under control of the wealthiest families. From 1931 to 1944 the country was ruled by the harsh and bizarre dictatorship of General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, who combined the arts of political repression with those of theosophy and witchcraft.

During the past quarter century, Salvadoran politics have become somewhat more stabilized in a pattern of quasi-democracy under guidance of military presidents who are dedicated to programs of moderate social reform. The present epoch began when a *golpe* (coup) brought Presidents Oscar Osorio (1950-1956) and José María Lemus (1956-1960) successively into power. In 1960, a bloodless coup overthrew the Lemus regime. After promulgation of a new, socially oriented constitution, elections of 1962 brought Lt. Col. Julio A. Rivera into power; and the cycle began over again. President Rivera undertook vigorous social and political reforms which seemed to promise a new era for El Salvador. Elections of March 5, 1967, secured victory for the official candidate, Colonel Fidel Sánchez Hernández, and the reformist program continued,

though in a more relaxed manner than under President Rivera. On February 25, 1972, Col. Arturo Armando Molina of the official party won presidential elections in a very close race.

Despite continued occupancy of the presidency by the official party, since 1962 El Salvador has been treated to an unaccustomed amount of democratization and party contest, both in elections and in the one-house National Assembly.

**Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN)** has been the official military-governmental party since 1962 and now holds 38 seats in the 52-member National Assembly. PCN carries on a socially conscious program of reform which it inherited from the preceding military regimes of 1950-1960, and has in addition permitted and even encouraged considerable political democratization.

**Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC)** is the second party of El Salvador, and during 1968-1970 even held a small margin in the National Assembly. PDC is Christian Democrat and reformist. Its presidential candidate, who very nearly won the 1972 elections with 324,756 votes to 334,600 for Colonel Molina, was Napoleón Duarte, three times mayor of the capital city of San Salvador. Officially, Duarte ran as candidate of the Unión Nacional de Oposición, which included PDC and two much smaller parties. PDC presently holds seven seats in the National Assembly.

**Partido Popular Salvadoreño** is rightist and nationalist and holds six seats in the Salvadoran national legislature. A **Frente Independiente Democrático**, a **personalista** group which put forward candidacy of General José Alberto Medrano in the last elections, has one legislative seat.

The **Partido Comunista de El Salvador (PCES)** has been illegal for over forty years, functions covertly, and follows a strictly pro-Soviet line. Its membership is microscopic, as is support for tiny groups of **fidelistas** terrorists. In El Salvador, most efforts at promoting left-wing violence have not enjoyed popular support and the government has suppressed them without difficulty.

In March, 1972, a revolt which had tacit support of elements that had lost the election marred El Salvador's progress toward political stability and democratization. Despite this momentary reverse, and the failure of any opposition candidate to win the presidency to this date, the Guide is pleased to report that the country is moving somewhat closer to the democratic end of the political spectrum.



## HONDURAS

Area: 43,300 sq. mi.

Population: 2,600,000.

President: Osvaldo López Arellano, military, seized power December 4, 1972, from Ramón Ernesto Cruz, civilian, presumably to serve remainder of six-year term which began June 6, 1971.

Honduras is a mountainous but fertile country. Though there are rich minerals (gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, iron, coal), these are almost uniformly neglected in favor of agricultural and pastoral pursuits. Internal communications are few and of poor quality. Many Honduran towns are without modern road connections with each other. There is no railroad transportation except along a piece of the Caribbean coast, where a short line hauls bananas to port. Poverty is widespread, with an average annual per capita income of \$253. The population is notoriously unschooled. During July, 1969, a short but savage war with El Salvador drove social and economic levels even lower than usual. To this day Honduras has not recovered from that disastrous episode, and only now is beginning to restore ties with El Salvador and other members of the Central American community.

Politics remains as underdeveloped as the socio-economic framework wherein it must function. Numerous dictatorial regimes, revolutions and *golpes de estado* have followed each other in rapid succession. Most of the time the leading parties, Liberal and Nacional, have competed for power by force or rarely by elections, with Partido Nacional being regarded as the more conservative of the two. When elections do occur, the two parties seem to attract about equal support from the voting population. Despite the unstable conditions of its political system, Honduras may be said to be among the few countries of Latin America (another being Colombia) that has a persistent two-party system.

During 1932-1948 the dictatorship of General Tiburcio Carías Andino, Partido Nacional, ruled Honduras. The moderate, conservative constitutional government of Juan Manuel Gálvez prevailed during 1949-1954. An indecisive election brought President Lozano Díaz to power as "Chief of State", 1954-1956. In 1957 a constitutional assembly declared Dr. Ramón Villeda Morales, Partido Liberal, to be president.

The government of President Villeda tried desperately to extricate the country from the afflictions of underdevelopment.

Important programs for education and land reform were introduced. On October 3, 1963, in one of the more meaningless assaults on democratic government in Latin America, a military cabal led by Col. Osvaldo López Arellano headed off presidential elections by seizing power. On February 16, 1965, elections for a constitutional assembly yielded a comfortable majority for the Partido Nacional. The assembly, in a style which had also been followed in the election of Villeda Morales, wrote a new constitution, converted itself into a national congress, and then elected López (already promoted from colonel to general) to be the next president.

Unable by the terms of his own constitution to succeed himself, López secured party agreement to a "national unity" pact whereby he might remain in de facto power during the next six-year term without upsetting the constitutional order too much. It was agreed that free national elections would occur March 28, 1971, and that all legislative, administrative and judicial posts aside from the presidency would be divided equally between the parties; and that General Osvaldo López Arellano would continue to serve as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, no matter who would be president!

In the first free presidential elections since 1948, Dr. Ramón Ernesto Cruz of Partido Nacional won over Jorge Bueso Arias, Liberal, 306,028 to 276,777, and was duly inaugurated on June 6, 1971. Cruz, an uncommonly inconspicuous little man, obviously served as front man for General López, who ran the country from his post as commander-in-chief. Trouble soon broke out between the Liberal and National Parties, with the Liberals contending that the Nationals were not living up to their side of the party pact in terms either of division of posts or division of departmental budgets.

On December 4, 1972, General López simplified matters by quietly seizing power, sending President Cruz home, bringing the party pact to an end, and announcing that he would rule by decree for the rest of the regular constitutional term of Ramón Ernesto Cruz.

According to the Constitution of 1965, a one-house congress, whose members are to be elected for a six-year term corresponding with that of the president, is supposed to constitute the legislative branch of Honduran government. It is housed in a modern chamber with the latest in furnishings and electronic aids. At times some vigorous debate does occur within its walls. At other times, such as the present, it does not function at all.

## NICARAGUA

Area: 54,000 sq. mi.

Population: 2,000,000.

**Presidency:** Occupied by provisional junta, two civilians and one military, which took office May 1, 1972, pending new presidential term to begin December 1, 1974; but Anastasio Somoza Debayle, military, runs the country.

In Nicaragua, a mestizo republic of Central America, socio-political conditions are among the most depressing in the hemisphere. There is railroad and highway communication among the Spanish-speaking cities near the Pacific coast, along both sides of Lakes Managua and Nicaragua. One road now reaches from Managua to Bluefields on the Caribbean, but many important towns on the Caribbean coast are not only disconnected from the rest of the republic insofar as land communication is concerned, but are also populated by English-speaking Caribbean types of people who are out of touch with the rest of the country.

At least two-thirds of the people are illiterate, social stratification is rigid, poverty is widespread and appalling. On December 23, 1972, a terrible earthquake dealt Nicaragua a cruel blow, and nearly wiped out the capital city of Managua - a hot, muggy city which in the best of times is without any particular charm and is afflicted by the ravages of widespread misery which contrast with the ostentatious display of wealth on the part of its tiny ruling elite.

The Somoza family has ruled the country since 1933. Anastasio Somoza founded the dynasty and first occupied the presidency in 1936. He either ruled through puppets or as president until he was assassinated in 1956. After an interval under two puppets and a civilian son, Luis Anastasio Somoza Debayle (1957-1963), Luis' brother, Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza Debayle, powerful chief of the national guard, was "elected" on February 5, 1967. He took office the following May 1 for a term newly set at five years. Constitutionally, he could not succeed himself in office; so by political agreement, a triumvirate now occupies the presidency de jure, pending coming into effect of a new constitution and inauguration of a president on December 1, 1974; but "Tachito" Somoza remains as chief of the armed forces and is the leading candidate for the elections to occur in September, 1974. Shortly after the earthquake of last December, Somoza took all de jure as well as de facto power by having himself declared to be Minister of National Reconstruction, with full legal powers to run the country. In the face of these developments, Senator Fernando Agüero, opposition

member of the triumvirate, resigned or was removed from his post.

Since the beginning of rule by the Somozas, control over the national guard has provided the family with a principal key to power. Also, the Somozas now own a very large portion of the Nicaraguan economy, including sugar mills, distilleries, the country's airline and principal shipping concern, a textile company, and thousands of hectares of cattle ranches, coffee and sugar plantations.

Since long before the interminable dictatorship, a chaotic Nicaraguan political scene was dominated by struggles between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Today, the party configurations of the country are as follows:

**Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN)**, contemporary version of the old Liberal Party, is the political instrument of the dynasty. By agreement, the party occupied 60 per cent of the seats in the constitutional assembly elected February 6, 1972, and is always assured a comfortable majority in each chamber of the bicameral congress - a body which has been inoperative since August, 1971.

**Partido Conservador Tradicional (PCT)** functions in a precarious manner but under arrangements with the regime manages to publish an anti-Somoza daily newspaper, *La Prensa*. PCT has deep roots among families of the conservative elite. Its leader, Senator Fernando Agüero, received almost 30 per cent of the vote in elections of 1967.

**Partido Socialista de Nicaragua (PST)** is a traditional, illegal, and ineffective pro-Soviet type of communist party. Its membership is very small and it is rent by discord. **Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional** (Sandino Front of National Liberation, named for an early anti-U.S. hero, August César Sandino), has even fewer members than PSN, but makes up for its microscopic size by undertaking violent forays against the entrenched order.

Other illegal groups such as the **Partido Social Cristiano** and **Partido Liberal Independiente** (anti-Somoza remnant of the old Liberal Party) are reduced to impotency by the repressive efforts of the regime.

In Nicaragua, the United States has made an unenviable record. U. S. armed forces were stationed in the country during most of 1912-1933, and the original Anastasio Somoza owed much of his success to his marine training and connections. Until 1961, the U. S. Embassy carried on a notoriously close relationship with the Somozas. In subsequent years, this effusive friendship has been muted but has not disappeared. In Nicaragua, the United States has made important contributions to the "anti-imperialist" explosion that is still to come.

## COSTA RICA

Area: 19,600 sq. mi.

Population: 1,900,000.

President: José Figueres Ferrer, civilian took office May 8, 1970, for a four-year term.

Costa Rica is a Central American republic with deep-green rolling hills, active volcanoes, very fertile valleys, and a central plateau characterized by numerous individually owned plots of land, pleasant towns (Alajuela, Cartago, Heredia, Paraiso, Santo Domingo, etc.), many smaller pastoral villages, and the clean, very civilized capital city of San José. Though conditions of life away from her *meseta central* are not idyllic, they are better than those of most other countries of Central America; and about three-fourths of the Costa Rican population live on the *meseta central*. Puerto Limón, on the Caribbean, is among the most attractive coastal cities between Veracruz and South America. Highway communications are good, and a network of paved roads connects the many little towns of central Costa Rica with each other and with the frontiers of the country. Efficient railroad lines carry both passengers and freight between San José and the coasts.

When Costa Rica was first settled during the middle of the sixteenth century, Spanish colonists found no precious metals but plenty of ferocious Indians who refused to be enslaved. Because of lack of wealth or slaves, Spanish settlers had to perform their own labor, and be content with the small plots of land they could manage by themselves. To this day, the proportion of proprietors of land to the total population is much higher in Costa Rica than in any other part of Latin America.

Costa Rica is also known for her relatively well developed educational system, and for a literacy rate (at least 80 per cent) which is among the highest in Latin America. Certain contemporary neo-Marxist ideologues complain that because Costa Rica has not developed patterns of class warfare or proletariat struggle for achievement of "socialism", the republic is seriously deficient. Among scholars less moved by a priori doctrine, there can be little doubt that the Costa Rican penchant for widely distributed proprietorship has made a substantial contribution to (1) her relative material success and (2) achievement of levels of popular participation in the political process that are unusual for Central America, or indeed for most of Latin America.

With few exceptions (1917-1919 and 1948) Costa Rica has since 1889 enjoyed reasonably stable popular or semi-popular government, and there were but few out-and-out authoritarian

rulers before that. Civilians have almost always occupied the presidency. The press is unrestrained and rather irresponsible. Political contest, though very heated, is seldom violent.

Costa Rican parties focus on leading personalities, but do have some recognizable ideological tendencies. Leading parties of the country are the following:

**Partido Liberación Nacional.** Despite its ominous name, this is a democratic reformist-socialist party under leadership of President José Figueres, who also served as president during 1953-1958 and has been prominent during the past quarter century in Latin American pro-democratic causes. Of 57 seats in the unicameral Legislative Assembly, PLN holds 32.

**Partido Unificación Nacional.** This party centers around several conservative, traditional, and *personalista* elements, including those of the former Partido Republicano Nacional which was led by (medical) Dr. Rafael Calderón Guardia (President, 1940-1944) and the former Partido Unión Nacional which was led by journalist Otilio Ulate Blanco (President, 1949-1953). In presidential elections of February 1, 1970, PUN put forward Mario Echandi Jiménez (President, 1958-1962). The party did elect 22 of its members to the Legislative Assembly. Another PUN leader, José Joaquín Trejos Fernández, served as President during 1966-1970. In elections of 1974, PUN will put forward Fernando Trejos Escalante as candidate for President.

**Partido Demócrata Cristiano.** This is a new Christian Democratic party and occupies one legislative seat.

**Partido Nacional Independiente** has been devised as an instrumentality for the candidacy of Jorge González Martens, a wealthy and popular Costa Rican, in presidential elections of 1974.

**Partido Acción Socialista.** PASO is a very small Marxist party which is currently serving as a vehicle for the Costa Rican Communist party, known as Vanguardia Popular. The party is somewhat invigorated by this relationship, and by the fact that it occupies two legislative seats, one of which is held by the famous Manuel Mora, traditional Communist opponent of the Costa Rican economic and political system.

**Movimiento Revolucionario Auténtico** is a microscopic but very violent *fidelist* organization which functions outside the normal channels of Costa Rican political democracy.

The Costa Rican legislative branch is very powerful and the Constitution of 1949 contains so many ingenious protections against abuse of authority that the President can only play a strong role when he enjoys a comfortable legislative majority. Also, many executive functions are performed by numerous autonomous bodies that are outside the scope of presidential control.

## PANAMA

Area 29,200 sq. mi.

Population: 1,500,000.

**Chief of Government:** Omar Torrijos Herrera, military, seized power from elected constitutional president October 12, 1968; for ceremonial presidency, see below.

Panama is a country of Hispanic and Caribbean-African population. Though most of the population is Spanish-speaking, a large portion of city dwellers, especially on the Caribbean side, speak English as their first language.

Though considerations of nationalism prevent most Panamanians from discussing the subject, the United States was almost singly responsible for the success of the Panamanian secession from Colombia in 1903, and has played a major role in the economic sustenance of the republic ever since.

Until five years ago, Panamanian politics were usually marked by a modicum of quasi-democratic government intermixed with occasional outbreaks of wild violence and periods of dictatorial rule. On October 12, 1968, the national guard threw out President Arnulfo Arias, a colorful demagogue who had taken office only twelve days previously. General Omar Torrijos, popular chief of the national guard, emerged as strongman of the new regime. A figurehead "provisional president," Demetrio B. Lakas, took office on December 19, 1969.

Popular "elections" of August, 1972, set up a 505-member People's Assembly, which wrote a new Constitution, established the all-powerful office of Chief of Government and the ceremonial offices of President and Vice President. Torrijos was to occupy the post of Chief of Government as "Maximum Leader of the Panamanian Revolution", with Lakas to continue as so-called President for a six-year term.

When parties were allowed to function, they were highly personalist and coalesced around two or three candidates at times of presidential elections. In 1968 there were at least a dozen parties, plus blocs that changed composition in kaleidoscopic fashion. Among the parties, the **Partido Panameñista** was more persistent than most, and was led by the highly nationalistic Arnulfo Arias. The **Federación de Estudiantes Panameños** (Federation of Panamanian Students) was enthusiastically nationalist and leftist, and heavily involved in most anti-Yankee rioting. After a period of quiescence, the FEP has returned to open activity.


The Torrijos regime is loudly nationalist, anti-United States, and addicted to extreme leftist verbalization. All opposition is suppressed, and the national Congress does not function.

**The Problem of the Canal.** The Canal Zone cuts directly through the heart of the Republic of Panama. The Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty of 1903 never did come clear on the question of sovereignty. In addition to a yearly payment of \$1,930,000 (which the People's Assembly of 1972 ruled Panama must reject), Panama receives over \$165 million annually from trade, wages and purchases arising out of the Zone; but to Panamanian nationalists, the canal question is a matter of political sovereignty and cannot be resolved by economic argument.

After violent riots of January, 1964, which broke out over a flag question, the two countries finally agreed to negotiate new agreements. Subsequently, in December, 1964, President Johnson announced establishment of an Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Commission to study other routes for a new canal. Apparently oblivious to the political elements that had caused all the tensions, the Commission recommended in December, 1970, that on the basis of engineering considerations, a new canal should be excavated in Panama, some ten miles west of the present one! The study by the Commission contained over 1000 pages, and its preparation cost the taxpayers \$22 million.

In September, 1970, the Panamanian regime rejected all proposed treaties; and in December, 1972, the Torrijos dictatorship turned down the whole Commission plan categorically. The national slogan became, "Sovereignty or death!" The Panamanian ambassador to the United Nations is a nationalist firebrand, Dr. Aquilino Boyd, and in mid-March, 1973, he succeeded in getting the UN Security Council to meet in Panama to discuss the canal question, amidst a rising crescendo of nationalist vituperation.

Meanwhile the United States, which considers that any relaxation of U. S. control over the Zone would pose an ultimate threat to her security and commerce, seems unable to either resolve political differences with Panama or conceive of imaginative alternatives. For example, there are other possible routes outside of Panama; and no one thinks to quietly advise Colombia that the United States would stand aside while the isthmus reverts to the originally injured party. It is conceivable that such steps might have a wholesome effect on Panamanian intransigence and could be taken without outraging the sensibilities of the world.



## Puerto Rico

Area: 3,435 sq. mi.

Population: 2,800,000.

Governor: Rafael Hernández Colón, civilian, took office February 2, 1973, for a four-year term.

With about 800 persons per square mile, Puerto Rico is by far the most densely populated independent or quasi-independent political unit in Latin America. Puerto Rico's per capita income, now about \$1,500 per year, while low by U. S. standards, is higher than that in any Latin American republic. Today, literacy is almost universal among Puerto Rican adults.

Since 1952 Puerto Rico has been known as an *estado libre asociado*, or free associated state. Under her Constitution of 1952, she exercises full authority over her internal affairs, including election of her Legislative Assembly (Senate and House of Representatives, both with four-year terms), all local councils, and governor; and commissioner to the U. S. House of Representatives, who may debate, vote in committees but not vote on the floor. Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens and may vote for President when in residence on the mainland. The United States collects customs but deposits them in the Puerto Rican treasury. There are no other federal taxes. U. S. currency and postal service are utilized, but Puerto Rico shoulders many costs of internal improvements.

**Partido Popular Democrático (PPD)** was founded by Luis Muñoz Marín, Governor from 1949 to 1965. Much of Puerto Rico's internal progress is to be attributed to the reformist work of dynamic Governor Muñoz, who undertook measures to encourage investment, break up big estates, promote low-cost housing, extend communications, advance education and clean up politics. PPD is associated with the mainland Democratic Party, and generally favors continuation of the present relationship with the United States. Governor Hernández is of the PPD.

**Partido Nuevo Progresista (New Progressive Party, PNP)**, is the party of the previous governor and unsuccessful candidate for reelection on November 7, 1972, Luis A. Ferré. PNP is linked with the Republican Party of the United States, is conservative, and generally favors statehood.

The movement for independence is represented by the **Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño (PIP)**, **Movimiento Pro-Independencia (MPI)** and miniscule communist or fidelista groups. In elections and plebiscites of 1967, 1968, 1971 and 1972 no more than 4 per cent of the voters have ever supported the idea of Puerto Rican independence from the United States; but this does not prevent considerable agitation and violence, much of it sponsored by "students" or by elements serving foreign powers, from erupting over this question.

## DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Area: 18,800 sq. mi.

Population: 4,400,000.

President: Joaquín Balaguer, civilian, took office August 16, 1970, for a second successive four-year term.

The Dominican Republic occupies about two-thirds of the island of Hispaniola. The country is dominated by a plantation economy. Over half the people are illiterate. Its conditions of life, while at a low level, are not so appalling as those of Haiti.

From 1795 to creation of the Dominican Republic in 1844, the country was periodically overrun by French, Spaniards and Haitians. The latter ruled the region from 1822 to 1844, and Spain reannexed the country from 1861 to 1865. Between 1866 and 1930 most of her political experience was quite wild, with periods of violent anarchy alternating with rule by ignorant and brutal military officers or mostly inept and corrupt civilian presidents. The U. S. marines occupied the country from 1916 to 1924.

From 1930 to 1961, the Dominican Republic was ruled by "Generalísimo" Rafael Leónidas Trujillo. His was one of the most stifling tyrannies on record. With his assassination, May 30, 1961, the glory of "Dios y Trujillo" (God and Trujillo) evaporated into the vapid nothingness from whence it came. But tyranny and anarchy both emerge out of the lawlessness of an immature polity, and the next five years were filled with turbulence and political imposition.

On April 25, 1965, rebels overthrew an illegal civilian junta and civil war broke out between leftist "constitutionalists" led by Col. Francisco Caamaño Deñó and rightist "loyalists" led by Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin and others. First on the grounds that American and other foreign lives were endangered, and later with the explanation that Communists were taking over the "constitutionalist" forces, U. S. Marines began landing on April 28, 1965. With grudging OAS approval, over 40,000 Marines were joined by 1200 Brazilian troops and token contingents from a few other Latin American republics.

Finally, after many months of violence, agreements were reached for a provisional government and presidential elections. Joaquín Balaguer, puppet president at the end of the reign of Trujillo, won over Juan Bosch (President for seven months in 1963), 759,887 to 494,570 votes. Subsequently, in 1970, he was reelected by some 607,000 to 240,000 votes for his nearest opponent, Francisco Augusto Lora.

The Balaguer regime is undertaking to improve administration and make a sort of guided "democracy" with social conscience work. Economic and social levels are still very low.



but an important land reform program is in progress. Economic production is said to be increasing at about 7 per cent per year. Inflation has been checked, schools are multiplying, and some improvement is occurring in rural life; but there is concern that Balaguer might decide to run again in elections of May 16, 1974, and reintroduce the presidential *continuismo* that was characteristic of his mentor, Rafael Leónidas Trujillo.


**Partido Reformista** is the party of President Balaguer, and enjoys a majority in each chamber of the Congress.

**Movimiento de Integración Democrática**, led by former Vice-President Francisco Augusto Lora, candidate in the 1970 elections, is an important opposition party whose members broke with Balaguer over the reelection question.

**Partido Quisqueyista Dominicano** (Quisqueya, the Indian name for the region) is an extreme right-wing party which until July, 1971, was led by hard-nosed General Elías Wessin y Wessin, now exiled for plotting to overthrow President Balaguer.

Other small parties include **Movimiento de Conciliación Nacional**, until recently led by the late ex-Provisional President Héctor García Godoy (1965-1966), and a moderate conservative party; and **Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano**, a non-violent party of Christian Democratic persuasion.

The famous **Partido Revolucionario Dominicano**, led by ex-President Juan Bosch, is torn by factionalism and (like its leader) becoming increasingly erratic. Bosch now states that he favors a "popular dictatorship"; and there is evidence that elements of the party are engaging in violent underground activity. In February, 1973, Col. Francisco Caamaño Deñó, leader of the Bosch forces in the revolution of 1965, was killed when he returned from Cuba to undertake guerrilla activities in the Dominican Republic.



## HAITI

Area: 10,700 sq. mi.

Population: 5,000,000.

**President:** Jean Claude Duvalier, civilian, took office April 21, 1971, as new president for life.

Haiti, which occupies the western third of the island of Hispaniola, is the next to the smallest Latin American country in area, being larger only than El Salvador, and is the most densely populated. The country has fertile valleys, many lakes and short but swift rivers which could be used for generation of power. Forest timber is of high commercial potentiality, and mineral resources including copper, iron, coal, gold, silver and nickel, remain almost untouched.

Prior to independence in 1804, Haiti was regarded as the jewel of the Caribbean and one of the richest possessions of the French empire. After independence, political and economic chaos brought the country to ruin, and a general pattern of deterioration has occurred ever since. Today, Haiti is undoubtedly the most wretched country in the hemisphere. Per capita income averages no more than \$100 per year, but this means little because most of the population is entirely outside a market economy. The poverty and general misery of almost the whole population are beyond belief. About 90 per cent of the people are illiterate. The official language is French, but people not in the aristocracy speak a Creole language that combines early Norman French with elements of African dialects and Spanish. A small, parasitic elite dominates political affairs.

Haiti has never known orderly constitutional government. Chaos alternating with harsh dictatorships has been the political rule. Except for very short periods, as during her struggle for independence under the inspired leadership of the remarkable Toussaint L'Ouverture (died in prison, 1803), Haitians have had no reason for political hope. The country has had twenty different constitutions, has only rarely abided by any of them, and only one Haitian president ever completed his term in a constitutional manner. Several have extended their terms beyond constitutional limits, some have been forced to resign and still others (such as Vilbrun Guillaume Sam) have been massacred while in office.

By various ruses François Duvalier, who had taken power in 1957, prolonged his term to 1964. Then a new "constitution" proclaimed him to be president for life. This was followed by a period of unrelieved tyranny, wherein order was kept by

Duvalier's sadistic hoods (tonton macoute), there were mass executions, individuals disappeared mysteriously, and the Haitian population was thoroughly terrorized.

Finally, Duvalier recognized that even his turn was coming. In January, 1971, he named his son, Jean Claude Duvalier, then 21, a very large chap not known for his brilliance, to succeed him as "president for life". François got the Haitian Congress to adopt a constitutional amendment lowering the minimum presidential age from 40 to 20. Then, on April 21, 1971, the dictator died at age 64 and Jean Claude was raised to the presidency by "demand" of the chiefs of the armed forces and with the "clamor of the people".

Political parties are unknown in Haiti. At times of presidential contest (1957 being the last with more than one candidate) groups form around leading contenders. In the last presidential election, April 30, 1961, François Duvalier ran unopposed. On June 14, 1964, voters ratified the "president for life" constitution in a nationwide referendum wherein the word *oui* was printed on all the ballots. Subsequently, the Duvalier dynasty has not bothered with any kind of election formalities. There is no freedom of expression and illiteracy is so widespread that few could read political views if their publication were permitted. In the Haitian context the word "corruption" would have no meaning, because absorption of public funds by officials for their private use is the norm.

Today, Jean Claude ("Baby Doc") Duvalier is a façade president. Government is run by a collective military and elitist leadership wherein strong roles are played by the widow of "Papa Doc" Duvalier and by the Minister of the Interior, Luckner Cambonne. The tonton macoute and other disagreeable instrumentalities of terror have been dissolved. Some attempts are being made at improving the economic and cultural lot of the hapless Haitian people. Official corruption continues, but it is no longer common for civil servants to fail to receive any paychecks at all.

Despite some current improvements, it still appears that Haiti is a republic that is utterly without hope. When one views the political conditions of all the Caribbean republics, one is led to wonder that the force and prestige of the nearby United States could not have moved them to a better fate.

## CUBA

Area: 44,200 sq. mi.

Population: 8,600,000.

**Prime Minister:** Fidel Castro Ruz, civilian, seized power January 1, 1959; **President:** Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, civilian, took office July 17, 1959. Both hold office for undefined terms.

The green West Indian beauty of Cuba is enhanced by mountainous regions at the western and eastern ends, by some forests, and by the many harbors that indent its 2500-mile coastline. The people are of European, African, and mixed descent, and the economy is dominated by plantation products, chiefly sugar and tobacco. Great haciendas, currently known as "people's farms" and monopolized by an office of the state called the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (INRA), are the characteristic units of rural production. Almost everyone works for the state, which is run by Fidel Castro and his associates.

Cuba has never known prolonged constitutional order. Until 1959 private American investment prevailed in much of the economy and U. S. diplomats collaborated with reactionary regimes such as those of Gerardo Machado and Fulgencio Batista. However, there was somewhat more individual proprietorship than in many Latin American countries; and Cuba enjoyed economic and cultural standards that were among the least depressed in Latin America.

**Partido Comunista Cubano (PCC)** is the only legal party, and for all practical purposes is run by Fidel Castro Ruz, who is its First Secretary. Such organs of the PCC as the Political Bureau, the Secretariat and the Central Committee are entirely dominated by Castro. The party has yet to hold its first congress. The party is said to have up to 125,000 members, which would be about 1.4 per cent of the entire population, including children.

A "constitution" is provided by a Fundamental Law which was decreed on February 8, 1959, and has been revised subsequently, also by decree. There is no congress, there are no elections, and except by decrees of the regime there is no legitimized basis for the "presidency" of Dorticós or the "premiership" of Fidel Castro Ruz. Castro and other leaders have repeatedly promised elections and democracy, but there are no signs that anything but the present one-man dictatorship will continue in fact.


There is no meaningful distinction between the PCC and the government. The latter is headed formally by a cabinet of 27 members, which in turn is dominated by a Cabinet Executive Committee (CEC) which includes Fidel Castro, his brother Raúl Castro (who is also First Vice Prime Minister) and Dorticós. Almost all the members of the CEC are military officers, one exception being Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, an old-time Communist who served in the government of Fulgencio Batista as minister without portfolio.

All views contrary to those of the regime are suppressed. According to an OAS report, one out of every 100 Cubans is a political prisoner. According to Castro, a third of the population is active in Committees for Defense of the Revolution, which are designed to spy on the rest of the population. Those who do not work are put into "re-education establishments", known elsewhere as slave labor camps.

It is not clear that all this has improved the material condition of Cuban life. Poverty in the lush Pearl of the Antilles was never so devastating as in most other Latin American countries. Today, poverty is more equitably distributed than it was before. Almost all production has declined below that of pre-Castro days. All basic consumer goods are rationed, the amount allowed per month to each individual in 1972 being two pounds of meat, six pounds of rice, six ounces of beans, six ounces of coffee, and four pounds of sugar. Milk is not available to healthy adults. Vegetables and fruits were once plentiful, but now are only rarely available. People form lines everywhere - for food, coupons, permits and even for restaurant seats and must devote a huge amount of time to acquiring the basic necessities of life. The work-week is set at forty-four hours, but it is increased because of official pressures to work longer hours, often without pay.

On the other hand, illiteracy has been obliterated. Many services, including recreational facilities such as beaches, are now freely available to all.

The fidelista dictatorship depends heavily on the Soviet Union for economic and military aid, and adopts an unvarying pro-Soviet posture in all international relations. However, in her promotion of extreme violence and terrorism in other countries the Cuban practice comes closer to that of Peking than of Moscow. Thus, violent leftwing elements everywhere (including the United States) link the names of Fidel Castro and the late Ernesto Che Guevara with those of Mao Tse-tung and the late Ho-Chi-minh, and hope that their countries will emulate the Cuban model of the good life.



## ARGENTINA

Area: 1,079,500 sq. mi.

Population: 25,000,000.

President-elect: Héctor J. Cámpora, civilian, to take office May 25, 1973, for a four-year term.

Argentina has all the elements needed for creation of a powerful and prosperous nation. In territorial size she is the second largest republic of Latin America, and approaches the dimensions of India (population, 560,000,000). Argentina has great regional variation, including a part of the high Andes to the west, mountainous ranching and mining country to the north-west along the foothills of the Andes, the bare steppes of Patagonia to the south; and of course the pampa, which occupies a great arc to the north, west and south of Buenos Aires, is about the size of Texas, and contains some of the richest black soil on earth. Argentine literacy, about 90 per cent, is the highest among the republics of Latin America. Even in bad times, Argentines enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the hemisphere. Severe problems of cultural assimilation do not afflict the country. The population is overwhelmingly of European origin, generally Spanish, Italian, and German, in that order. Highway and especially railroad facilities are adequate.

Despite richness of the soil, the countryside is only sparsely occupied. The oligarchic families who monopolize the land in great *estancias* (landed estates) are satisfied to use it inadequately, often for extensive cattle grazing. Consequently, this huge and fertile country contains only about 25 million inhabitants; and metropolitan Buenos Aires, in many respects the finest city of the hemisphere, contains almost one-third of the population of the country. If Argentina were to have the density of population of the United States or Mexico, she would have about 70 million people.

Though forces of José de San Martín secured independence for the Argentine provinces in 1816, the country did not become an organized state until 1862. Between 1829 and 1852, Juan Manuel de Rosas, *caudillo* governor of the province of Buenos Aires, was the ruthless dictator of most of the provinces. After his overthrow by Justo José de Urquiza, a constitution was drawn up in 1853; but Buenos Aires was not brought into the union until 1860. From 1862 until 1930, Argentina was governed by a succession of presidents who were chosen under forms of election and in many instances (e.g., Bartolomé Mitre, 1862-1868; Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, 1868-1874; Roque Sáenz Peña, 1910-1913) made important contributions to education, internal development, and civilian democracy.

In 1930, with overthrow of the decrepit government of 78-year-old Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922 and 1928-1930), Argentina began a descent into a political maelstrom from which she has never emerged. The regime of General Juan Domingo Perón (1946-1955) left a legacy of demagoguery and fiscal irresponsibility from which the republic has never recovered; and indeed Argentina seems determined to reenter a period of *peronismo* which may be even worse than the first one. After the overthrow of Perón in 1955, civilian administrations alternated with military impositions. Two prominent civilian presidents during this period, both ejected by the armed forces, were Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962) and (medical) Dr. Arturo Humberto Illia (1963-1966). Then a "revolutionary" military dictatorship began in June, 1966, under "presidency" of General Juan Carlos Onganía. On June 18, 1970, the commanders of the armed forces unceremoniously replaced Onganía with an inconspicuous officer, General Roberto Levingston; and on March 22, 1971, when Levingston tried to remove the powerful General Alejandro Lanusse as army commander, Lanusse turned the tables by assuming the presidency himself.

The military regime ruled by decrees which superseded the Constitution of 1853, closed down the Congress and disbanded political parties; but still permitted a measure of press freedom and public debate. Despite the modicum of political stability (fractured from time to time by wild violence perpetrated by *peronistas* and extremist elements), production declined, inflation reached 60 per cent per year, there was widespread unemployment and numerous businesses went bankrupt. The military rulers even introduced the rationing of meat - in Argentina, of all places, where beef is as much a staple of diet as beans are in Mexico. Finally, the armed services decided that military force does not automatically solve profound socio-economic problems, so held elections on March 11, 1973. On that date, Argentina came full circle back to a beginning point of no return, and elected (dental) Dr. Héctor J. Cámpora, 63, whose slogan was "Cámpora to the government! Perón to power!"

In 1965, there were no less than 222 different Argentine political parties. In 1973, the political-party spectrum had been somewhat simplified, in that the number of parties in various races around the country had been reduced to 62. Nine candidates sought the presidency, and were supported by a bewildering array of parties, movements, fronts, forces, and alliances. The two that led the voting in the March elections are as follows:

**Frente Justicialista de Liberación (FREJULI)**, comprised of an amazing welter of left-wing, right-wing and undefinable

political groups, including especially the *Partido Justicialista* and numerous factional supporters of *peronismo*, with or without Perón. FREJULI and its candidate Cámpora, received "virtually" 50 per cent of the total vote, and far more than its nearest opponent, thus electing the dentist without need for a run-off election which would have been required had they won less than half the votes.

*Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR) is a traditional liberal party founded early in the century and responsible for (1) nomination of the senile Yrigoyen in 1928 which brought on the original military interposition in 1930, (2) bitter factionalism in the late 1950s and early 1960s which made it impossible for civilian presidents to govern, and (3) nomination for the 1973 elections of old standby, Ricardo Balbín, 68, whose uncharismatic personality probably helped throw the election to the *peronistas*. Balbín secured only about 22 per cent of the vote, with the rest going to other candidates, including Oscar Alende, of the new *Alianza de Centro-Izquierda* (Center-left Alliance).

Also in the 1973 elections, Argentines voted for the first time since 1965 for 69 senators (3 from each of 22 provinces and the Federal District), 243 deputies, governors of the provinces, provincial legislatures and municipal officials.

The Guide regards the following as being among the causes for the perpetual malaise of the Argentine political system: (1) rural land monopoly that can only be called medieval, (2) irresponsibility on the part of civilian political leaders, (3) understandable military imposition which substitutes authoritarian force for democratic experience, and (4) *peronismo*. Perón, in his time a tall, dynamic military officer, and his beautiful wife, Eva Duarte Perón, were both unbelievably charismatic and incredibly corrupt, and very nearly bankrupted the nation; but they talked to the *descamisados* (shirtless ones) as they had never been talked to before, and lavished rewards on the working people of the country regardless of disastrous effects on the rest of the economy. From November 17 to December 14, 1972, Perón (now 78) was back in Argentina from his retreat in Spain. Much of his spark was gone, and it seemed at first that his visit might be a disaster for his supporters; but on election day the people proved that the memory of *peronismo*, regardless of its reality, is still a powerful force in Argentina.



## URUGUAY

Area: 72,000 sq. mi.

Population: 3,000,000.

President: Juan María Bordaberry, civilian, took office March 1, 1972, for a five-year term.

Most of Uruguay is flat or gently rolling and pastoral in appearance. Though there are small properties near Montevideo, these give way to large estates or *estancias* farther from the capital. Despite fertility of the soil, about 85 per cent of the land is used for stock raising and is very sparsely populated. Over half the population lives in Montevideo and environs. Railroads and public highways radiate from Montevideo to the borders of the republic. Educational levels are high.

Until the first administration of José Batlle y Ordóñez (president, 1903-1907 and 1911-1915) Uruguayan political history was one of almost unrelieved chaos. Batlle introduced state-sponsored social welfare programs, state participation in the economy, and habits of orderly constitutional government. He also proposed the plural, presidentless executive which was tried during 1952-1967. Until the mid-1960s, Uruguay enjoyed one of the highest standards of living in Latin America, and was lauded for its Scandinavian type of Latin American democracy. Since about 1965, it has become evident that the expensive programs of social welfare and state administration or intervention in almost every sector of the economy have outstripped the capacities of the productive system. Now, Uruguay suffers chronically from declining production, inflation, trade imbalance, unemployment, strikes, runaway corruption, bureaucratic overcentralization and inefficiency, social and political disorder, continuous suspension of the constitutional guarantees, and the very real threat of military dissolution of what little remains of Uruguayan democracy.

The two principal parties are the socially minded *Partido Colorado* and the conservative *Partido Nacional* (popularly called *blanco*), both named for the red and white colors they wore in battles during the nineteenth century, and both rent by extreme factionalism. The Colorado Party has held the executive branch during all but one term of the present century, and (beginning with José Batlle y Ordóñez) is responsible for the extensive programs of social welfare and mixed economy which we have mentioned.

A *Frente Amplio* (Broad Front) combines a number of left-wing and Christian Democratic parties. Of these, the *Partido Democrático Cristiano* is a leading party; and the *Partido Comunista del Uruguay* dominates labor as well as a *Frente Izqui-*



**erdista de Liberación** (Leftist Liberation Front, FIDEL) which is active in electoral matters in support of the Broad Front.

An extraordinarily complex system of proportional representation gives sustenance to the many parties and factions. In the last elections, there were two major and four minor Colorado candidates, one major and several very minor Blanco candidates (led by Wilson Pereira Aldunate) and one candidate, General Liber Seregni, of the Broad Front. Bordaberry manages to govern with assistance of an **acuerdo nacional** (national pact) which includes some Blancos and gives him a working majority in the Congress.

From 1968 to late 1972, Uruguay was tormented by a very dangerous Maoist-Castroite terrorist organization, **Movimiento de Liberación Nacional**, called **tupamaros** or **tupas** after the name of a rebellious Inca chieftain of the late 18th century, Tupac Amará II. Finally, the government declared "internal war", unleashed the armed forces, captured the tupa leader (Raúl Sendic), seized over 1,000 terrorists, and closed down their various headquarters and centers of operation around the country.

The tupas may be defeated, at least temporarily, but they may also have succeeded in destroying Uruguayan democracy. As a result of their role in suppressing terrorism, military officers became more alert than before to the serious social and political problems that afflict the country, including especially bureaucratic ineptitude and corruption. A sign of their new sense of importance appeared when they secured the arrest of Dr. Jorge Batlle, second major candidate of the Colorados in the last elections, for having "insulted the armed forces". This caused a national uproar; but undaunted by the commotion, the army and air force (later joined by the navy) demanded in February, 1973, that President Bordaberry accept their 19-point program for social reform, administrative decentralization, elimination of corruption, replacement of defense and interior heads by people approved by the military, and full freedom for the armed forces to control all affairs related to "national security" - and moved up tanks to enforce their demands. President Bordaberry capitulated completely, and agreed to establish a military-civilian National Security Council which will serve as a government within the government to oversee implementation of policies set by the armed forces.

In Uruguay, a combination of expensive and self-defeating bureaucratic programs, violent revolutionary elements, and reacting military forces, are combining to bring down what was until recently regarded as the most durable constitutional democracy in South America.

## CHILE

Area: 286,400 sq. mi.

Population: 10,000,000.

President: Salvador Allende Gossens, civilian, took office November 4, 1970, for a six-year term.

From many standpoints, Chile is one of the most attractive countries in the hemisphere. Despite her elongated shape, central and southern Chile are well integrated with the rest of the country by highway and rail communication. About 80 per cent of her population is literate. The republic is well supplied with good soil, minerals, timber and fisheries resources. Despite these favorable features, much of Chile has traditionally been monopolized by a few and therefore impoverished.

Until recent decades, government was a plaything of members of the parasitic landed oligarchy, who monopolized public affairs like everything else but more or less adhered to constitutional rules. The military services are usually respectful of civilian legal norms, but did undertake violent uprisings in 1851, 1859, 1891, 1924, and 1931.

President Eduardo Frei (1964-1970) tried to introduce much needed social reforms, but was frustrated by congressional opposition from both the extreme right and the extreme left, and bitter factionalism within his own Christian Democratic Party. Opposition by myopic feudal and political elements made it impossible to implement reforms.

The Chilean party system, formerly dominated by three major parties (Conservative, Liberal, Radical) has become extraordinarily complex. As of this moment, pro-government parties which are combined in the **Unión Popular** (UP) include the following: (1) **Partido Socialista** (PS), the party of President Salvador Allende and not a normal democratic socialist party at all, but a congeries of radical Marxists, many of whom are more Maoist than pro-Soviet; (2) **Partido Comunista** (PC), which promotes Soviet interests, publishes the daily *El Siglo*, and is less inclined to violence than are many elements of PS; (3) **Movimiento de Acción Popular Unida** (MAPU), a Marxist faction which broke from Frei's Christian Democratic Party; (4) **Organización de la Izquierda Cristiana** (Organization of the Christian Left, IC), another very radical pro-Marxist "Christian Democratic" faction, and (5) **Partido Radical** (PR), an old liberal Chilean party of the left.

The opposition, which called itself the **Confederación Democrática** (CODE) in the last congressional elections, includes: (1) **Partido Demócrata Cristiano** (PDC), still Chile's largest party and led by ex-President Eduardo Frei, (2) **Democracia Radical** (DR), an anti-Marxist, conservative faction which broke from the Radical Party when the latter moved over to the

Marxist columns in 1970, (3) **Partido Nacional**, formed in 1966 to bring together the old Conservative and Liberal parties, and (4) several other small parties and factions.

The **Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria** (Movement of the Revolutionary Left, MIR), is more violent and extreme than Unión Popular, and today holds several poor communities by force.

In presidential elections of September 4, 1970, Allende won with a small plurality and only 36.3 per cent of total votes. In congressional elections of March 4, 1973, Unión Popular got 43.3 per cent of the vote to 54.7 per cent for CODE, but gained two seats in the Senate and six in the Chamber of Deputies, leaving CODE with 30-20 and 87-63 leads in the two chambers, respectively.

The regime has attempted, thus far unsuccessfully, to put forward a plebiscite which if approved would establish a "Workers' Constitution", replace the bicameral Congress with a unicameral "Assembly of the People", and set up a system of courts that would be subject to legislative control. The regime has intervened in the big conservative daily, *El Mercurio*, and announced other plans to get the rest of the press under control. Copper, telephones and telegraphs, banks, the textile industry, and foreign trade, are now in advanced stages of government monopolization. Workers' committees are supposed to run the mines. Chile's "land reform" proposes to put most private farmers out of business entirely and turn all agrarian workers into peons employed by the state, under control of a so-called Agrarian Reform Corporation. Agricultural imports have ascended from \$180 million in 1970 to 700 million in 1972.

Production has declined precipitously. There are food shortages, inflation has reached the highest level in Chilean history (164 per cent in 1972), the system of distribution has virtually collapsed, and the long queues typical of Communist countries are to be seen everywhere. As in Cuba, poverty is being distributed more equitably than previously, and it is likely that the material conditions of the very poorest Chileans have improved slightly. This, plus effective political organization of the poor, account in part for the slight improvement in Allende's fortunes in elections of 1973.

During 1972 there were widespread strikes and disorders against inflation, economic disintegration, and the oncoming specter of tyranny. In November, 1972, in response to undefined pressures, the Allende government added three military officers to the cabinet. Among them, General Carlos Prats González, Commander of the Army, was named to be Minister of the Interior. It remains to be seen whether this modification of an otherwise all-Marxist cabinet constitutes a stabilizing, constitutional force.

## VENEZUELA

Area: 352,150 sq. mi.

Population: 11,000,000.

President: Rafael Caldera López, civilian, took office March 11, 1969, for a five-year term.

Venezuela, a rich and varied country on the north coast of South America, has important resources including oil, iron, copper and gold; fertile lands which are used both for intensive and extensive agriculture and grazing; and a great river system which centers around the Orinoco, second only to the Amazon.

Until 1958, Venezuelan political history was characterized by long periods of brutal dictatorship interspersed with very short-lived confusion or fleeting "democracy". The two most well known recent dictators were General Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935), famous "tyrant of the Andes"; and General Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1952-1958), a rather nondescript ruler of the corrupt "public works" type.

On January 23, 1958, combined democratic and leftist forces overthrew the dictatorship of "PJ" (as his friends in the oil companies called Pérez Jiménez). Elections, a rarity in Venezuela, were held on December 7, 1958, and produced a plurality for Rómulo Betancourt, civilian leader of Acción Democrática (AD), a democratic socialist party.

When Raúl Leoni was inaugurated as president, March 11, 1964, it was the first time in Venezuelan history that one elected president peaceably followed another one. Betancourt and Leoni, however, were both of AD; so Venezuelans passed their final political test when, December 1, 1968, they elected Rafael Caldera of the opposition Social Christians and inaugurated him March 11, 1969.

Venezuelan politics are characterized by many parties and changing blocs and fronts, formed out of both personalista and ideological elements.

**Acción Democrática** is weakened by factionalism, but still plays a major role in the congress. AD has picked Carlos Andrés Pérez to be its standard bearer in forthcoming elections of December 2, 1973.

**Partido Social Cristiano** (called COPEI because of an earlier name, Comité Organizador Pro Elección Independiente) is the Christian democratic party of President Caldera. Its candidate in the next elections is to be Lorenzo Fernández, whose policy (like that of Caldera) would be to conciliate rather than suppress Communist elements.

**Unión Republicana Democrática (URD)** is a leftist socialist

party which follows Jovito Villalba, formerly of AD; and **Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo** (Electoral Movement of the People, MEP), is even farther left.

**Partido Comunista Venezolano** (PCV) is Soviet oriented and, having eschewed a policy of armed struggle in 1967, was legalized in 1969. For a time it appeared that PCV, MEP and URD would combine in the next presidential elections in a united front (**Unión Popular Venezolana**) behind the candidacy of Jesús Angel Paz Galarra; but though Paz remains a candidate of PCV-MEP, URD has pulled out of this arrangement.

**Movimiento al Socialismo** (Movement Toward Socialism, MAS) is a dissident faction from PCV, and in forthcoming elections will put forward the candidacy of José Vicente Rangel.

Meanwhile former dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez, of all people, leads a **Cruzada Cívica Nacionalista** (National Civic Crusade, CCN) from his retreat in Spain. CCN espouses nationalist slogans from both the extreme left and the extreme right; but claims from time to time to be staunchly anti-Communist. CCN and PJ are supported by a battery of small nationalist parties.

**Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional** (FALN) and **Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria** (Movement of the Revolutionary Left, MIR) are pro-Chinese, fidelista organizations, and in the past have sponsored much violence and general terrorism. Though there was some recrudescence in violence in early 1973, especially among "student" groups, the furious violence of the past few years has abated. This turn of events may be attributed in part to boiling factionalism within these "movements", but also to policies of the Caldera government, such as legalization of the PCV, amnesty to guerrillas, and free one-way tickets to any other countries of their choice. The Guide recommends that this latter policy be applied by the United States to certain individuals in this country.

The government of President Caldera pushes ahead with land reform, public housing, technical assistance to agriculture, and multiplication of educational opportunities. The tax on income from oil production is now 80 per cent. The next logical step will occur in 1983, when the government will assume operation of all foreign oil properties. No one has thought to bring about Venezuelan mastery of her oil and other resources, as well as general land reform harnessed to productive labor and capital, by the simple expedients of (1) imposing taxes on the value of all privately held lands and (2) removing fiscal burdens from other elements of production.

## COLOMBIA

Area: 455,300 sq. mi.

Population: 21,500,000.

President: Misael Pastrana Borrero, civilian, took office August 7, 1960, for a four-year term.

Western and northern Colombia are mountainous. The southeast, over half the area of the country, is sparsely populated, tropical lowland plain. Most Colombians live in the high cordilleras, along the rivers between the ranges or in the port cities. Minerals and subtropical crops are important to the economy. In part because of mountainous conditions, extensive latifundia are not so prevalent as in most other parts of Latin America; and during the last decade governments have tried to increase private proprietorship.

After several changes in name and political organization, the Republic of Colombia has been a unitary state since 1886, and is divided into 22 regional departamentos. Currently, a decentralist movement demands more autonomy for the regional governments.

Beginning about 1910, and during certain periods prior to that year, Colombia enjoyed comparatively stable semi-democracy under oligarchical supervision. Conservatives dominated politics from 1880 to 1930. Liberals held the presidency from 1930 to 1946. After 1946, violence between Liberals and Conservatives took on appalling proportions and brought death to over 100,000 persons. Later, *la violencia* was seized upon by sadistic and criminal elements devoid of political purpose; and by forces abetted by foreign powers. During 1946-1953 there were two Conservative governments (Mariano Ospina Pérez, 1946-1950; Laureano Gómez, 1950-1953), with that of Gómez displaying dictatorial tendencies. When Gómez prepared to impose a new constitution for a corporative state, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla seized power in 1953.

The dictatorship of Rojas turned out to be one of the most corrupt and inept in recent Latin American history. In 1957, the bungling dictatorship was overthrown by combined forces of the Church, business, labor, students and others.

In 1957 a pact between the parties, followed by a plebiscite, secured approval for a 50-50 sharing (*paridad*) of positions between the Liberals and Conservatives at all levels except the presidency, where the principle of *alternación* between the parties would prevail. Supporters of the pact have been joined

since 1958 in the Frente Nacional, and have managed to hold majorities in both houses of the congress. The pact, which was to prevail for sixteen years, is to terminate in 1974.

Though influential political factions and third parties emerge from time to time, Colombia may be said to have adhered during most of her political history to a two-party system which first appeared during the middle of the nineteenth century.

**Partido Liberal**, which underwent serious factionalism during recent years between elements led by leftwing Alfonso López Michelson and more traditional Julio César Turbay, seems now to be pulling itself together again under the able leadership of ex-President Carlos Lleras Restrepo.

**Partido Conservador**, the party of President Pastrana, continues to be rent by factionalism between pro-frente elements in support of President Pastrana and personalista followers of Belisario Betancur and Evarista Sourdis. The Conservative Party includes some incredibly reactionary elements.

**Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO)**, an alarming political phenomenon of the last few years, is led by the demagogic "Evita Perón of Colombia" and "captain of the people," María Eugenia Rojas de Moreno Díaz, 38, daughter of none other than ex-dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, now 73 and ailing. In the 1970 elections, Rojas came within an ace of winning the presidency. When his narrow defeat was announced, both he and his daughter called openly for revolution. Now, "Evita Perón" María Eugenia is a senator and leader of the anti-frente opposition in the upper chamber, wherein her party holds 37 of the 118 seats. ANAPO has adopted the slogan, "Better dictatorship with bread than democracy with hunger," as though either correlation has been proven. In local elections of April, 1972, the traditional parties pulled well ahead of ANAPO; and now the party is suffering from extreme factionalism and withdrawal of several hundred supporters who complain about its demagoguery and lack of program. In mid-1973, it appeared that Colombian constitutional government might survive after all.

Soviet interests are represented by the small **Partido Comunista de Colombia** and its guerrilla branch, **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia**. There are also the even tinier **Ejército Popular de Liberación** (Maoist) and the **Ejército de Liberación Nacional** (Castroite). Except for incidents of terrorism and guerrilla warfare in certain locales, and wild demonstrations by "students", Colombia is currently enjoying some respite from extreme violence.

## ECUADOR

**Area:** 116,300 sq. mi.

**Population:** 6,200,000.

**President:** Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, military, head of junta of the three armed forces; seized power from constitutional president February 16, 1972, for an indefinite term.

Ecuador, an Andean republic, is largely Indian and mestizo. Cultural assimilation between European and Indian elements is still not complete. Unemployment is widespread and the economy functions precariously at a very low level. Educational and political progress cannot be said to occur at all, and well over half the population is illiterate.

With but few exceptional periods, Ecuador's political history has been one of chaos alternating with occasional spells of dictatorial and often erratic rule, with sixteen different constitutions in 152 years of independent political history. During the 23 years from 1925 to 1948, Ecuador was ruled by nineteen different administrations, for an average of 1.21 years each. From 1948 to 1961 there were authentic elections and relatively stable constitutional governments. Then Ecuador reverted to her more familiar political habits. In 1961, elected President José María Velasco Ibarra resigned under pressure after serving a little more than a year. He was followed by Carlos Julio Arosemena, who was thrown out by military forces in 1963 on grounds of excessive drunkenness. Until March 30, 1966, the country was ruled by a military junta, to be replaced in turn by two successive provisional presidents. In elections of June 7, 1968, voters gave a small plurality to Dr. Velasco Ibarra.

Velasco, now 79 years old and in exile, was a most phenomenal feature of Ecuadorian politics. A mercurial demagogue, he was elected to the presidency in 1933, 1952, 1960, and 1968, and seized power by force in 1944. He served out one full term, 1952-1956, and was ousted by force from all his other administrations. On June 22, 1970, in response to widespread chaos, President Velasco assumed dictatorial powers, announced suspension of the 1967 constitution as "absurd", and closed the congress and the supreme court. He claimed (not without reason) that the university campuses were nests of Maoists and other assorted Marxist extremists, so shut them down during the last half of 1970. There were widespread arrests of prominent officials.

The 1968-1972 Velasco regime was unbelievably inept and erratic, and responsible for corruption so massive that the government could not meet payrolls of civil servants and seemed about to push the country into national bankruptcy. Also, as presidential election day approached, it appeared quite possible that victory might go to Assad Bucaram, popular radical political figure and successful mayor of the port city of Guayaquil. In the face of these inauspicious circumstances, the combined armed forces removed President Velasco from office on February 16, 1972, and canceled the elections that had been set for June 4.

Until about two decades ago, the two major parties were the **Conservador** (pro-clerical, extremely traditional) and **Liberal Radical** (19th century liberal). Until the latest military seizure they both played roles in congressional politics, but in presidential elections were replaced by a bewildering array of personalista parties and blocs which came and went according to the varying fortunes of their leaders. One of the latest and most ascendant of these was Bucaram's **Concentración de Fuerzas Populares**.

Somewhat more durable parties are the **Partido Socialista** and **Partido Comunista del Ecuador**. The latter takes a standard, pro-Soviet position in political affairs. The Cuban and Chinese points of view are also represented by small revolutionary parties. These do not seem to have wide support around the country, and secure most of their sustenance from elitist intellectuals and students.

It is not easy to define the program of the regime of President Rodríguez (army) and the other members of his military junta (navy-air force). He states that his government is "nationalist, military and revolutionary", and threatens action against "privileged economic groups", but thus far the program of the government has not been clarified. While encouraging foreign oil exploitation, the regime has been slow to enter into long-term contracts with outside interests.

There is no question that the junta is stamping out the corruption which had become rampant under Velasco. No announcement has been made as to when elections will occur, if ever; nor is it clear how these political events are helping to solve the intense social and material problems that afflict the overwhelming majority of the Ecuadorian people.

## PERU

**Area:** 493,300 sq. mi.

**Population:** 13,750,000.

**President:** Juan Velasco Alvarado, military, seized power from constitutional president October 3, 1968; to serve for an indefinite term.

Peru typifies all the physical and ethnic characteristics and problems of much of Latin America. At least half the Peruvians are Indians, and few of them are assimilated into the Hispanized Peruvian elite culture. Like many of her sisters, Peru is afflicted by physical dissection, poverty, low productivity, and high illiteracy.

Beginning with her first head of government, the famous José de San Martín (1821), Peru has been ruled by sixty different heads of state or juntas during 152 years of independent history, or an average of one each 2.5 years. In contrast to many Latin American republics, Peru is not noted for extremely long dictatorships. The longest one was that of Augusto Bernardino Leguía, 1919-1930. A more recent dictatorship was that of General Manuel Odría, 1948-1956. Subsequently, two civilian constitutional presidents, Manuel Prado (1956-1962) and Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1963-1968) were thrown out of office by military force before completing their terms. The "military guardians" lay a heavy hand on Peruvian politics and are in charge of the present dictatorship.

Today, Peruvian political parties are heavily censored, and without the possibility of being elected to office are withering from political atrophy.

**Partido Aprista Peruano** is a famous Peruvian party. The term *aprista* is drawn from APRA, or Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, long the terror of Peruvian governments. The party began in the 1920s as an indigenous, socialist-reformist movement of university students and still follows its aging leader, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. Even though the Peruvian military forces fought a no-quarter battle against the apristas for most of four decades, much of the corporatist-socialist program of the current regime bears the unmistakable stamp of aprista influence.

**Partido Demócrata Cristiano** is a Christian democratic party which prior to the present regime showed some promise of making political headway.

**Partido Acción Popular** was the party of ousted President Belaúnde Terry, and (like the military sector) had taken over



large parts of the aprista program and was attempting to undertake important programs for social and economic reform.

The regime of General Velasco is a complete dictatorship. The rulers have closed down the congress, have announced no plans for elections, and rule by decree. The judicial branch is entirely reorganized, with judges subservient to the military will. The government expropriates newspapers that are critical of its policies and turns them over to "cooperatives" of workers; or orders that they sell their stock to public agencies. TV and radio broadcasting has fallen entirely under government censorship and control. A new university statute proclaims, among other things, that the university is to be anti-imperialist and in the service of the "popular classes".

When the regime first came to power it annulled contracts with the International Petroleum Corporation (U.S.), charging the firm owed vast sums to Peru; expropriated the International T & T; and imposed new contracts on remaining foreign-owned mining industries. Subsequently, the dictatorship has established a complex network of "communities", or quasi-public corporations with participants from government, labor, and private capital, to operate all sectors of the economy. Within that framework, industrial and agricultural cooperatives are encouraged. "Land reform" is redistributing over 8 million acres of land, not to individual proprietors, but to officially approved cooperatives and semi-public agencies. New agricultural and industrial unions are to unite all workers and obliterate unions not linked with the regime. As yet, there is no clear evidence that these measures are having a material effect, one way or the other, on the condition of the impoverished Peruvian people.

Peru, the Soviet Union, Cuba and China, are undertaking close political and economic collaboration, and Soviet loans and teams of technicians are aiding Peru in construction of power projects, irrigation works, and improvement of her coastal desert lands. Despite all these elements, there are features of the Peruvian regime that make it different from typical Marxist rule. It appears that the Peruvian rulers, while certainly collectivist and strongly imbued with Marxist ideology, are quite genuinely nationalist, and heavily influenced by aprismo and by syndicalist-corporatist ideas borrowed from their own military training and contacts. Also, it is likely that the top military leaders are not all in complete agreement about their radical programs. One person to be watched is General Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, who holds the office of prime minister and is widely regarded as a very powerful figure with views more moderate than those of other colleagues.

## BOLIVIA

Area: 424,100 sq. mi.

Population: 5,000,000.

President: Hugo Bánzer Suárez, military, seized power August 21, 1971, for an indefinite term.

Bolivia has almost exactly twice the area but about one-tenth the population of France. The South American republic has rich resources in minerals (tin, lead, silver, copper, iron, oil, and many others) and in the fertile soil of her temperate and subtropical regions, which constitute over half the area of the country. Over half of her people are Indian. A large portion of the Bolivian population lives on the bleak Andean *altiplano* at altitudes over 10,000 feet, and depends mainly on employment in nationalized tin mines.

Despite her great natural wealth, Bolivia is among the most backward and poverty-stricken countries of Latin America. The Indian population has been kept in numbed destitution by generations of conquistadores, feudalistic *patrones*, tin barons and military strongmen, several of them ignorant roughnecks. Bolivia is now governed by at least her 55th political regime in 147 years of independent history. There have been 187 revolts of importance, whether or not victorious; and General Bánzer is the seventeenth president in 26 years.

In 1952, Víctor Paz Estenssoro and his Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) seized power and began a sort of Mexican-style social revolution. The tin mines were expropriated and began a predictable decline in production from which they have never recovered; but a sweeping agrarian reform, much of it initiated by the Indian agriculturalists themselves, did create a new class of numerous small landed proprietors and gave thousands of Indians a new lease on life. MNR presidents were Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1952-1956 and 1960-1964) and Hernán Siles Zuazo (1956-1960). In 1964 President Paz cajoled the congress into amending the constitution so he could succeed himself in office. He was then reelected for the term 1964-1968 and promptly thrown out by military forces led by Vice President and General René Barrientos Ortuño, who had been put on the MNR ticket to placate the armed forces.

General Barrientos, a very popular and able reformist, was elected constitutionally in 1966 but killed in a plane accident in 1969. He was followed by Vice President Luis Adolfo Salinas, civilian, who in his turn was thrown out of office later in 1969 by General Alfredo Ovando Candía. In October, 1970, General Juan José Torres seized power. When it became obvious

that Torres was setting up a thoroughly Marxist type of regime, with confiscations, suppression of the press, assaults on the church, and even a so-called "People's Assembly" which met in June, 1971, in the chamber of the Bolivian senate, conservative military elements overthrew his government; and General Hugo Bánzer, former commandant of the War College, was placed in the presidency.

**Frente Popular Nacionalista (FPN)** is the name the Bánzer regime gives to its official party. Under the circumstances, without foreseeable elections, it is the only viable political instrument.

**Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario**, much truncated by the course of events, has merged with FPN, as has the **Falange Socialista Boliviana**, a durable Bolivian party with fascist-authoritarian tendencies; but in recent months MNR elements have begun to grumble about this arrangement.

Under blows from the current anti-Communist government, parties of the extreme left fare less well than they did earlier. The pro-Soviet **Partido Comunista de Bolivia (PCB)** has lost its pro-Chinese comrades to a "Marxist-Leninist" faction (PCB-ML). The Castroite-terrorist **Ejército de Liberación Nacional** (Army of National Liberation, ELN) which Che Guevara was leading when he was captured and killed in Bolivia in 1967, is much decimated by that and subsequent reverses.

The Bánzer regime carries on merciless war against guerrillas, and is aided in that enterprise by a right-wing organization known by the felicitous name, the Death Squadron. In March, 1972, the government expelled all 119 staff members of the Soviet embassy, for having aided guerrilla forces. Having only three staff members in Moscow, Bolivia contended that the Soviet personnel were not only intrusive but also excessive.

In October, 1972, for the first time since 1956, the Bolivian peso was devalued down from twelve to the dollar to twenty. With painful memories of the time before stabilization in 1956 when the peso went down to 14,000 to the dollar, workers and other low income people began a campaign of protest that almost brought down the government. The Bolivian economy, never too scintillating, suffers from endemic deterioration on every front. The Bánzer regime, like the whole country, seems to be teetering on the brink of disaster. General Bánzer states that Bolivia is not ready for elections as yet. The tragic truth about Bolivia seems to be that if she can be ruled at all, it can only be by a highly responsible and incorruptible type of quasademocratic authoritarianism. To expect such a regime to emerge out of the Bolivian context may be asking too much.

## PARAGUAY

**Area:** 157,000 sq. mi.

**Population:** 2,400,000.

**President:** Alfredo Stroessner, military, first took office in 1954; to be inaugurated August, 1973, for a fifth five-year term.

Paraguay is a primitive interior country and suffers from some of the worst afflictions of underdevelopment to be found in Latin America. Modern capitalism is virtually unknown. A parasitic, non-investing medieval type of oligarchy holds title to most of the land; but, in what is probably the most chaotic pattern of land occupance in the Americas, over half the agrarian producers are small squatters, who cultivate tiny plots without title, without modern tools, and without appreciable income. It is alleged that if one divides the total income of rich and poor alike by the population, the per capita income is \$230 per year. In point of fact, a very few earn far more than this "per capita" figure, some Paraguayans may earn amounts in the general range of \$230 per year, and most of the population is essentially outside the market economy.

The capital, Asunción, only installed running water twelve years ago, and such conveniences are unknown in most of the rest of the country. Government statistics on agrarian reform, education and the like, are pure fiction. The interminable Stroessner regime is now making some efforts to clean up the country, is building new roads into the isolated Chaco region, has completed a highway to Brazil, and is trying to raise educational levels.

The population is overwhelmingly a homogenized mestizo blend of European and guaraní Indian. Though Spanish is the official language, the guaraní tongue is heard everywhere. Despite the grim economic conditions of the republic, Paraguayans have a reputation for a pride of country not equalled in many other parts of Latin America. There are landscapes of pastoral beauty, there is a rich and unusual guaraní culture, and untapped resources include iron, oil, and vast stands of timber.

Politics are characterized by long periods of dictatorship, punctuated from time to time by stimulating outbreaks of rebellious anarchy. The first tyrant was the austere, cruel Dr. José Gaspar Rodríguez Francia, 1813 to 1840. Francia's rule was absolute, and Paraguay was a virtual prison. He shut off the republic from the world, and prohibited commerce or even the exchange of mail. After twenty-seven years under Dr. Francia, and three years of unspeakable chaos, Carlos Antonio López served as a somewhat more humane and progressive dic-

tator from 1844 to 1862. For eight years after that the country was ruled by López' debauched and sadistic son, Francisco Solano López, who involved his country in war with Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay (1865-1870). The Paraguay War almost wiped out the male population of the country. It is said that the population was reduced from 525,000 to 221,000, of whom only 28,746 were males.

An army-police coup seized power on May 5, 1954, and General Alfredo Stroessner was elected as the only candidate on July 11 of that year. Subsequently he was reelected in 1958, 1963, 1968, and on February 11 of 1973. According to the Constitution of 1967, the term beginning in August, 1973, should be his last one, but that remains to be seen. The Stroessner regime is a military dictatorship which barely permits "opposition" parties to function in a most precarious manner.

**Partido Colorado**, a traditional party which dates from the 1870s, is now the official party of the regime, is inextricably intertwined with government and armed forces, and normally secures at least 70 per cent of the vote.

**Partido Liberal Radical** is a shadow "opposition" party of centrist political position with some seats in the legislative chambers.

**Partido Liberal**, like the Colorado Party derived from the 1870s, is becoming increasingly ephemeral.

**Partido Febrerista**, which in recent years calls itself the **Partido Revolucionario Febrerista**, is slightly radical, often suppressed, and has almost ceased to exist.

Under the 1967 Constitution the unicameral legislative system was abandoned in favor of two houses, to consist of the 30-member Senate and a 60-member House of Representatives. The Constitution also provides that the party polling the largest number of votes should occupy two-thirds of the seats in each chamber, thus assuring to the Colorado Party 20 Senate seats and 40 in the House, regardless of proportionate votes secured by less successful parties. Both presidential and congressional terms are for five years. Much of the constitutional system is quite overtly authoritarian in content and tone, and there is no danger that any legislative bloc will seriously challenge the regime.

The Guide does not mean to offer a carping criticism against the Stroessner regime, and is quite aware that alternatives to authoritarianism do not exist in Paraguay. Nor would the Guide claim that the Stroessner dictatorship is the most brutal in Latin America.

## BRAZIL

**Area:** 3,286,500 sq. mi.

**Population:** 100,000,000.

**President:** Emilio Garrastazu Médici, military, took office October 30, 1969, for a term which by Institutional Act No. 16 is to end March 15, 1974.

In the Western Hemisphere, Brazil is exceeded in population only by the United States and Canada. In much of her territory, Brazil is a beautiful land of irregular rolling hills, winding rivers, and green forests. At least two-thirds of Brazil is a semi-temperate or subtropical plateau region, suitable for settlement and development. Yet, the economic and political development of Brazil has hardly begun. Though the nation has great mineral and agricultural resources, she is plagued by poverty, inadequate communications, underdeveloped health standards, monopolistic or chaotic land-ownership patterns, and indecision regarding her basic political institutions. Her average per capita income is about \$450 per year, and illiteracy afflicts at least a third of the Brazilian population.

It is of importance that Brazil is not Spanish. Her heritage is Portuguese and African and she has a reputation (somewhat tarnished by events since 1964) for being rather more relaxed than her neighbors. Brazil is in Latin America, but not entirely of it, and tends to be conscious only of her own vast world. Brazil's political history is marked by periods of apparent quietude and constitutional order in an atmosphere of elitist quasi-democracy, punctuated by occasional episodes of disturbance accompanied by profound constitutional changes.

On September 7, 1822, Brazil glided almost imperceptibly into independence from Portugal. The father of her independence and her first emperor, Pedro I (1822-1831) was the son of John VI of Portugal; and in 1972, President Americo Thomaz of Portugal returned the remains of Pedro I to Brazil in what was both a moving regal ceremony and an indication of the continuing close attachment between the two countries. Today, the two countries share close economic and cultural ties, and by recent decree their people are to share a common citizenship.

Prior to the present epoch of military interposition, Brazilian independent political history included the following periods: (1) constitutional monarchy under Pedro I and the great Pedro II, 1822-1889, (2) republican form, managed by ruling patronal elements within formalities of constitutional democracy, 1889-1930, (3) revolution and dictatorship in populist-fascist style by Getúlio Vargas, 1930-1945, and (4) resumption of the

democratic style, 1945-1964. During the latter period, Vargas returned to power as an ineffective constitutional president in 1950, and committed suicide in 1954; and President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) began construction of Brasília, the new interior capital. The sudden and irresponsible resignation of President Jânio Quadros, August 25, 1961, brought Vice President João Goulart, follower and admirer of Vargas, into the presidency. Thereafter, Goulart moved steadily toward the left and toward a Vargas-style demagogic dictatorship. There can be no question that during the Goulart period there was monumental corruption as well as significant infiltration by revolutionary Marxist elements into the various branches of the government.

The present epoch of military dictatorship began with a lightning revolt which drove Goulart from office on April 1, 1964, and placed commanders of the Brazilian armed forces in power. The new government ruled through a series of *atos institucionais* and *atos complementares* which effectively altered the constitutional order. The sixth constitution of Brazil, a highly authoritarian document, was approved by a puppet Congress and promulgated January 24, 1967, but has already been amended extensively.

General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco (1964-1967) was chosen by Congress under procedures pronounced in an institutional act; and on October 3, 1966, a Congress truncated by removal of several of its members violated constitutional provisions for popular election by choosing General Artur da Costa e Silva, who took office March 15, 1967 and served until felled by a stroke, August 29, 1969. Under "authority" of an Ato Institucional N. 12, a military junta governed until the Congress (which Costa e Silva had shut down because of disorders) could be reopened to approve of selection of General Emilio Garrosta Médiçi - under "authority" of Institutional Act No. 16, which provided that the Congress, and not an electoral college (composed of congressmen plus delegates selected by state legislatures) as provided in the Constitution of 1967, would select the President. No thought was given to the possibility that Vice President Pedro Aleixo, a civilian, might succeed to the office vacated by Costa e Silva.

In 1969, the Constitution of 1967 was revised by incorporation of fifty-eight amendments. The document, which like its predecessor of 1964 is extremely detailed and complex, provides for a very strong presidency. Both in fact and in constitutional essence, the government is carried on by presidential dictatorship. The Chamber of Deputies (now 310 members) and the Senate (three from each of the 23 states) are mere shadows of their former voluble and irresponsible selves. The

Constitution no longer refers to the country as the United States of Brazil, but calls it the Federal Republic of Brazil. Though Brazil is constitutionally "federal", and though regionalism and distances do impose some distinctions among the various parts, the realities of politics combine with the content of a centralizing constitution to make most of the states into appendages of the central government.

**Aliança Renovadora Nacional** (National Renovating Alliance, ARENA) is the official government party, and is inextricably intertwined with the military sector and regime. The President openly announces his choices for ARENA candidates, and dictates ARENA policy without fear of contradiction.

**Movimento Democrático Brasileiro** (MDB) is an anemic opposition party which does participate in elections and manages to get its candidates into about a third of the seats of the Chamber of Deputies and into one state governorship (Guanabara, actually the city of Rio de Janeiro).

In legislative elections of November 15, 1970 (preceded by arrests of some 5000 persons, including 500 MDB leaders), ARENA received 48 per cent of the votes, MDB 22 per cent, with 21 per cent of the ballots being cast blank and 9 per cent declared to be null. ARENA won 70 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and all but six of those in the Senate.

Since 1964, some 1500 persons have lost their political rights, which means they may not vote, hold public office, or engage in any kind of political debate or activity. These include both living ex-presidents (Juscelino Kubitschek and Jânio Quadros) and about a third of all members of Congress from 1966 to 1970. Thousands of persons have been jailed or dismissed from governmental and educational services on grounds of subversion or corruption. Severe censorship, which had been lifted for a few years, was reinstated in October, 1972, with specific prohibitions against comment on presidential succession, political prisoners, and other specific topics. This means, among other things, that information or comment or speculation may not be disseminated about elections that will presumably occur some time in 1973, or about individuals who might be candidates for the presidency.

As is to be expected under the circumstances, all Communist activity is illegal and suppressed. The traditional Brazilian pro-Soviet Communist party, led for years by the venerable Luiz Carlos Prestes, is called **Partido Comunista Brasileiro**; and a pro-Chinese version has adopted the name **Partido Comunista do Brasil**. Among several terrorist groups that are especially active are the **Vanguardia Popular Revolucionária** and **Ação de Liberação Nacional**. These organizations include assassinations, kidnappings and bank robberies in their repertoire of activities.

The Guide is not unmindful of the terrible problems of combined corruption, subversion and threatened social dissolution that brought on the present military dictatorship. Also, it is fair to comment that President Médici turns out to be not only a very able administrator, but something of a charismatic figure. His speeches ring with a poetic lilt, and his surprisingly appealing personality touches a sympathetic note among his warm hearted, romantic people. Inflation, which had exceeded 100 per cent per year under the ham-handed Goulart regime, has been reduced to not over 20 per cent. The government encourages individual incentive, both domestic and foreign. The economy is booming, unemployment is nearly non-existent, and gross national product increases at the phenomenal rate of about 11 per cent per year. Brazil now manufactures automobile engines and parts for export to Europe and the United States, and is undertaking a program of economic and technical aid to Bolivia. The government is mounting a genuine effort to reduce Brazilian illiteracy.

Army engineers are rapidly completing construction of a great trans-Amazon highway system, to include north-south and east-west roadways, as well as a new highway to be built along the northern boundaries of Brazil to the frontier of Peru. Even more significantly, a homestead plan is under way, whereby some half million acres in the newly opened Amazon country are being distributed, in plots of 247 acres with small wooden houses, seeds, tools, initial living allowances for six months, credit and technical aid, to needy colonists, mostly from the depressed northeast. Thus far, over 10,000 colonists have been settled in the Amazon along the new highways, but are now running into collision with Indians who have occupied the region since ancient times.

Though Brazil has not settled upon her final political forms, she is enjoying an economic improvement which is long overdue. If this can continue for an appreciable time, it may contribute to the legitimization of political institutions that are acceptable to the Brazilian people.



## LATIN AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### Relations With The United States

Periods of U.S.-Latin American relations have tended to be of three different types:

1. The most well known periods have been those that are typical of relations between very powerful national states and their weaker neighbors (e.g., Soviet Union in Hungary, 1956, and Czechoslovakia, 1968). There were diplomatic interventions and military occupations, exaggerated assistance to and support for investment interests, use of recognition as an instrument of internal interference, undue chumminess with hated tyrants, seizures of territory by aggression (Mexico, 1846-1848; Puerto Rico, 1898) and the like.

U. S. interventionism reached its peak from 1898 to 1934, with the Spanish-American War (1898), the Panama episode (1903); Roosevelt Corollary (1904); military occupation of Cuba (1898-1902, 1906-1909, and intermittently until 1922), Nicaragua (1912-1933), Haiti (1915-1934) and the Dominican Republic (1916-1924); and incursions into Mexico under direction of the morally inspired President Woodrow Wilson (1914-1917). In response to real or alleged Communist-bloc threats, active U. S. intervention or quasi-intervention has also appeared in more recent years (Guatemala, 1954; Bay of Pigs, 1961; Dominican Republic, 1965).

2. There have been periods during which the United States has stressed respect, forbearance and friendship in her relations with Latin America. For example, there was the epoch of Latin American independence and the Monroe Doctrine, 1810-1823. The Monroe Doctrine (1823) was designed to preserve the national security of the United States from European encroachment in this hemisphere and the independence of the new Latin American countries from the same danger. At first, Latin American leaders applauded the principles of the Monroe Doctrine; but later, when its concepts were "extended" or twisted to justify U. S. expansion (1848, 1898) or interventionism (1898-1934), or Latin Americans saw these acts as being grounded in the Monroe Doctrine, their praise turned to condemnation.

Another such period was that of the Good Neighbor Policy, 1933-1945. Idealism combined with alarm over Axis aggression to inaugurate this new epoch of good feeling. The policy was inexpensive and effective. It emphasized mutual respect, Latin American self-determination, and non-intervention by the United States in Latin American internal affairs.

A recent epoch of active U. S. friendship toward Latin



America was that of the Alliance for Progress. This period had its beginnings during the decade of the fifties, when the United States and the hemisphere became concerned over Communist-bloc intrusions in the Americas. It picked up momentum when Peruvian and Venezuelan mobs attacked Vice-President Richard Nixon in the spring of 1958, and the forces of Fidel Castro seized the government of Cuba on New Year's day, 1959. Interest in Latin America soared to a high pitch with announcement (October, 1962) of discovery of Soviet missile emplacements in Cuba, and was further sustained by knowledge that Soviet-Cuban expansionist ambitions were being aided by a wave of subversion, terrorism and propaganda designed to prepare the Latin American republics for incorporation into one of the Communist blocs.

The idea for the Alliance for Progress was first proposed by Juscelino Kubitschek, President of Brazil, who suggested that an Operation Pan America might be established to funnel funds into the social and economic regeneration of Latin America. The next year, in 1959, the Inter-American Development Bank was created to facilitate such a hemispheric project; and in 1960 the members of the OAS agreed to an Act of Bogotá, which established objectives of the new program within the framework of the inter-American system. Under the inspiration of President John F. Kennedy, a conference at Punta del Este, Uruguay, August 17, 1961, gave this great project the name, Alliance for Progress. Countries of the hemisphere (U.S., 20 per cent; Latin America, 80) were to provide \$100 billion over the decade beginning in 1961, to be made available to those republics that prepared national programs for education, housing, land reform, taxation and fiscal improvement, economic integration and inflationary controls. The Alliance was supposed to induce peaceful social change and reform, and also to strengthen democracy in Latin America. It is not clear that much basic reform was accomplished, or would be permitted by oligarchic elements; and it is certain that there has been a retrogression, not an advancement, in constitutional democracy. The decade of the Alliance having concluded, there is no evidence that the Nixon administration plans to undertake any new programs of similar nature.

3. There have been periods when the United States has seemed to be unaware of the existence of Latin America. This occurred between the U. S. Civil War and opening of the First International Conference of American States in 1889, and during the years just after World War II. Today, it appears that most U. S. foreign policy interest is focusing on Europe and Asia. Present policies are to have a "low profile" or "less

visibility" for the United States in Latin America. Considering its former strident presence in Latin America, much can be said for this; but on the other hand it smacks of neglect and disdain, which many Latin American leaders can hardly brook. Since he took office, President Nixon's visiting in Latin America has been confined to Mexico. One must mention that it was Richard Nixon who as vice president suffered humiliating experiences, unparalleled for a person in his office, at the hands of unbridled Peruvian and Venezuelan mobs. Latin Americans, who put much store by the concept of dignidad, might understand a certain reluctance on the part of the U. S. President to visit their countries.

The part played by U. S. investments in Latin America is exaggerated grossly. Misery existed in Latin America long before U. S. investors took an interest in the region, and still does in several countries where there is not much U. S. investment (e.g., Haiti, El Salvador, Ecuador, Paraguay). Total U. S. private investment in all Latin America in any one year does not exceed \$12 billion, or 10 per cent of total investment in the region. That in Canada alone now runs to about \$18 billion. Since Canadian population is about one-tenth that of Latin America, the per-capita impact of U. S. investment in Canada is roughly fifteen times its per-capita impact in Latin America. This does not seem to have driven Canada into a morass of wretchedness.

Current controversies over 200-mile fisheries limits claimed by several countries (notably, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Chile) create tensions and misunderstandings, as do U. S. threats to withhold aid if governments do not change their policies. The tendency of past U. S. administrations (especially that of Woodrow Wilson) to tie diplomatic recognition to moral judgments about regimes was also a point of controversy. At present, the United States seems to be returning to a Jeffersonian type of de facto policy of recognition, whereby admission of the existence of a government, no matter how loathsome, does not imply approbation. Military aid continues under the Military Security Act of 1951. In line with its general improvement everywhere, the U. S. foreign service related to Latin America is of much higher caliber than it was only a decade ago.

The ingredients for U. S. policy in Latin America that the Guide would propose would be (1) a rejuvenation of the Good Neighbor Policy, and (2) sufficient moral, ideological and charismatic content to inspire the hemisphere as we did during the years just after 1776. In addition to costly programs, which may or may not have helped our reputation in Latin America, there was much of this spirit during the brief Kennedy period.

## Relations With The Communist Blocs

The responses of the Communist countries and their allies and admirers to the opportunities afforded them by world anarchy are pragmatic and Machiavellian and not out of harmony with the realities of international disorder. Their devices are suited to the pursuit of their own national interests as they define them and to the methods most appropriate to their recent revolutionary experiences and current capabilities.

Relations of the Communist countries with Latin America are vigorous and aggressive, and occur in six different categories:

1. **Official diplomatic relations.** At last count, a dozen countries of Latin America carry on diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. Mexico, Cuba, Chile, Peru, and Argentina do so with Communist China, and Chile, Mexico, and Peru with Cuba. About fifteen countries carry on trade relations of one degree or another with the Soviet Union, and for 1973 the U.S.S.R. plans to double its trade with Latin America, to \$200 million. Latin American countries (such as Costa Rica) which do conduct diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. find it difficult to cope with subversive pressures that flow out of highly motivated and large Communist embassies. Communist diplomatic personnel make contact with local popular leaders, disseminate propaganda, assist revolutionary organizations in stirring social chaos, and in some cases (Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, Uruguay) have been found to be passing out money to subversive groups, or otherwise intervening to help foment strikes, sabotage industrial production, stir up dissident students, and the like. It was on such grounds that in April, 1972, Bolivia expelled 119 members of the Soviet embassy from that country.

2. **Unofficial political activity by proxy.** The Communist countries have a ready-made constellation of native extremist parties, left-wing "nationalists", radical labor leaders, immature juveniles, ambitious politicians and demagogues, opportunists, and idealists genuinely concerned about the terrible problems afflicting their countries. From the mid-sixties to the present, almost identical student disorders have broken out in Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, and even in the United States. Their tactics have included the following: (1) Protest against real or imagined abuses, (2) provocation of violent encounters, (3) seizure of buildings and ransacking of papers belonging to administrators and faculty, (4) proclamation of escalating demands, (5) insistence on full amnesty for all participants, and (6) provocation of police retaliation, accompanied by charges of police brutality to secure

new allies and whip up public fury for further demonstrations.

3. **Use of the Cuban base of operations.** Cuba is a forward base for this type of unofficial political activity. In this respect, though she receives massive economic aid from the Soviet Union, Cuban enthusiasm for terrorism and guerrilla warfare is much closer to the inspiration of Peking than to that of Moscow. Various Communist conferences in Cuba have proclaimed publicly their intention to overthrow every government in the Americas. Demonstrators throughout the hemisphere quite openly proclaim their enthusiasm for Cuban and Chinese leaders and concepts, and display pictures of Mao Tse-tung, Fidel Castro, and the late Ho Chi Minh and Che Guevara.

4. **Dissemination of literature and radio-TV propaganda.** Textbooks in Portuguese and Spanish are published in the U.S.S.R., China, and Cuba, and are available to libraries, bookstores, and even some schools that would otherwise be without reading materials. Communist propaganda journals of excellent physical quality and very low cost are distributed to newsstands throughout Latin America. Radio Moscow and Cuban and Chinese transmitters broadcast in Portuguese, Spanish, French, and several Indian tongues. Prensa Latina, a subsidized fidelista news service, provides dispatches for dissemination throughout Latin America.

5. **Travel to the Communist countries.** The U.S.S.R., China, and Cuba, invite thousands of persons, including students, professional people, and labor leaders and delegations, to visit their countries each year, for attendance at conferences or festivals, for tours, and for training in subversion, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and the like. Lumumba University in Moscow, as well as institutions in Peking, Havana, and Sofia, are active in this type of educational activity.

6. **Violence, guerrilla warfare, terrorism.** There is more evidence of Cuban than of Soviet involvement in direct violence and terrorism. In this instance, the activity is a reflection of the influence of Peking and of recent revolutionary experience on the thinking of Cuban leaders. A Tri-Continental Congress meets periodically in Cuba, and has a permanent secretariat, wherein the **Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad (OLAS)** is designed to conduct activities in Latin America. OLAS directs its main attention to the "anti-imperialist" war against the United States. Authorities in various parts of Latin America find that arms, money, and guerrillas themselves are supplied by Cuba to foment destruction and disorder.

## Latin American Foreign Policies

In the semi-organized anarchy of international relations, weaker nation-states are badly buffeted and are treated with but small respect by the stronger powers. Many Latin American republics have been invaded, intervened, insulted, cajoled, and knocked about by more powerful countries. During the nineteenth century European powers such as Britain, Spain, and France intruded into the internal affairs of nations all over Latin America. At the turn of the century this sort of activity was taken over by the United States, which confined most of its attentions to the Caribbean and Central America; but during 1846-1848 and 1914-1917 even the larger republic of Mexico became painfully aware of the aggressive proclivities of her powerful neighbor. Currently, Communist countries instigate internal penetration within Latin American republics in a manner that demonstrates little regard for their sovereign independence. The internal weaknesses and instabilities of the Latin American republics have done little to strengthen the defenses that might be provided by military arms or the arts of diplomacy.

Out of this hapless amalgam have arisen certain features which in one degree or another are common to the foreign policies of most of the republics of Latin America.

**1. Self-determination and non-intervention.** Most of the republics of Latin America stress self-determination and non-intervention to the point of obsessed fanaticism. Innumerable inter-American pacts, including the Charter of the OAS and many others, make pointed and repetitious reference to Latin American rejection of all intervention. For understandable reasons, when one considers past relations with the United States, Mexico's foreign policy is especially emphatic on this point. Non-intervention to the Latin American means, specifically, non-intervention by the United States. It is only quite recently that some republics have demonstrated comprehension that intervention might also come from other quarters and in subtle forms unlike the landing of the U. S. Marines. Though based in part upon a laudable desire to conserve their fisheries, the insistence by some countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay) upon a partial or complete 200-mile maritime limit arises out of this spirit of self-determination and non-intervention; and U. S. threats to withhold aid or other benefits from those countries that try to enforce the 200-mile limit, are met by angry protests that such retaliation constitutes a violation of the principles of non-intervention into internal affairs.

**2. Nationalism.** As in many developing nations, those of Latin America are heavily imbued with large doses of nationalism. Among intellectuals, labor leaders, professional and middle-class people, strong feelings of mexicanismo, panamericanismo, bolivianismo, ecuatorianismo, and so on, provide credos to substitute for present distresses and memories of past humiliations. Cultured elites of Europe, Canada, or the United States might scorn the symbols and strident slogans of nationalism; but nationalism is a very real and meaningful doctrine in the developing countries, including those of Latin America.

**3. Nationalization.** In their zeal to eject all vestiges of foreign interposition, several Latin American republics have undertaken nationalization or governmental expropriation of resources and industries held by elements from abroad, especially the United States. Nationalization replaces the foreign owner with government monopoly, does not usually distribute titles among native proprietors, and may in fact result in a worse condition for the nation; but nationalization has strong emotional roots of self-realization, and cannot be discussed on rational grounds of economic benefit or loss. In Chile, for example, the nationalization of foreign-owned copper mines was not just a program supported by the Marxist government of President Salvador Allende. Though proposed by the government, the measure was unanimously approved by all parties, from far right to far left. No matter how badly the government mineral monopolies of Chile, Bolivia and elsewhere may be mismanaged, it would be unthinkable that they would ever be returned to their former owners.

**4. Recognition.** Though sometimes inclined to withhold recognition from loathsome tyrannies, most Latin American republics follow variants of the Estrada doctrine (from the Mexican foreign minister, G  naro Estrada, 1930), which would insist that recognition or non-recognition not be used as a device to bring internal pressure to change the policies or forms of Latin American regimes. This is essentially the same as the old Jeffersonian de facto policy of recognition, which simply noted existence of governments whether we liked them or not, and served the United States well for over a century.

**5. Asylum.** The instabilities of Latin American governments create favor among them for political asylum, whereby refugees from governmental changes secure protection in the embassies and territories of other Latin American republics.

**6. International law and peaceful settlement.** Latin American nations have little force upon which they can rely. Hence, they put great store by the strengthening of international law and the devising of instrumentalities for peaceful settlement.

### The Inter-American System

The inter-American system had its inception at the Panama Congress, called by Simón Bolívar in 1826. Since then, there have been ten regular inter-American conferences (1889-1954), three regular and two special meetings of the General Assembly (successor to the Inter-American Conference), a series of meetings of consultation of ministers of foreign affairs beginning in 1939, several special conferences, and a multitude of specialized conferences on matters of technical, social, educational, juridical, and general humanitarian interest.

The Organization of American States, with its seat in Washington, provides an umbrella which covers many different efforts toward hemispheric collaboration. Though not as effective as many would desire, the OAS is not paralyzed by anything like the big power veto in the Security Council of the United Nations.

On February 27, 1970, ratification was secured for important revisions of the OAS Charter of 1948. Under the new arrangements, much stress was placed on the economic and social regeneration of Latin America, implicitly with help from the United States. Despite the verbosity of the new Charter on this subject, the success of such plans depends on willingness of the United States to appropriate large sums for amelioration of Latin American social and economic conditions.

The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MCMFA) continues to play an important role in solution of disputes endangering hemispheric peace. It is to be noted, however, that all the OAS actions to date relative to threats to the peace have been confined to the small countries of the Caribbean and Central America, and have not affected the large countries of South America.


The new General Assembly is to meet annually in regular session. The Second Regular General Assembly, meeting in Washington, D.C., during April 11-21, 1972, rehashed questions of intervention and military expenditures and about 35 other items of even lesser consequence. The third meeting is in session at the time of this writing. The old Council (before 1948, the Governing Board) is now known as the Permanent Council and is permanently available in Washington, D.C., for service in matters related to security and peace. It should be borne in mind that members of all the OAS agencies act as representatives of their respective foreign ministries. Consequently, there is not as much distinction among these different OAS units as might appear at first glance.

The old Pan American Union is now called by the prosaic but more accurately descriptive title, General Secretariat. The Secretary General (presently Enrique Galo Plaza of Ecuador)

has a five-year term and may be reelected once. There are other councils, specialized organizations and entities for the performance of the many functional services of the OAS. A current criticism is that the OAS is ensnared in endless meetings and that problems are "met" by useless resolutions and verbalization *ad infinitum*. Introduction of the U.S.-Soviet struggle into the hemisphere is threatening whatever effectiveness the OAS may have had until now, and the fortunes of the organization are at about their lowest ebb since its beginning.

The principal documentary instruments of the inter-American system are the revised OAS Charter (1948, 1970), the Rio Pact (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) ratified in 1948, and the Pact of Bogotá that was formulated in 1948. The Rio Pact requires that members submit their controversies to peaceful settlement; and provides that in case of armed attack, the Organ of Consultation (either MCMFA or Permanent Council) may by two-thirds vote take economic, diplomatic or military measures against the aggressor. A reluctant state may not be compelled to contribute its own military forces, but there is no arrangement whereby a veto may negate the whole effort. The Pact of Bogotá gathers together many procedures and structures for peaceful settlement to which members agreed in previous treaties. Though not ratified by all the OAS members, the pact provides an important guide for peaceful settlement of controversies in the Americas.

The Inter-American Development Bank, founded in 1959, is the principal institution for channelling of financial assistance to the countries of the hemisphere.





### Inter-Latin American Relations

The few major wars suffered by Latin American countries have been ferocious affairs. The following are generally listed as being the most important conflicts: The Argentine-Brazilian war over Uruguay (1825-1828); the anti-coalition war, whereby Argentina and Chile sought to prevent unification of Bolivia and Peru (1836-1839); the Paraguayan War (1864-1870; see Paraguay, p. 47); the war of the Pacific, involving Chile, Bolivia and Peru (1879-1883); the Gran Chaco war between Paraguay and Bolivia (1932-1935); and the brief but very vicious war between El Salvador and Honduras during July, 1969. The latter conflict may have seemed minor or even absurd to the outside world but was ruinous to the economies of both countries. The war, which erupted over a complexity of accumulated issues, was finally ended through vigorous intercession by the OAS and threat of sanctions against Salvadoran invaders; but relations between the two countries, while finally resumed, remain rancorous to this day.

Aside from these and many skirmishes over borders, use of water, internal political interventions, and other issues, relations among the Latin American republics have generally been surprisingly peaceful. For one thing, major war involves expense which can hardly be borne by shaky Latin American treasuries; and in many instances the borders of Latin American republics are too far from their centers of population and governmental authority, and transportation is too poor, to permit access of contending armies to each other.

Most inter-Latin American relations are carried on with more peaceful objectives, including especially economic and even political integration. Mexico and all the republics of South America are members of the **Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)**, which was founded on February 18, 1960, by the Treaty of Montevideo. The original hope was that barriers to trade among members would be eradicated by 1972. Subsequent difficulties in agreeing on commodities to be put on less restricted trade lists delayed the realization of that objective.

As an antidote to the defects of LAFTA, in 1969 the republics of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile organized an **Andean Group**, which is designed to eliminate or reduce trade restrictions and develop multinational industries among the five countries. Venezuela joined the Andean Group in February, 1973; and Argentina and even Mexico send observers to meetings of the organization. An important multinational organization, the **Corporación Andina de Fomento (Andean Development Corporation)** pursues vigorously the various integrative industrial projects of the Andean Group. Of all the various Latin American integrative attempts, the Andean Group

appears to be the most promising at present. Members of the organization are now talking about establishing an Andean Court of Justice, whose main task would be to settle disputes related to the various agreements among the Andean Group.

During 1967-1969, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay entered into a Treaty of the Plata Basin for collaboration in development of economic projects involving and exploiting the confluence of the Paraná, Uruguay, and Paraguay rivers, all of which flow directly or indirectly into the Plata Basin. Brazil and Argentina have now agreed to construct a large dam to tap the hydroelectric potentiality of the Paraná River. The Rio Plata republics held their Fifth Conference of Foreign Ministers during December 4-8, 1972, and seem to be making moderate progress.

At one time, the successes of the **Organization of Central American States** (known everywhere by its Spanish initials, ODECA) and the **Central American Common Market (CACM)** seemed to offer the most brilliant hopes for Latin American integrative efforts. The July, 1969, war between El Salvador and Honduras blasted all of that and the whole movement for Central American collaboration seems to have reached an impasse from which it will not soon recover.

### NOTE ON SOURCES

Information in the *Guide* is drawn from numerous news sources, including newspapers and news journals as they come to the attention of the author. Also, information is checked with almanacs, statistical reports, encyclopedias, atlases, and the like.

Certain publications which the *Guide* has used more or less regularly include the weekly *Times of the Americas*, a complete U.S. 8-page tabloid newspaper devoted exclusively to news about Latin America; the Mexican weekly, *Tiempo*, distributed in the United States as *Hispanoamericano*, and the *Latin American Digest*, published until recently by Professor Marvin Alisky, then the Director of the Center of Latin American Studies at Arizona State University. In preparation of this edition of the *Guide*, it was possible to double check data from other news sources by consulting the excellent publication edited by Professors Kenneth Ruddell and Philip Gillette, *Latin American Political Statistics* (Los Angeles: Latin American Center, University of California, 1972). In preparation of this fifteenth edition of the *Guide*, the author has also benefited greatly from the work of Professor William E. Ratliff, ed., *1971 Yearbook on Latin American Communist Affairs* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971). Where there are references to Communist parties or movements, the *Guide* checked with the *Yearbook* to help determine the accuracy of its other sources.

The author is much indebted both to the sources he has mentioned and many others to which he has not made specific reference. In a very few instances, usually because of conflict with other information, the *Guide* has not followed its sources exactly. In cases where there are errors, it is the *Guide*, and the *Guide* alone, that is at fault.

—J. L. B.



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