

LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL GUIDE

Twelfth Edition


1969

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\$1.00

This biennial publication summarizes the environment of politics, recent political history, political movements and leaders, structure and processes of government, and leading political problems, in the twenty republics of Latin America. There is a section on the international relations of Latin America, including relations with the United States and Communist blocs, Latin American foreign policies, and institutions for hemispheric collaboration.



The Guide is designed to keep the student and general reader informed on current political developments and issues in all the republics of Latin America. It supplements other readings on Latin American governments, politics, and international relations. It is used in courses in political science, history, and Latin American affairs. The Guide appears every two years. Juniper Editions will promptly fill all bookstore and other orders for the Guide, for use during 1969 and 1970.


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LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL GUIDE, 1969
Events Since Publication

BOLIVIA

President: Alfredo Ovando Candía, military, seized power September 26-27, 1969, from constitutional president, Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas, civilian. Siles, vice president with President René Barrientos Ortuño, military, occupied the office April 27, 1969, after Barrientos was killed in a helicopter accident.

BRAZIL

President: Emílio Garrastazú Médici, military, inaugurated October 30, 1969, after Congress (especially convened for the occasion) gave its approval under military pressure. This followed a month of rule by a military junta, after President Artur da Costa e Silva suffered a stroke, August 29. Vice-President Pedro Aleixo, civilian, was disregarded. New constitution (the seventh), adopted October 30, 1969.

CHILE

Next presidential elections: September, 1970. Inauguration, November, 1970. See Guide, 1971-1972, appearing January 15, 1971.

COLOMBIA

Next presidential elections: April 19, 1970.

Candidates: National Front, Misael Pastrana Borrero, Conservative. Others: Belisario Betancur, Evaristo Sourdís, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla.

COSTA RICA

Next presidential elections: February 1, 1970.

Candidates: José Figueres, PLN; Mario Echandi Jiménez, PUN. Both former presidents. PUN badly split.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Next presidential elections: May 16, 1970.

Candidates: Joaquín Balaguer, Partido Reformista Dominicano, incumbent president; Elías Wessin y Wessin, military, Partido Quisqueyano Democrático. Election of Wessin could move the Dominican Republic far to the right, possibly back into something like the trujillista dictatorship.

GUATEMALA

Next presidential elections: March 1, 1970.

Candidates: Mario Fuentes Pieruccini, PR; Carlos Arana Osorio, military, MLN, very popular and very conservative; Jorge Lucas Caballero, PDC (Partido Demócrata Cristiano).

MEXICO

Next presidential elections: July 5, 1970.

Candidates: Luis Echeverría Álvarez, PRI; Efraín González Morfín, PAN. Echeverría, Secretary of the Interior (Gobernación) in administration of President Díaz Ordaz, will be inaugurated December 1, 1970.

PANAMA

President: Demetrio B. Lukas, civilian, sworn in December 19, 1969, as president under direction of Omar Torrijos, military, who is running the country.

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LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL SUMMARY	2
NORTHERN LATIN AMERICA	5
Mexico	6
Guatemala	9
El Salvador	10
Honduras	11
Nicaragua	12
Costa Rica	13
Panama	14
Puerto Rico	15
Dominican Republic	16
Haiti	17
Cuba	18
SOUTH AMERICA	19
Argentina	20
Uruguay	22
Chile	23
Venezuela	24
Colombia	25
Ecuador	26
Peru	27
Bolivia	28
Paraguay	29
Brazil	30
LATIN AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	33
Relations With the United States	33
Relations With the Communist Blocs	35
Latin American Foreign Policies	37
Inter-American Cooperation	38

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LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL SUMMARY

The Guide has long contended that it is important whether or not Latin America makes progress toward the achievement of viable constitutional democracy. No system of popular government can solve all human problems. However, the political history of this hemisphere offers no instance where tyranny has achieved social progress as rapidly as it has been accomplished in freedom. In most cases, the Latin American episodes of dictatorship have been periods of cultural stagnation and economic deterioration--except for the construction of gaudy public works and glittering monuments to the tyrants. Even where a highly authoritarian regime can point to some material progress -- as, possibly, in Argentina or (according to some) in Cuba, the experience in dictatorship and the loss of practice in the arts of democratic government may well prepare a country for forms of authoritarianism which offer little in the way of economic or social amelioration. Also, the oppressive hand of tyranny will be quite likely to deprive a country of the rich cultural development so essential for the flourishing of the arts, invention, and general human betterment.

Before we enter upon our brief discussion of Latin American accomplishments and failures in the achievement of democratic government, we should indicate the meaning we give to the term democracy. It is often contended that democracy has so many meanings to so many different people, that it cannot be defined. The Guide disagrees with that view, and contends that the idea of democracy has evolved in the western world for over two thousand years, and that we of the West should be particularly able to define its meaning. At the very least, the Guide knows that when it uses the word democracy, it means the following:

A social-political condition where the maximum possible numbers of people enjoy (1) individual rights and freedom of choice, (2) security under the rule of law, and (3) meaningful participation in decision-making, during the maximum possible time.

The 11th edition of the Guide, 1967, contended for an optimistic long-range view of the prospects for the achievement of democratic government in Latin America. The Guide proposed that, despite some setbacks, as in Argentina, the prospects in terms of generations or half-centuries were for a long and painful but generally upward evolution toward constitutional democracy. Some very serious reversals of this trend, especially in Brazil, Peru, and Panama, should make the Guide less sanguine about this prediction. Likewise, the trend of the world seems to be away from popular understanding of or support for the principles of democratic government. Almost 200 years after the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789, the virility seems to have gone out of the democratic message, and its spirit or philosophy to be a matter more for calumny and abuse than for ringing cries of popular zeal. Furthermore, new instrumentalities of tyranny are so totally effective in bringing whole populations into patterns of unquestioning submission, that the overthrow of modern authoritarianisms becomes increasingly rare. Modern-day devices of communication and propaganda are added to refinements in surveillance and police control, and are further supplemented by the ingenious device of expropriating property and turning it all over to the monolithic State. The citizen remains bereft of all means of defense and in 1969-1970 is even denied the satisfaction he might acquire through the personal nourishment of a philosophy of freedom. Finally, the tyrannies themselves have learned to

utilize the slogans of democracy, so that even men who would be free from the chains of oppression do not know where to turn for relief from the ominous trend.

Seen in these worldwide terms, the eternal struggle between tyranny and freedom may be thought to be finally moving toward its conclusion. Tyranny, which has worn the guises of personal dictatorship, absolutist monarchy, fascism, Nazism, and Oriental satrapy, may by now have found the means to achieve its final victories over the democratic idea. Without some aid from elsewhere, it may seem that Latin American democracy, like freedoms around the world, is being gradually sucked into a maw of tyranny not unlike that foreseen in George Orwell's 1984. In view of its previous optimistic stance, the Guide will withhold judgment on that gloomy view of the future; but must admit that, temporarily at least, the current Latin American scene offers small room for cheerfulness.

By the rather arbitrary criteria established by the Guide, at least a decade of full democratic success must pass before a country can move into the democratic columns. By that standard, Venezuela now deserves an unquestioned place, along with Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay. The reader will detect (p. 22) that the democracy of Uruguay has suffered grievous reverses during the past two years, and that her own position in the democratic column is seriously jeopardized.

Peru, for which the Guide expressed much hope in 1967, has now been taken over by a mindless military cabal, and so descends our rather arbitrary ladder to the "tyrannical or authoritarian" category; but the Guide believes that sufficient progress has been made in the Dominican Republic and Guatemala -- and against overwhelming odds -- to justify us in moving them up from the "unsettled, authoritarian" status to that of the "precariously semi-democratic". Honduras, Bolivia, and Ecuador, are still candidates for spontaneous political combustion, and so remain in the "unsettled, authoritarian" category.

Republics which are in classifications other than "tyrannical or authoritarian" seem capable of making political adjustments, of moving about from one part of the spectrum to another. What is more distressing is that those that get to the "tyrannical or authoritarian" class seem to be almost permanently incapable of getting out of it. Democracy, in other words, is a far more fragile phenomenon than is tyranny; and, whereas a democratic government may be torn asunder in a day, it may require generations to put back together the delicate elements required for its reconstruction. It is for these reasons that the Guide sadly reports the addition of three Latin American republics -- Brazil, Peru, and Panama -- to the "tyrannical or authoritarian" category. On the basis of the discussion that is to follow, the Guide ranges the republics of Latin America, 1969, in about the following manner, and in the order within each category as shown:

	1969	(1967)
<u>Relatively stable democracies</u> (Costa Rica, Chile, Venezuela, Uruguay)	4	(4)
<u>Precariously semi-democratic</u> (Colombia, Mexico, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Guatemala) . . .	5	(5)
<u>Unsettled, with strongly authoritarian tendencies</u> (Honduras, Bolivia, Ecuador)	3	(6)
<u>Tyrannical or authoritarian</u> (Haiti, Cuba, Brazil, Peru, Argentina, Panama, Paraguay, Nicaragua)	8	(5)

The evidence is overwhelming that possession of rich resources, favorable climate, optimum population density, fine soil, and the like, are quite irrelevant to the development of the institutions of secure popular government. Some of the most successful democracies in the world, such as that of Iceland, are almost totally lacking in these elements; and those, such as Argentina, which possess abundant gifts of nature, seem to be forever incapable of establishing permanent democratic government. Rather, it seems clear that the principal requirements for development of Latin American political democracy include:

1. Education of populations and leaders. Not only are illiterate citizens unable to participate knowledgeably in the political process; but their leaders are often very imperfectly educated, and share many of the same prejudices that afflict their even less educated fellows.


2. Land distribution, rational taxation of all land values, termination of neo-feudalism, emergence of a large middle class of independent proprietors in agriculture, trade, and manufacture. Some Latin American urban centers are undergoing change in these directions, but medieval practices still dominate much of the countryside and even the mentalities of many urban dwellers. Devices which would help to speed improvement would include conscious programs of distribution of unused or poorly used land; rational value-taxation of both rural and urban land, to discourage parasitical, non-productive holdings and speculation; removal of taxation from improvements on land, to encourage their multiplication; and improvement in the physical conditions of the countryside, to stop the headlong flight into city slums.

3. Economic, social, ethnic, geographic integration. Emergence of middle-class elements, education, linguistic and cultural assimilation, and improvement of transportation and communications, are contributing to the internal integration of several republics. Many observers agree that the pace must be quickened.

4. More self-disciplined, responsible, socially conscious leaders. These must be people who can provide their countries with actual experience for an appreciable time in stable self-government, and who have the good sense to leave office at the ends of their constitutional terms. Men who have the wit and conscience to lay groundwork for forthcoming liberties, are more revered than are the corrupt, venal tyrants who ill-prepare their peoples for self-government.

5. An end to proportional representation and adoption of single-member constituencies for election to office. In country after country, a multitude of political parties flourish because proportional representation offers them an opportunity to secure a few legislative seats. PR, which is adopted from European practice, is preferred because it affords opportunities for all shades of opinion to be heard. Therein lies its major defect, in that the participation of a myriad of squabbling parties brings governmental policy-making to a state of virtual paralysis, thus contributing to the emergence of dictatorship and the suppression of all true public opinion of whatever shade.

The Guide repeats that it considers the greatest resource of Latin America to be its people. Idealistic Latin American people, many of them immensely courageous, are forging an epic struggle against mounting problems arising from historical and social adversity. If free government is ever securely achieved in Latin America, it will be because of the heroic efforts of those Latin American people, and not because of the expressions of this Guide.



MEXICO

Area: 760,000 sq. mi.

Population: 46,000,000.

President: Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, civilian, took office December 1, 1964, for a six-year term.

In territorial size, Mexico is the fifth country of the hemisphere, being exceeded by Canada, the United States, Brazil, and Argentina; and she is third in population, behind only the United States and Brazil. Like most large nations, Mexico possesses poor, dry soil as well as productive lands. Her resources are generally plentiful, especially in oil. Most of her 46 million people, who are largely mestizo with important numbers of Indians and fewer of unmixed European descent, live in the central and southern highlands of the country. Because of her exotic Indian cultures, many U.S. travellers consider Mexico to be among the most "foreign" countries of Latin America.

Mexico is divided by her precipitous geography and by ethnic variety. However, many parts of the republic are increasingly linked by a network of highways and railroads as well as by airlines. Mexico relies heavily on her nationalized railroads for freight and passengers alike. In contrast to their experiences in the United States, rail passengers in Mexico receive tolerable and considerate service to almost all parts of the republic. By way of ethnic integration, governments since the Revolution have succeeded notably in bringing the Indian into meaningful contact with Mexican national life.

With overthrow of Dictator Porfirio Díaz in 1911, it was hoped that a long era of chaos and tyranny had finally come to an end. But Francisco Madero, the revolutionary president, was assassinated in 1913 and it was not until 1917 that a new constitution was adopted and some semblance of order introduced into Mexican political life. The aims of the Revolution, as least as expressed in the Constitution of 1917, were effective suffrage, no re-election, thorough social reform, anti-clericalism, and mass education. Since 1920, Mexico has gone through the formalities of electing her presidents in an increasingly orderly manner, though with no hope for opposition candidates. The administration of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) stressed agrarian reform, nationalization of oil resources, betterment of working conditions and bargaining powers of laboring people, and an educational program designed to lift Mexico out of illiteracy. The regime of Adolfo López Mateos (1958-1964) stressed distribution of the land to individual proprietors, and there was nationalization of some foreign-owned companies, notably the Mexican Light and Power Company. The administration claimed it had distributed 40 million acres, or one-fourth of all the land made available to farmers since the Revolution.

President Díaz Ordaz, 56, was Secretary of the Interior (Gobernación) under President López Mateos. His regime is more conservative than the norm, but determined to carry on the constructive reforms of its predecessor. President Díaz Ordaz emphasizes fiscal responsibility, continued land reform and education, and encouragement to investment. In common with other countries of the world which have become targets of Castroite-Maoist violence, Mexico has suffered an unusual period of extreme civil disturbance, especially among students. During the spring of 1967, coordinated outbreaks of rioting and destruction occurred at the National University in México, D.F., and among stu-

dents and others in the states of Michoacán, Guerrero, Tabasco, Sonora, Chihuahua, Campeche, and Tamaulipas. During August of 1968, just as Mexico was preparing for the international Olympic games, the performance was repeated. Violent student protests and demonstrations broke out simultaneously around the country, and more particularly in Mexico City. In an unheard of step, armed forces occupied the campus of the National University temporarily. From time to time, Mexican police announce confiscation of huge quantities of anti-government propaganda, as well as plans for sabotage, which they allege emanate from China or Cuba. All this does not prevent Mexico from continuing diplomatic relations with the fidelist regime.

Public tranquility is not helped by the persistent continuismo whereby the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) shifts its own people in and out of the presidency and most other elective posts. A conservative opposition party, Partido Acción Nacional, does exist, offers presidential candidates, usually elects a very few deputies (presently one) from the constituencies to Congress, and is enjoying some electoral victories at the state and municipal levels. At present, there are eighteen mayors, including those of Hermosillo (Sonora) and Mérida (Yucatán) from the PAN. PAN holds a few seats in municipal ayuntamientos (councils), including a majority in the city of Mérida. State governments are a stronghold of the PRI, but of the seven members of the legislature of Yucatán, two are from PAN. PAN is presently led by Manuel González Híjónosa.

A tiny Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana (PARM) was founded in 1954, and seems hardly distinguishable from PRI. A legal party, Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), was led by Vicente Lombardo Toledano until his death November 16, 1968, and represents the Soviet Communist position in public debate and the Chamber of Deputies. Other Communist and pro-Communist activity is divided among several factions, including the illegal Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM). A left-wing faction of the official PRI calls ex-President Lázaro Cárdenas its mentor. Interests of Peking and Havana are handled by groups such as Frente Electoral del Pueblo (FEP), Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN), and the extremely violent Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP).

In presidential elections, votes for the PRI normally constitute about 85 per cent of the total, with somewhat larger support for PAN in the Federal District (Mexico City) than in the small cities and rural areas. Votes for other legal opposition parties is usually negligible. In congressional votes of July, 1967, 84 per cent of the vote went to PRI candidates; 12 per cent to PAN; and 2 per cent each to PPS and PARM. In the same election, PRI candidates won 88 per cent of the vote outside the Federal District and 65 per cent of the vote within it. Except in Sonora, where the PRI candidate won the governorship after a fierce battle, there was no effective opposition to the PRI in gubernatorial contests.

Dominance by the PRI results in part from long usage and resultant patterns of power, from use of public facilities for propaganda purposes, from some restrictions which lesser officialdom imposes on opposition candidates, and from integration of labor, agrarian, and popular organizations into the PRI. Miscounting of votes and intimidation of voters no doubt occur, especially in the countryside, but may be unnecessary.

Under constitutional reforms of 1963, the Chamber of Deputies has come to include up to 35 opposition members, and minor parties are enjoying an unaccustomed respect in that body. In addi-

tion to 178 deputies elected from the various constituencies and called diputados de mayoría (presently PRI 176, PAN 1, PARM 1), an opposition party may now earn up to twenty additional seats for diputados de partido, in proportion to its total vote over the nation, at the rate of two seats for each 1 per cent of the total that the party secures. In the current Chamber, the PAN occupies nineteen such seats, with a few additional diputado de partido seats allotted to PPS and PARM.

The Senate has sixty members, two from each state and the Federal District. Its "debates" are never marred by the presence of any opposition member, and all legislation passes unanimously.

The Mexican Congress is weakened by the fact that the principle of no reelección, which was certainly necessary to prevent interminable regimes such as that of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1880 and 1884-1911), was also imposed on the national legislative chambers. Consequently, the Chamber of Deputies is renewed totally each three years, and the Senate each six -- though individual members may be re-elected after an intervening term. What is needed in the Congress is some continuismo which would lend experience and seniority to a portion of the members.

Whether because of, regardless of, or in spite of the PRI, some aspects of Mexican life are improving. Mexico City is now as clean and modern as most other great capital cities of the world -- and, like several other Latin American capitals (e.g., Buenos Aires, Santiago) is probably more secure and sanitary than Washington, D.C. Several state capitals have undertaken programs of sanitation, electrification, and beautification. Mexican GNP growth rates are reported as exceeding 6 per cent, well over the population growth of 3.6 per cent per year. Actual food production is now increasing at a rate that matches general economic growth. If one includes income from tourist revenue, Mexico enjoys a favorable trade balance of about \$250,000. Educational efforts are finally making an important dent in illiteracy, which today does not afflict over 30 per cent of the population.

Nevertheless, many of these benefits are confined to urban Mexico. Poverty of no less than two thirds of the population is still intense. Sanitation in large parts of the country is virtually unknown. Rural life can hardly be distinguished from that of El Salvador or Honduras. The poverty of rural Mexico is matched by the display of wealth on the part of the new class of political leaders and the gentry who cooperate with the ruling official party. There are cynics who contend that this is where most of the returns from economic growth have gone.

Agrarian reform has stressed officially sponsored, cooperative-type ejido units wherein land is shared out among the farm workers and financing, marketing and community betterment are handled on a collaborative basis under direction by the Banco Ejidal and other government agencies. The Díaz Ordaz administration has turned increasingly to individual land distribution and creation of a large class of self-motivated proprietors. It will not be surprising if food production increases correspondingly.



GUATEMALA

Area: 42,050 sq. mi.

Population: 5,000,000.

President: Julio César Méndez Montenegro, civilian, took office July 1, 1966, for a four-year term.

The most thickly populated part of Guatemala is precipitous, volcanic, and beautiful. Many isolated Indian communities retain much of their original cultures. Though the population is overwhelmingly Indian, the Indians play but small part in Guatemalan politics. Rural ladino (non-Indian) land owners, military officers and middle-class urban elements dominate political activity.

The political history of Guatemala is characterized by long periods of heavy-handed dictatorship punctuated from time to time by shorter intervals of chaotic "democracy". The last long-term dictator was Jorge Ubico (1931-1944), a reactionary tyrant of the "public works" type. During 1944-1954, Guatemala was ruled by the increasingly radical regimes of Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz. In June of 1954 the Arbenz government was overthrown by Guatemalans under leadership of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. The rebels entered from Honduras, and enjoyed a quick victory because of some indirect U.S. help and because the Guatemalan army refused to support the pro-Communist regime of Jacobo Arbenz.

In June, 1957, a personal guard assassinated "elected" President Carlos Castillo Armas. At the end of March, 1963, a military cabal overthrew constitutionally elected President Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes. Under direction of Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, an illegal junta ruled until inauguration of elected President Julio César Méndez Montenegro, an enlightened civilian, July 1, 1966. On May 4, 1966, the fourth Guatemalan constitution in thirty years was proclaimed.

The most durable Guatemalan party is that of President Méndez, Partido Revolucionario (PR). PR is democratic and reformist, and led by civilian liberals. A second and much newer party, Partido Institucional Democrático (PID) represents the conservative and military point of view. A third party, Movimiento Liberación Nacional (MLN), which was formed around the person of Castillo Armas, is now disintegrating. At present, PR holds a solid majority of seats in the unicameral congress, and PID occupies fifteen legislative seats. Interests of the countries of the Communist blocs, particularly Cuba and its Peking-type approach to world affairs, are administered by two dangerous terrorist groups, the Movimiento Trece de Noviembre (Revolutionary November 13 Movement), and Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR). These organizations have brought terror to a new pitch of refinement. They shoot civilians indiscriminately, kidnap patrones for ransom, ambush soldiers, bomb power plants, and destroy military vehicles. They have now carried their arts of violence from the countryside into Guatemala City, where they murdered two U.S. Embassy military attachés on January 16, 1968, and the U.S. Ambassador, John Gordon Mein, on August 28. Meantime, a socially unconscious right wing carries on its own program of terrorism under the ominous name, White Hand, and undertakes to suppress radicalism by murdering as many "communists" as possible. Among its victims was Miss Guatemala of 1950, who was killed during January, 1968.

In the midst of these events, President Méndez attempts to undertake a program of modernization, land reform, education, tax reform, and the preservation of democratic liberties. It need hardly be added that his difficulties are considerable.

EL SALVADOR

Area: 8,260 sq. mi.

Population: 3,200,000.

President: Fidel Sánchez Hernández, military, took office July 1, 1967, for a five-year term.

El Salvador, the smallest country in Latin America, is a very crowded, eroded, and monopolized land. Traditionally, a very few families have owned most of the national territory and have dominated politics. Living and cultural standards are low, though undergoing some improvement under prodding of recent governments. It is notable that despite extreme population density (almost 390 per square mile) and an almost utter lack of resources, the economic and social problems of the country are no more severe than are those of less thinly populated and much better endowed neighbors. By Central American standards, both highway and railroad communications are well developed.

Salvadoran politics are characterized by periods of quasi-democracy under the guidance of military presidents, punctuated by periodic adjustments by force of the patterns of power. It is becoming typical for vigorously reformist, pro-democratic movements to seize power, undertake programs of social reform, and then permit themselves to be overwhelmed by the powerful oligarchic spirit of resistance to change. After the harsh and bizarre dictatorship of Maximiliano Hernández Martínez (1931-1944), followed by a revolt and the presidency of General Salvador Castañeda Castro, another golpe introduced a period of one-party rule with reformist trimmings under Presidents Oscar Osorio (1950-1956) and José María Lemus (1956-1960), both military. In 1960, a bloodless golpe overthrew the Lemus regime. After promulgation of a new, socially conscious constitution, elections of 1962 brought Julio A. Rivera, again military, to power, and the cycle began over again. President Rivera undertook vigorous social and political reforms which seemed to promise a new era of social consciousness and democracy for El Salvador. Elections of March 5, 1967, secured victory for the official candidate, Col. Fidel Sánchez Hernández, and the reformist program continued, but in a more relaxed manner.

Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN) is the leading and official party. Its members currently occupy 27 seats in the 52-member unicameral congress, and it can expect to secure over half the vote in presidential elections. The Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) is enjoying ascendancy, with 19 members in congress. Many alcaldes, including José Napoleón Duarte, mayor of the capital city of San Salvador, are of the PDC. A Partido de Acción Renovadora (PAR) has survived from the period before the 1960 revolution, and under leadership of Dr. Fabio Castillo is moving from a moderate-liberal to extreme left position. A Partido Popular Salvadoreño (PPS) is rightist and nationalist, with five members in the congress. Smaller personalista and illegal Castroite-type parties (e.g., Partido Revolucionario Abril y Mayo) complete the political spectrum.

During the PCN regimes of Julio A. Rivera and Fidel Sánchez Hernández, El Salvador has been treated to an unaccustomed degree of election freedom and party competition, as well as freedom of public expression. Though the tempo of reform has slackened, widespread electrification and land reform have been pushed, and the government is devoting large amounts to education.

HONDURAS

Area: 43,300 sq. mi.

Population: 2,500,000.

President: Osvaldo López Arellano, military, seized power on October 5, 1963; took office as constitutional president, June 6, 1965, for a six-year term.

Honduras, one of the least developed countries of Latin America, is notably plagued by poverty, illiteracy, and lack of internal communications. There is a dirt highway to the Caribbean coast. There is no cross-country railroad transportation, and many towns of the republic have no modern land communication with each other. The population is notoriously unschooled. Politics remains as underdeveloped as the social and economic framework wherein it must function.

During 1932-1948, the dictatorship of General Tiburcio Carías Andino, Partido Nacional (conservative), ruled Honduras. A moderate, conservative constitutional government of Juan Manuel Gálvez ruled during 1949-1954, to be followed by an illegal usurpation of power by Julio Lozano Díaz as "Chief of State", 1954-1956. A year later a constitutional assembly declared Dr. Ramón Villeda Morales, Partido Liberal, to be president.

The government of President Villeda, 1957-1963, tried desperately to extricate the country from feudalism. Important programs for education and land reform were in progress. Both extreme right-wing and left-wing elements joined in their usual determination to sow social chaos and make democracy impossible.

On October 3, 1963, in one of the more meaningless Latin American assaults on democratic government, a military cabal seized power and set up a ruling junta. Elections for a constitutional assembly, February 16, 1965, yielded a comfortable majority for the Partido Nacional. The assembly, in a style which is becoming a standard Honduran process, wrote a new constitution, converted itself into a national congress, and then elected the leader of the military junta, Osvaldo López Arellano, to be the next president. Meanwhile, López had been promoted from colonel to general.

The leading parties, Liberal and Nacional, have competed for power by force and by elections. The ascendancy of Communist groups, or the allegation of their ascendancy, was partly responsible for the right-wing nacionalista military golpe against the distinguished President Villeda Morales.

The present six-year term of President López is supposed to end June 6, 1971. According to a very strong provision of the Constitution of 1965, he may not succeed himself in office. Provided there is no new upset in these constitutional arrangements, and provided further that elections are actually held, a strong contender for nomination by the Partido Liberal will be Carlos Roberto Reina, an economist of some distinction and former ambassador to London.

A one-house congress, whose members are elected for a six-year term corresponding with that of the president, constitutes the legislative branch of Honduran government. Predictably, the presidential Partido Nacional occupies the majority of congressional seats. Also, the constitution provides the president with powers sufficiently ample to permit him to dominate the legislative scene. The fact is that President López Arellano is running a strong, dictatorial-type regime. Honduras, which needs almost everything, finds that democracy does not come easily.

NICARAGUA

Area: 54,000 sq. mi.

Population: 1,800,000.

President: Anastasio Somoza Debayle, military, took office May 1, 1967, for a four-year term.

Nicaragua, a mestizo republic of Central America, is only partly integrated. There is railroad and highway transportation among the Spanish-speaking cities near the Pacific coast. One dirt highway now extends from Managua to the Caribbean side. Many places along the Caribbean are not only disconnected from the rest of the republic insofar as land communication is concerned, but are also populated by English-speaking Caribbean-type people who are out of touch with the rest of the country. At least two thirds of the people are illiterate, social stratification is rigid, and poverty is deep and widespread.

The Somozas have ruled Nicaragua since 1933. Anastasio Somoza founded the dynasty, first occupied the presidency in 1936, and either ruled through puppets or as president until he was assassinated in 1956. His son, Luis Anastasio Somoza Debayle, a civilian, served as president during 1957-1963, and subsequently died. After an interval under two presidents (René Schick Gutiérrez, died; and Lorenzo Guerrero Gutiérrez) who were loyal to the Somozas, another of the Somoza sons, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, chief of the national guard, was elected on February 5, 1967, and took office the following May 1.

In Nicaragua, the United States has not made an enviable record. U. S. armed forces were stationed in the country during most of 1912-1933. Until 1961, the U.S. Embassy carried on a notoriously close affiliation with the hated Somozas. In Nicaragua, the United States has made important contributions to the "anti-imperialist" explosion that is still to come.

The Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN) is the political instrument of the Somozas. Despite the heavy hand of the interminable dictatorship, opposition parties do function in a precarious manner. The principal one, Partido Conservador Tradicional (PCT), publishes a big opposition daily, La Prensa, which is outspoken against the regime. It is said by knowledgeable scholars in the field, including especially Dr. Marvin Alisky of Arizona State University, that the regime permits publication of La Prensa to maintain a democratic façade. The conservatives are badly rent by factionalism.

Other parties are small and ineffective. The Partido Socialista de Nicaragua (PSN) is tiny but exercises much influence in labor and intellectual circles. A violent group, known as the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandino Front of National Liberation, FSLN; named for Augusto César Sandino), promotes Communist-bloc interests and is supported by students and others. Within the PLN itself, opposition to the Somoza dynasty is currently led by Ramiro Sacasa.

Nicaragua has the only bicameral congress in Central America. The minority candidate for president in the preceding election, as well as living "elected" ex-presidents, may also sit in the senate. Needless to say, the Nicaraguan Constitution of 1950, as amended to this date, provides the president with such a broad range of powers that he need not fear any threat to his regime from within the "constitutional order".

In Nicaragua, so-called presidential elections are often vicious affairs. The next is set for February 5, 1971.

COSTA RICA

Area: 19,600 sq. mi.

Population: 1,600,000.

President: José Joaquín Trejos Fernández, civilian, took office May 8, 1966, for a four-year term.

Costa Rica is a beautiful micro-republic with deep-green rolling hills, active volcanoes, fertile valleys, and a central plateau characterized by numerous individually owned plots of land, delightful towns (e.g., Alajuela, Cartago, Heredia), many smaller pastoral villages, and the very civilized capital city of San José. Though conditions of life away from her central plateau are far from idyllic, they are better than those of other countries of Central America; and about three-fourths of the population live on the meseta central. Highway communications are good, and a network of paved roads connect the many little towns of central Costa Rica. Efficient railroad lines carry both passengers and freight between San José and the coasts.

When Costa Rica was first settled during the middle of the sixteenth century, Spanish colonists found no precious metals but plenty of ferocious Indians who refused to be enslaved. Because of lack of wealth or slaves, Spanish settlers had to perform their own labor, and be content with the small plots of land they could manage by themselves. To this day, the proportion of proprietors of land to the total population is higher in Costa Rica than in any other part of Latin America. There can be little doubt that this factor alone goes far to explain the phenomenal Costa Rican success in the development of democratic institutions.

Costa Rica has enjoyed relatively stable popular or semi-popular government since 1889, and there were but few out-and-out dictators before that. Civilians have almost always occupied the presidency. The press is unrestrained. Political contest, though very heated, is seldom violent. Exceptions to this pattern occurred in 1917-1919 and 1948.

Costa Rican parties center around leading personalities, but do have some recognizable ideological tendencies. Partido de Unificación Nacional (PUN) is led by President Trejos, and gathers together several conservative, traditional or personalista elements. Among these are a Partido Republicano Nacional, led by the aging (medical) Dr. Rafael Calderón Guardia, who was president during 1940-1944 and was almost installed by fraud in 1948. In the latter instance, José Figueres led a revolution which restored constitutional order. Mario Echandi, a popular figure and moderate president during 1958-1962, may form a Partido Auténtico Republicano as a device to run as presidential candidate in 1970.

A leading party is Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN), which despite its ominous name is a democratic reformist-socialist party under guidance of José Figueres, ex-president (1953-1958), and prominent in Latin American pro-democratic causes. Figueres will be the PLN candidate in 1970. Communists have long been led by Manuel Mora, and publish a daily paper, Libertad. Their party, called Vanguardia Popular, may not participate in elections, and has little impact on Costa Rican politics.

At present, PLN holds 29 and PUN 28 seats in the 57-member unicameral legislative assembly. In Costa Rica, the legislative branch is very powerful, and the Constitution of 1949 hems in the president with so many limitations that he can only play a strong rôle when he enjoys a legislative majority. The Constitution contains many ingenious protections against abuse of authority.

PANAMA

Area: 29,200 sq. mi.

Population: 1,400,000.

Presidency: Occupied provisionally by a military junta under direction of Colonels José M. Pinilla (nominal head), Omar Torrijos, and others who come and go in an unpredictable fashion. Elections of some sort to occur in 1970.


Economic and political life of Panama is dominated by the presence of the United States at the Panama Canal. The United States is almost singly responsible for completion of all railroad, highway, and water routes both across and along the length of the Panamanian isthmus, and for a large share of the economic sustenance of the republic. Though considerations of nationalism prevent most Panamanians from discussing the matter, there can be no doubt of the important U.S. rôle in the Panamanian secession movement of 1903, whereby independence from Colombia was secured.

From the beginning, Panamanian politics have been marked by a modicum of orderly democratic government intermixed from time to time by outbreaks of wild violence and dashes of dictatorship. The present period is of the latter type. After an especially chaotic presidential campaign, during which the National Assembly tried to impeach outgoing President Marco Aurelio Robles on the grounds he was meddling in politics, Panamanians finally elected Arnulfo Arias, a colorful demagogue, May 12, 1968. Arias took office October 1, and was thrown out by the military on October 12. Apparently twelve days were enough to persuade the national guard that Arias would not do.

Panamanian parties, such as they are, are highly personalista. Politics are dominated by a few wealthy families, who are often related to one another. At times of presidential elections, the numerous small parties tend to coalesce around two or three candidates. For example, in elections of 1968, an Alianza del Pueblo was patched together to support the official candidate, David Samudio, and included Partido Laborista, Partido Liberal Nacional, Partido Progresista Nacional, and Movimiento de Liberación Nacional. Another coalition, Unión Nacional, advanced the candidacy of super-nationalist Arnulfo Arias. Unión Nacional included four undistinguished parties, plus the more vigorous and persistent Partido Panameñista. Finally, the Partido Demócrata Cristiano put forward Antonio González Revilla as its candidate. A very important force is the Federación de Estudiantes Panameños (Federation of Panamanian Students). This organization is enthusiastically leftist and nationalist, and heavily involved in anti-Yankee rioting associated with the Canal Zone.

The Canal Zone. Economy and society of the Panama City-Colón strip are dominated by the Canal Zone, which provides a large share of employment as well as income from trade, wages, and purchases. Most of the 15,000 Canal Zone employees are Panamanians. Under provisions of the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty of 1903, the Canal Zone is leased in perpetuity to the United States. The treaty never did come clear on the question of sovereignty, but both the Panamanian and U.S. flags now fly in the Zone. Panama receives an annual payment of \$1,930,000, and always seeks more.

After violent riots of January, 1964, which broke out when first U.S. and then Panamanian students tried to fly their respective flags at Balboa Highschool, the two countries finally agreed to enter into new negotiations over the canal. In December, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson announced the United States would under-



take to (1) enter into a new canal treaty with Panama, (2) establish a commission to study other routes for a new canal. In January, 1966, the United States presented a draft treaty to Panama providing for joint administration of the present canal, concession of most points demanded by Panama, and reversion of the entire operation to Panama by 1999. To date, nationalist agitation prevents Panama from acceding to the proposed treaty.

Meanwhile, the Interoceanic Canal Commission continues to investigate alternative routes; and the Colombians have formed a public corporation to undertake construction of a combined hydro-electric-canal project which would take advantage of existing rivers, extend 260 miles from the Gulf of Urabá on the Caribbean to Málaga Bay on the Pacific, and be adequate for smaller ships.

The present Canal Zone, cutting as it does through the very center of an erstwhile independent republic, provides a field day for agitation. Whatever the final decision of the canal commission, it seems unlikely that anyone in his right mind will propose continuing the canal at its present location, or anywhere else in Panama. A canal zone along the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border would not split any country in two, and could probably be purchased outright by the United States.

Puerto Rico

Area: 3,435 sq. mi.

Population: 2,500,000.

Governor: Luis A. Ferré, civilian, took office January, 1969, for a four-year term.

Since 1952 Puerto Rico has been known as an estado libre asociado, or free associated state. She exercises full authority over her internal affairs, including election of all legislative bodies and of her governor. The U.S. collects the customs but deposits them in the Puerto Rican treasury. There are no other federal taxes. U.S. currency and postal services are utilized, but Puerto Rico shoulders many costs of internal improvements that are a federal charge in the continental United States.

Much of Puerto Rico's internal progress must be attributed to the work of dynamic Governor Luis Muñoz Marín, 1949-1965. His government designed measures to encourage investment, break up big estates, promote low-cost housing, extend communications, promote education, and clean up politics.

Governor Ferré, a founder of the Partido Estadista Republicano (Republican Statehood Party), now leads the Partido Nuevo Progresista (New Progressive Party), but still favors statehood. Partido Popular Democrático (PPD), founded by ex-Governor Muñoz Marín into political difficulties when his successor, Roberto Sánchez Vilella, was divorced while serving as governor, and PPD refused to propose Sánchez' candidacy in 1968. In a 1967 plebiscite 60 per cent of voters indicated they prefer to continue the present relationship with the U.S., and 40 per cent voted for statehood. A tiny, violent Castroite group demands "independence".

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Area: 18,800 sq. mi.

Population: 4,000,000.

President: Joaquín Balaguer, civilian, took office July 1, 1966, for a four-year term.

The Dominican Republic occupies about two-thirds of the island of Hispaniola. The country is dominated by a plantation economy, mostly sugar and coffee. Its conditions of life, though at a low level, are not as appalling as those of Haiti. Over half its people are illiterate. Its population is of African, European, and mixed descent.

The Dominican Republic has seldom experienced meaningful constitutional democracy. From 1808 to 1866, it was periodically overrun or menaced by Haitians, French, or Spaniards. Between 1866 and 1930 most of its political experience was quite wild, with periods of violent anarchy alternating with rule by megalomaniacs or ineffective and corrupt civilian presidents. The U.S. marines occupied the country from 1916 to 1924.

From 1930 to 1961, the so-called Dominican Republic was ruled by "Generalísimo" Rafael Leónidas Trujillo. His was one of the most stifling tyrannies on record. With his assassination, May 30, 1961, the glory of "Dios y Trujillo" (God and Trujillo) and the "Benefactor de la Patria" evaporated into the vapid nothingness from whence it came. But tyranny and anarchy both emerge out of the lawlessness of an immature polity, and the years immediately after Trujillo were filled with turbulence, uncertainty, and political imposition. Finally, April 25, 1965, rebels overthrew an illegal civilian junta, and civil war broke out again. Then, after an absence of 31 years, the U.S. marines returned, and with OAS approval were joined by 1200 Brazilian troops and token contingents from a few other Latin American republics. Finally, after many months of fighting and useless loss of life, arrangements were made for a provisional government and presidential elections. Joaquín Balaguer, formerly a puppet president under Trujillo but an able administrator, was elected by 754,409 votes to 517,784 for Juan Bosch, who had been elected and overthrown during 1963.

Current leading parties are the Partido Reformista Dominicano, which supports President Balaguer and has a comfortable majority in both houses of the congress; Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, formerly Juan Bosch's party but now led into increasingly militant directions by José Francisco Peña Gómez; and a small Partido Democrático Cristiano. Foreign interests are promoted by the Partido Comunista Dominicano (U.S.S.R.), Movimiento Popular Dominicano (China) and Movimiento 14 de Julio (Cuba).

In presidential elections set for May, 1970, a Partido Quisquayista Dominicano (Quisquaya, the Indian name for the region), will run General Elías Wessin y Wessin, hard-nosed military leader of the right-wing faction in the revolution of 1965. Another likely candidate would be Col. Francisco Deñó, leftist leader in the same disturbance; but he disappeared in The Hague in October, 1967. The constitution permits reelection of an incumbent president, and it will be surprising if Balaguer does not run again. He has undertaken valiant efforts to improve administration and make democracy work in the Dominican Republic. Extremist elements are instigating violence to frustrate his plans. If there is an election at all, this will be a considerable achievement.

HAITI

Area: 10,700 sq. mi.

Population: 4,600,000.

President: François Duvalier, civilian, first took office September 22, 1957; subsequently, proclaimed himself president for life.

Haiti is next to the smallest Latin American country in area (El Salvador, 8,260 sq. mi.), and is the most densely populated. Illiteracy is about 90 per cent. Poverty is the most intense in the Western Hemisphere. A small, parasitic aristocratic class dominates political affairs. The country is overwhelmingly African in ethnic origin, with an overlay of French cultural veneer. The official language is French, but people not in the aristocratic classes generally speak a Creole language that combines early Norman French with elements of Spanish and African dialects.

Haiti has never known orderly, constitutional or democratic government. Chaos alternating with short dictatorships has been the political rule. Except for very short periods, as during her struggle for independence under the inspired leadership of the remarkable Toussaint l'Ouverture (died in prison, 1803), and perhaps during occupation of Haiti by the U.S. marines (1915-1934), Haitians have had no reason for political hope. She has had twenty different constitutions, and it is rare for a Haitian president to complete his term in a constitutional manner.

Political parties in the usual sense are unknown in Haiti. At times of presidential contest, groups will form around leading contenders. Meaningful elections are unknown, and presidents such as Duvalier are likely not to even trouble themselves with normal electoral formalities.

By various ruses, Duvalier prolonged his term to 1964. Then, a new "constitution" proclaimed him to be president for life. On June 14, 1964, ratification was secured in a nationwide referendum wherein the word oui was printed on all the ballots, which voters cast as received. The 1964 constitution grants sweeping powers to the president. There is no freedom of expression, and illiteracy is so widespread that few could read political views if their publication were permitted.

By using private thugs (tonton macoute) to enforce his rule, Duvalier has broken from army surveillance. Duvalier's sadistic hoods, who stalk about in black suits and dark glasses, are greatly feared by the terrorized Haitian populace. Individuals disappear mysteriously, and are said to be thrown to the sharks or tormented in Duvalier's dungeons. From time to time there are mass executions -- as on June 8, 1967, when nineteen officers of the palace guard were executed on the grounds they had plotted against François Duvalier. Haiti enjoys no program of U.S. aid, and Duvalier and his supporters absorb for their own personal use whatever funds flow into the treasury. It is common for the government to be dilatory about paying its employees. In November, 1968, they received paychecks for August and November, but were told to forget about payment for their services during September. Under the conditions of unpredictable terror which prevail throughout the republic, the populace learns to be silent in the face of adversity.

Haiti, which is located within the very shadow of the United States, is a republic that is utterly without hope. When one views the political conditions of all the Caribbean republics, one is led to wish that the force and prestige of the United States could have moved them to a better fate.

CUBA

Area: 44,200 sq. mi.

Population: 8,100,000.

"Premier": Fidel Castro Ruiz, civilian, seized power January 1, 1959; "President": Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, civilian, took office July 17, 1959. Both hold office for undefined terms.

The green West Indian beauty of Cuba is enhanced by mountainous regions at the western and eastern ends, by some forests, and by the many harbors that indent its 2500-mile coastline. The people are of European, African, and mixed descent, and the economy is dominated by plantation products, chiefly sugar and tobacco. Great haciendas, currently known in Cuba as "people's farms" and monopolized by the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (INRA), are the characteristic units of production. Before the 1959 revolution there was somewhat more individual proprietorship than in many Latin American countries, though much of the land was in the form of big estates held by foreigners as well as by Cubans. Today, all such proprietorship has been abolished, and monopoly by one institution, the state, is the preferred mode of production.

Cuba has never achieved prolonged constitutional order. Gerardo Machado, Fulgencio Batista, Fidel Castro, and others, have served as strongmen, with intermittent civilian governments characterized by indescribable corruption and nepotism. Until 1959, private American investment prevailed in much of the economy, and U.S. diplomats collaborated with reactionary regimes.

Since the first days of the fidelist revolution, the regime moved rapidly into the sphere of the Communist-bloc countries. The Partido Comunista Cubano is now the only legal party, and all contrary political views are suppressed relentlessly.

The only pretense at constitutional legality is a so-called organic law which was decreed on February 8, 1959. There is no congress, and there is no legitimized basis for either the "presidency" of Dorticós or the "premiership" of Castro. In 1964, Castro announced there will be neither elections nor opposition parties "in the forthcoming years". So-called "participatory democracy" is provided when massed throngs shout their enthusiastic approval of lengthy speeches by their leader, Fidel Castro. Most of the original 26 de julio revolutionary leaders have been shot, or imprisoned, or have fled the country, and their places have been taken by hardened Communist personnel.

It is not clear that all this has notably improved the material lot of Cuban life. Poverty in the lush Pearl of the Antilles was never so devastating as in most other Latin American countries, and downright hunger was not common. Today, everything is in short supply for everyone, and poverty is more equitably distributed than it was before. However, illiteracy, which even before Castro was lower than in most of Latin America, has been obliterated, though this may not mean an increase of cultural opportunities. Many recreational facilities have been made public.

In foreign affairs, the fidelist dictatorship depends upon the Soviet Union for economic and military aid and advice. The Cuban government adopts an unvarying pro-Soviet posture in all international relations. However, in her promotion of extreme violence and internal disruption in other countries, the Cuban practice comes much closer to that of Peking than of Moscow. Thus, riotous elements everywhere link the names of Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che Guevara with those of Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tsê-Tung.



ARGENTINA

Area: 1,072,000 sq. mi.

Population: 24,000,000.

President: Juan Carlos Onganía, military, seized power June 28, 1966, and inaugurated June 30, 1966, for an indefinite term.

Argentina possesses all the elements needed for creation of a powerful and prosperous nation. In territorial size she is the second largest republic of Latin America, and approaches the dimensions of India (population, 475,000,000). Argentina possesses all types of regional variation, including a part of the high Andes to the west, mountainous ranching and mining country to the northwest along the foothills of the Andes, the bare steppes of Patagonia to the south; and of course the pampa, which occupies a great arc to the north, west, and south of Buenos Aires, is about the size of Texas, and contains some of the richest black soil on earth. Argentine literacy, about 90 per cent, is the highest in Latin America. Even in bad times, Argentina enjoys one of the highest standards of living in the hemisphere.

Severe problems of cultural assimilation do not afflict the country. The population is overwhelmingly of European origin, generally Spanish, Italian, or German, in that order, and is known for its good health and physical stamina. Highway and especially railway communications are adequate.

Despite the richness of the soil, the countryside is only sparsely occupied; and metropolitan Buenos Aires, in many respects the finest city of the hemisphere, contains almost one third of the population of the country. If Argentina were to have the density of population of the United States, there would be about 70 million Argentines. But, the families who monopolize the land are satisfied to use it inadequately, often for extensive cattle raising. Consequently, this huge and fertile country contains only 24 million inhabitants.

Though José de San Martín secured the independence of the Argentine provinces in 1816, the country did not become an organized national state until 1862. Between 1829 and 1852, Juan Manuel de Rosas, caudillo governor of the province of Buenos Aires, was dictator of Argentina. After his overthrow by Justo José de Urquiza, a constitution was drawn up in 1853; but Buenos Aires was not brought into the federation until 1860. From then until 1930, Argentina was governed by a succession of presidents who were chosen under forms of election and who in many instances made important contributions to education, internal development, and civilian democracy. Among these, the names of Bartolomé Mitre (1862-1868), Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1868-1874), and Roque Sáenz Peña (1910-1913) are particularly renowned.

In 1930, with overthrow of the decrepit regime of President Hipólito Irigoyen (1916-1922 and 1928-1930), Argentina began her descent into a political maelstrom from which she has never emerged. The regime of Colonel Juan Domingo Perón took power in 1945 and was overthrown in September, 1955; and left upon Argentina a legacy of demagoguery and irresponsibility from which the republic has never recovered. A provisional government served until inauguration of elected Arturo Frondizi, May 1, 1958. In 1962, Frondizi was arrested by the army because he had allowed electoral gains to be made by peronistas; and was followed in the presidency by José María Guido, president of the senate. Elections of 1963 gave victory to (medical) Dr. Arturo Humberto Illía, and on June 28, 1966, the kindly but ineffectual President Illía

was in his turn overthrown by the military.

Prior to the Onganía dictatorship, a leading party was the Unión Cívica Radical, which was badly split into factions. There were numerous other parties -- some two hundred major and minor ones at last count, including various proponents of different shades of peronismo, both with and without Perón. Argentina was presumably governed by the Constitution of 1853, made famous by its brevity, as well as by its durability despite all reverses.

The Onganía dictatorship has its peculiar aspects, and is called a dictablanda -- according to its critics, more dicta than blanda. All parties have been abolished, and the government has announced that there will be no elections in the "near future". The Congress is shut down, and governors of all provinces have been replaced, with all pretense at federalism abolished. At the same time, and despite some "moral" censorship, the press remains politically free, and often condemns the regime in unbridled terms. The courts, completely reorganized by the military, have a good reputation for their independence of judgment, though the regime determines for itself which judicial decisions to respect.

In a peculiar reordering of the hierarchy of law, the Onganía government announces that the following have priority, from top to bottom: (1) an initial Argentine Revolutionary Act, (2) a Statute of the Argentine Revolution, (3) Constitution of the Argentine Republic of 1853, and (4) laws and decrees. A Revolutionary Council (junta) "granted" a new legal system, and named the President; and provided, through its Charter of the Revolution, that "in case of the incapacity or death of the President, his successor shall be chosen jointly by the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces". There is no clue as to when the regime intends to resume constitutional or democratic forms, though there is recent talk about a ten-year period. More surprisingly, the population suffered so grievously under previous governments that it seems to be enormously apathetic about the whole question.

Actually, though the Guide hesitates to admit it, the present Onganía regime is undertaking seriously needed transformations of Argentine politics and society. Labor unions, which were laced with peronistas and Communists, and determined to keep the republic in economic and social chaos with strikes, excessive wage demands, and featherbedding, have been brought under sharp control. Some brutal and heartbreaking mistreatment of students and professors occurred at first. The government has undertaken drastic reforms to prevent politicization of the universities and to return them to their scholarly pursuits. The regime has ruled that "communists" (as defined by the government, with ten days to prove innocence) are to be sharply restricted in terms of jobs and may not even obtain documents as citizens. The government is rejuvenating the economy and has stopped the accelerating inflationary spiral. It is undertaking a profoundly radical land-value tax program, to get the great pampa into use. But opposition is rising; and political maturity is far from achieved.



URUGUAY

Area: 72,200 sq. mi.

Population: 2,900,000.

President: Jorge Pacheco Areco, civilian, took office December 6, 1967, to complete five-year term of deceased Oscar Diego Gestido, who had taken office the previous March 1.

Most of Uruguay is flat or gently rolling, and pastoral in appearance. Stock-raising and extensive agriculture predominate. Though there are many small properties near Montevideo, these give way to large estates, or estancias, farther away from the capital. Railroads and highways radiate from Montevideo to the Uruguayan borders. Despite the fertility of the soil the rural land is relatively empty, and over half the population lives in the attractive capital city and its immediate environs. Literacy, over 90 per cent, is very high for Latin America.

Until the first administration of José Batlle y Ordóñez (president, 1903-1907 and 1911-1915) Uruguayan political history was a record of almost unrelieved chaos. Batlle, who was of the Partido Colorado and died in 1929, may be held almost singly responsible for Uruguayan stress on state-sponsored social welfare as well as for habits of stable, constitutional government which evolved after the beginning of this century. Batlle also introduced the idea of the plural, presidentless executive, which was tried during 1952-1967.

The two principal parties are the conservative Partido Nacional (popularly called Blanco, or White), and the socially minded Partido Colorado (Red Party). The two parties are named for colors they adopted in battles during the nineteenth century. Minor parties include the Partido Democrático Cristiano, Movimiento Cívico Cristiano, and Unión Popular (formerly the Partido Socialista). Soviet interests are looked after by the Partido Comunista Uruguayo (PCU), a legal party which dominates the National Confederation of Workers and the University of the Republic, even though only about 10 per cent of the students are Communists. An even more ominous group is the so-called Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, a fidelista, Peking-oriented terrorist organization which, like similar movements in the United States, takes Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tsé-Tung and the late Ernesto "Che" Guevara as its heroes. Another hero of the Movimiento is Tupac Amaru II, an Inca Indian chieftain of Peru who led an unsuccessful rebellion against the Spanish in 1790. It is for that reason that these terrorists of Uruguay are called tupamaros.

The colorados now hold the presidency and a majority of seats in the Congress. However, Uruguayan parties are rent by extreme factionalism, caused in part by a complex system of proportional representation wherein various factional lists compete politically.

During 1967 and 1968 it appeared that one of the most stable democracies in Latin America was on the verge of collapse. Expensive programs of social welfare, and excessive state administration of almost every sector of the economy, had finally induced an inevitable inflation and virtual bankruptcy. Communist elements, which the tolerant Uruguayan democracy has never had the heart to suppress, fomented interminable strikes and unrest. Riots led by Communist-inspired students and others added to the unending turbulence. Finally, the terrorist tupamaros introduced widespread assassinations, dynamitings and general guerrilla warfare. The elements unleashed by a sense of tolerance and social concern seemed about to destroy the system that gave them birth.

CHILE

Area: 286,400 sq. mi.

Population: 9,000,000.

President: Eduardo Frei Montalva, civilian, took office November 3, 1964, for a six-year term.

Chile is among the most attractive countries in the Western Hemisphere. Many of her cities and towns are well organized, pleasant, and beautiful. Though there are extensive slums around the larger cities, present and past governments have seen to their electrification and sanitation. Central and southern Chile, most of whose inhabitants dwell in the narrow valley between the Andes and the coastal hills, is scenic and is well integrated with highway and rail communication. Ethnically, the country is largely mestizo and European. About 80 per cent of Chileans are literate.

Chile has a reputation for orderly democracy. However, violent uprisings have occurred, notably in 1851, 1859, 1891, 1924, and 1931. Until recent decades, government was a plaything of members of the parasitic landed aristocracy, who monopolized public office but more or less adhered to constitutional forms. On September 4, 1964, Chileans cast about 1,500,000 votes for Eduardo Frei, Christian Democrat, and about 1,000,000 for his opponent, Salvador Allende, of the extreme left-wing Popular Action Front.

The Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) is the presidential party, is badly torn by factionalism, and is losing ground. Opposition comes from the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP), which includes the articulate and influential Partido Comunista (Soviet), which is legal in Chile, the Partido Socialista (Peking-fidelista oriented and violent) and the small Partido Democrático Nacionalista, which is neo-Nazi. Two traditional parties, both conservative, are the Radical and Nacional. The National Party, formed in 1966, brings together the former Liberal and Conservador.

Since 1964, President Frei and his PDC have tried to undertake a program of land reform, nationalization or semi-nationalization of industry, extension of obligatory education, effective tax collection, and control of inflation. A number of factors have combined to obstruct the realization of this program. The CD, whose members do not collaborate well with each other, has not been able to win a majority in the Senate; and, in elections of March 3, 1969, lost its majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Some factionalism within the CD seems to be fomented by infiltrators from the extreme left. As is to be expected, FRAP opposes the Frei program at every turn. Even more disheartening, the parties of the right seem devoid of social consciousness, and leave no stone unturned to frustrate Frei's plans to rehabilitate Chile before the fidelista-Maoist tidal wave breaks over them all.

Some progress has been made in industrial nationalization, which may or may not be useful for the improvement of the Chilean economy, as well as in land reform. But opposition by myopic feudal elements makes only limited implementation possible. Meanwhile, as preparations are made for 1970 presidential elections, municipal elections of 1967 and congressional elections of 1969 reveal further deterioration in the political strength of the Christian Democrats. Various aspirants, including Radomiro Tomic, seek the CD presidential candidacy; and the National Party, which is in the ascendancy after 1969 elections, may put forward Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez, 71, president from 1958 to 1964. Meanwhile, violence is on the upswing and Communist-led elements join the race to give the coup de grâce to Chilean democracy.

VENEZUELA

Area: 352,150 sq. mi.

Population: 9,800,000.

President: Rafael Caldera, civilian, took office March 11, 1969, for a five-year term.

Because of (1) oil resources, (2) location relative to the Panama Canal, (3) easy access across the Caribbean to Cuba, and (4) key position as a gateway to political subversion in Central America, the Caribbean, and South America, Venezuela is a special target for hemispheric expansion by the Communist blocs.

Venezuelan history is characterized by long periods of brutal dictatorship interspersed by very short-lived confusion or fleeting democracy. Among Venezuela's more infamous tyrants was Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935). The dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez, which began in 1952, was overthrown on January 23, 1958. Elections, themselves a rarity in Venezuela, led (December 7, 1958) to the choice of Rómulo Betancourt as constitutional president of the republic. The country turned another corner when, on December 1, 1963, and in the face of threats of leftist terrorism, the voters elected Raúl Leoni to the presidency. When Leoni was inaugurated March 11, 1964, it was the first time in 152 years of Venezuelan history that one elected president had peaceably followed a previous one. Betancourt and Leoni were of the same party, Acción Democrática. Venezuelans passed the final political test when, on December 1, 1968, they elected Rafael Caldera of the opposition Christian Democrats, and inaugurated him last March 11.

Venezuelan politics are characterized by many parties, formed out of both personalista and ideological elements. Partido Acción Democrática (AD), now badly rent by factionalism, is the social-democratic party of Betancourt and Leoni, and ran Gonzalo Barrios (1,051,870 votes) in the last election. Partido Social Cristiano (Christian democratic; called COPEI because of an earlier name, Comité Organizador Pro Elección Independiente), is the party of President Caldera and won the 1968 elections with 1,082,941 votes. Other leaders are Jovito Villalba (Unión Republicana Democrática, URD), Arturo Uslar Pietri (Frente Nacional Democrático, FND), and Miguel Angel Burelli, who led a coalition of URD, FND, and others, in elections of 1968 (829,937 votes). Most of these are dissident former adherents of AD. In the elections of 1968, another disenchanted AD leader, Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa, led still another faction. Meanwhile, former dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez, of all people, threatens to return to Venezuela and lead a Cruzada Cívica Nacionalista (Nationalist Civic Crusade, CCN), which is already active within Venezuela.

In the midst of the confusion caused by these competitions, a Frente Armado de Liberación Nacional (FALN) and a Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left, MIR), continue a campaign of violence hardly matched anywhere else in the hemisphere. These terrorists are in direct communication with the Cuban Castro regime, and from time to time the Cubans land arms and guerrillas for participation in the exciting task of destroying Venezuelan democracy. By comparison with MIR and FALN, the Soviet-sponsored Partido Comunista Venezolano, which generally eschews direct violence, is a fairly mild affair.

In 1966 and 1967, it became clear that Central University was a center for organization of terrorist activity, and for sponsorship of forays of violence against Caracas. Feeling that "academic freedom" had gone too far, the government shut it down.

COLOMBIA

Area: 455,300 sq. mi.

Population: 20,000,000.

President: Carlos Lleras Restrepo, civilian, took office August 7, 1966, for a four-year term.

Western Colombia is mountainous. The southeast, over half the area of the country, is sparsely populated, tropical lowland plain. Most Colombians are of mixed European, Indian, and African origin, and live in the high cordilleras, along the rivers between the ranges, or in the port cities. Minerals and subtropical crops are important to the economy. Though poverty is widespread, literacy is about 60 per cent. In part because of mountainous conditions, extensive latifundia are not so prevalent as in most other parts of Latin America.

For many years Colombia enjoyed a comparatively stable semi-democracy, under oligarchical supervision. Conservatives dominated politics from 1880 to 1930. Liberals held power from 1930 to 1945. During 1946-1953, Conservative governments, ending with that of President Laureano Gómez, displayed increasingly dictatorial, semi-fascist tendencies. The dictatorship of General Rojas Pinilla seized the government in 1953 and was overthrown in 1957.

After 1946, violence between Liberals and Conservatives took on appalling proportions, and brought death to well over 100,000 persons. Later, la violencia was seized upon by sadistic and criminal elements devoid of political purposes; and by forces abetted by foreign powers. The pacification program finally is achieving some success. Principal guerrilla forces, led by the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (Army of National Liberation, ELN) and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) have been captured or eliminated. In November, 1968, about three hundred guerrillas were put on trial. It was charged that 83 had received training at Lumumba University in Moscow, eighteen in Bulgaria, and several others in Cuba, in guerrilla tactics, sabotage, and the use of explosives.

In 1957 a pact between the parties, followed by a plebiscite, secured approval for a 50-50 sharing (paridad) of positions between Liberals and Conservatives at all levels of government except the presidency, where the principle of alternación between the two parties was to prevail. The arrangement was to continue until 1974. Supporters of the 1957 pact are joined in the Frente Nacional, which holds 143 seats (Liberal, 93; Conservador, 50) in the present Chamber of Deputies. This coalition is led by President Carlos Lleras Restrepo (L), 60, and recent ex-presidents of both parties. However, both the liberales and the conservadores have broken into pro-frente and anti-frente factions. Altogether, the opposition holds 61 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and includes the right-wing Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO) of former dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, as well as the very radical, left-wing faction of the Liberal Party known as Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (MRL) of Alfonso López Michelson, and miscellaneous other dissident liberals and conservatives.

President Carlos Lleras Restrepo is turning out to be an able, courageous president who, under threat of resignation, has gotten a rather irresponsible congress to attend sessions, restrain inflation, undertake social reform, and terminate the present paridad-alternación system by 1974, according to original plan. Candidates for the 1970 election, last under these arrangements, must all be of the conservative ticket. Aspirants include Misael Pastrana Borrero, ex-Dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, and others.

ECUADOR

Area: 116,300 sq. mi.

Population: 5,700,000.

President: José María Velasco Ibarra, civilian, took office September 1, 1968, for a four-year term.

Ecuador, an Andean republic, is largely Indian and mestizo. Cultural assimilation between European and Indian elements is still not complete. Educational, economic, and political progress has been slow, and about half the population is illiterate.

Except between 1948 and 1961, Ecuador's history has been one of unrelieved chaos alternating with occasional periods of dictatorial and often erratic rule. In 1948, after an unusually fair election, Dr. Enrique Galo Plaza Lasso, Liberal, became president. Galo Plaza's administration stabilized the country. The phenomenon of honest elections was repeated three more times, in 1952, 1956, and 1960. Then, this orderly pattern collapsed and Ecuador reverted to her more familiar political habits. Elected President José María Velasco Ibarra resigned after serving a little over a year. He was followed by Julio Arosemena, who was thrown out in 1963 by the military on the grounds of excessive drunkenness. For about three years, until March 30, 1966, the country was ruled by a military junta, to be replaced in turn by two successive provisional presidents, Clemente Yerovi Indaburo and Otto Arosemena Gómez. Finally, in elections of June 7, 1968, voters gave a small plurality to Dr. José María Velasco Ibarra, the current president.

Political parties combine traditional and personalista elements. Until recent years, the two major parties which usually held power were the Conservador (pro-clerical, extremely traditional) and Liberal Radical (19th century liberal). Though both continue to play rôles in Ecuadorian politics, they tend to give way to new personalista or ideological parties or blocs. There is a Partido Socialista and a Partido Socialista Cristiano. A Leftist Democratic Bloc gathers together leftwing elements in the Chamber of Deputies; and the supporters of the President are content to simply call themselves velasquistas. Cabinet posts are currently held by one conservative, two socialists, and seven velasquistas. The situation in the Congress is quite different. There, the largest number of seats in the 52-member Senate and 80-member Chamber of Deputies are controlled by a coalition of liberals and conservatives led by ex-President Camilo Ponce Enríquez, conservative. In the Chamber, the coalition holds 33 seats, the Leftist Democratic Bloc occupies 20, and the velasquistas 27.

The most phenomenal feature of Ecuadorian politics is President Velasco himself. A mercurial demagogue, Velasco has as one of his slogans, "Give me a balcony, and I shall sweep into power!" He is an expert at sweeping into power, and also at being swept out of it. He was elected to the presidency in 1933, 1952, and 1960, and seized power by force in 1944. He was ousted by force in 1935, 1947, and 1961, but served out one full term, 1952-1956. Signs are that the Ecuadorian president is again conducting himself in his usual unpredictable, erratic manner, and the Guide offers no assurance that he will actually be in the presidency when these pages go to press.

Meanwhile, there is little except the persuasive talents of the great Ecuadorian balconista to explain Velasco's widespread support. Much of Ecuadorian politics remains quite irrelevant to the needs of her depressed people.

PERU

Area: 496,300 sq. mi.

Population: 13,000,000.

President: Juan Velasco Alvarado, military, chief of junta, seized power from constitutional president October 3, 1968; to serve for indefinite term.

Peru typifies all the physical and ethnic characteristics and histories of Latin America, as well as most of the problems and aspirations of the continent. At least half the Peruvians are Indians, and few of these are assimilated into the Spanishized Peruvian culture. Peru is physically divided between a desert coast, a high Andean sierra, and eastern jungle lowlands. Like many of her sisters, Peru is afflicted by poverty, low productivity, and high illiteracy. Peru, unlike Mexico, has not turned her back on her Spanish heritage, and no other capital of the Americas is more steeped in colonial tradition than is Lima.

Peru has seldom enjoyed more than short periods of political freedom or constitutional order. Subsequent to the dictatorship of General Manuel Odría (1948-1956), two civilian constitutional presidents, Manuel Prado (1956-1962) and Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1963-1968) have been thrown out of office by military force just before completing their terms.

A famous Peruvian party is the Partido Aprista Peruano (PAP). The term aprista is drawn from APRA, or Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, long the terror of Peruvian governments, which began in the 1920s as an indigenous left-wing movement of university students and is still led by its aging leader, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. The movement has long advocated democracy, education, reformist economic policy, integration of Indians, and "anti-imperialism," whether U.S., Soviet, or Chinese.

During recent years PAP turned to opportunism, and coalesced in the Congress with the Unión Nacional Odrista (UNO), whose reason for existence was an affection for General Manuel Odría, who as dictator during 1948-1956 was a fierce persecutor of the apristas. But during 1967 and 1968, the apristas moved away from UNO and closer to Partido de Acción Popular (AP), led by socially conscious President Belaúnde Terry. Now all that is changed.

On October 3, 1968, a clique of generals and colonels ejected the reform-minded government of President Belaúnde. A new military junta suspended both civil guarantees and political parties, and even commenced the dismantling of the interior furnishings in the two chambers of the national congress. "President" Velasco offers no clue as to when there will be new elections, if ever.

Peruvians have been traditionally friendly to the United States; but the regime makes a great furore over its annulment of contracts with the International Petroleum Company for oil exploration, charging the firm owes vast sums to Peru. The young military nationalists rain invective on the United States for alleged "economic aggression" if U.S. economic aid is cut. Meanwhile, the Peruvian government hurriedly patches together trade and diplomatic relations with eastern European countries, including the U.S.S.R. The regime mixes its emotional, populist appeals to the left and right with heated eulogies for Tupac Amará, Indian revolutionary of 1790 who has become the hero of fidelista-type extremism. See Uruguay, supra, page 22.

Meanwhile, only about one fifth of cultivable Peruvian land is available for use by her deprived people, and the emotional slogans of the regime seem rather irrelevant to that problem.

BOLIVIA

Area: 424,100 sq. mi.

Population: 4,000,000.

President: René Barrientos Ortuño, military, took office August 6, 1966, for a four-year term.

Bolivia has rich resources in minerals (tin, lead, silver, copper, oil, iron, and many others) and in the fertile soil of her temperate and subtropical regions, which constitute over half the area of the republic. However, most of her population lives in the bleak Andean altiplano, and depends mainly on employment in the nationalized tin mines. Despite her great natural wealth, Bolivia is among the most backward and poverty-stricken countries in Latin America. The overwhelmingly Indian population has been kept in numbed destitution by generations of conquistadores, patrones, tin barons, and ignorant military ruffians. It is only recently that degrees of enlightenment, admixed with large doses of U.S. aid, have appeared on the Bolivian political-social scene.

Bolivian political history is a tale of a bewildering succession of revolts and petty tyrants. A modicum of socially conscious stability was introduced in 1952, when the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) seized power, and began a sort of Mexican-style social revolution. The tin mines were nationalized, and immediately began a decline from which they have never recovered; but a drastic agrarian reform did in fact create a new class of numerous small proprietors. Presidents during the period were Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1952-1956 and 1960-1964) and Hernán Siles Zuazo (1956-1960). President Paz permitted personal ambition to overcome his good sense, and cajoled the congress into amending the constitution so that he could succeed himself in office. He then got himself reelected for the term 1964-1968. In a predictable succession of events, Vice-President General René Barrientos Ortuño joined with other dissident elements and drove Paz out of office. A junta followed; and Barrientos was then elected to the presidency on July 3, 1966.

Bolivian parties fluctuate in kaleidoscopic array. That which supports the government is presently called Partido de la Revolución Boliviana (PRB). It is joined in coalition (as of this moment) by the Movimiento Popular Cristiano (MPC); Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Party of the Revolutionary Left, PIR), which is anti-communist (!); and Partido Social Democrático (PSD). Opposition includes the Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB), which deftly combines socialist and fascist ideas; tattered and squabbling remains of the MNR; and the wild-eyed Partido Revolucionario de Izquierda Nacionalista (Revolutionary Party of the Nationalist Left, PRIN), which prefers the leadership of foreign mentors.

Barrientos is a brave and popular president who is trying to make some sense out of a chaotic economy and society. The government now permits some mixed companies to undertake new mining ventures, and is trying to disentangle the most disruptive features of nationalization. All this only whets the appetites of foreign intruders. On April 30, 1967, the Cuban publication Granma claimed Bolivian guerrillas were Cuban-trained. In October, 1967, Bolivian armed forces captured and killed none less than Ernesto Che Guevara himself. They also captured and imprisoned the French Communist journalist, Régis Debray; and at the same time, the minister of the interior surreptitiously sent Che's diary to Fidel. Bolivia is in almost continuous state of siege. Probable next president: Very able General Alfredo Ovando Candía.

PARAGUAY

Area: 157,000 sq. mi.

Population: 2,200,000.

President: Alfredo Stroessner, military, took office August, 1968, for a fourth five-year term.

Paraguay is a most primitive and poor country, and suffers from some of the worst extremes of poverty to be found in Latin America. Modern capitalism is virtually unknown. A parasitic, non-investing medieval type of oligarchy holds title to most of the land; but, in what is probably the most chaotic pattern of land occupancy in the Americas, over half the agrarian producers are small squatters, who cultivate tiny plots without title, without modern tools, and without appreciable income. There are rich iron deposits and great timber resources, both almost entirely unused. The capital, Asunción, only installed running water in 1961. Government statistics on agrarian reform, education, and the like, are pure fiction. There are but few roads, and disease (tuberculosis, hookworm, malaria, typhus, leprosy) is rampant. The population is overwhelmingly a homogenized mestizo blend of European and guaraní Indian. Though Spanish is the official language, the guaraní tongue is spoken everywhere.

Politics are characterized by long periods of dictatorship, punctuated by stimulating outbreaks of anarchy and rebellion. The first tyrant was the austere, cruel Dr. José Gaspar Tomás Rodríguez Francia. Dr. Francia's rule was absolute, and Paraguay was a virtual prison. He shut the republic off from the world, and prohibited commerce or even the exchange of mail. Dr. Francia reigned for almost thirty years, from 1813 to 1840. Carlos Antonio López, a rather more humane and progressive dictator, followed a period of unspeakable chaos and served until 1862. For eight years after that, López' corrupt, debauched and sadistic son, Francisco Solano López, systematically ruined Paraguay when he involved the country in war with Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The Paraguay War almost wiped out the male population of the country. It is said that the population was reduced from 525,000 to 221,000; and that of these, there were only 28,746 men.

The Stroessner dictatorship is probably not as brutal as the regime of François Duvalier of Haiti, or the Communist despotism in Cuba, and it seems to be moving slightly away from its more tyrannical features of the recent past. In elections of February 11, 1968, which gave Stroessner's Partido Colorado 70 per cent of the vote, the Partido Radical Liberal (centrist) got 22 per cent; Partido Liberal (19th century liberal), 6 per cent; and Partido Febrerista (democratic left), less than 2 per cent. An opposition candidate, Carlos Levi Ruffinelli, liberal, was permitted to run against Stroessner.

A new constitution, adopted in 1967, permits the incumbent president to serve for two more terms. The new constitution also abandons the unicameral legislative system in favor of a new two-house congress, to consist of a 30-member Senate and a 60-member House of Representatives. To assure that the new spirit of democracy is not carried too far, the new constitution also provides that the party polling the largest number of votes in an election should occupy two thirds of the seats in each house. Thus, the Partido Colorado presently holds 20 Senate seats, and 40 in the House, with remaining seats distributed among other parties. Both presidential and congressional terms are for five years, and much of the constitutional system is highly authoritarian.

BRAZIL

Area: 3,286,500 sq. mi.

Population: 87,000,000.

President: Artur da Costa e Silva, military, took office March 15, 1967, for a four-year term.

In the Western Hemisphere, Brazil is exceeded in population only by the United States, and in area only by the United States and Canada. In much of her territory, Brazil is a beautiful land of irregular rolling hills, winding rivers, and green forests. At least two thirds of Brazil is a semi-temperate or subtropical plateau region, suitable for settlement and development. Yet, the economic and political development of Brazil has hardly begun. Though the nation possesses great mineral and agricultural resources, she is plagued by inflation, poverty, inadequate communications, underdeveloped health standards, monopolistic or chaotic land-ownership patterns, and indecision regarding her basic political institutions.

It is of importance that Brazil is not Spanish. Her heritage is Portuguese and African, and she has a reputation for being more relaxed than her neighbors. Certainly she is in Latin America, but not entirely of it, and tends to live and stew in her own vast world. Brazil's political history is marked by periods of apparent quietude and constitutional order in an atmosphere of elitist quasi-democracy, punctuated by increasingly frequent episodes of disturbance accompanied by profound constitutional changes.

On September 7, 1822, Brazil glided almost imperceptibly into independence from Portugal. In 1889, following a long period of successful constitutional monarchy (Pedro I and the great Pedro II), the armed forces overthrew the empire and established a republican form of government. After some preliminary confusion and military imposition, Brazil settled down to an alternation in the presidency, managed by the ruling patronal elements within the formalities of election procedures and what amounted to one-party rule under Partido Republicano. In 1930, after about eight years of increasing social disturbance, Getúlio Vargas seized power by force and inaugurated a new epoch of Brazilian political history. During 1930-1945, Vargas, in the style of European dictators of the time, established himself as a sort of populist-fascist strongman, but popular and military pressure finally forced him from office.

During 1946-1964, the government returned to constitutional government. Political parties which emerged out of the last months of the Vargas dictatorship contested with each other for public office. In 1950, Vargas returned to power as an ineffectual constitutional president, and committed suicide in 1954. During 1956-1961, President Juscelino Kubitschek began the construction of Brasília, the new interior capital. The building of the city placed an intolerable strain on Brazilian finances; and to this day, only the president, supreme court and congress are more or less permanently located there. Despite all theories to the contrary, much Brazilian governmental administration is still carried on in Rio de Janeiro, a far more attractive city. The Foreign Ministry has only partially moved out of its famous quarters at Itamaraty Palace, in Rio; and of foreign embassies, only that of the United States has moved to Brasília in full force, leaving behind a huge consulate in Rio. Brasília, which

has a population of about 100,000, is surrounded by satellite slum-cities whose population exceeds 200,000.

The sudden resignation of President Jânio Quadros, August 25, 1961, brought Vice-President João Goulart, follower and admirer of Getúlio Vargas, into the presidency. Thereafter, Goulart moved steadily toward the left and toward a Vargas-style type of demagogic dictatorship. There can be no question of the monumental corruption that afflicted Brazilian government under Goulart, as well as infiltration by significant pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese elements into many branches of administration. Near the end, Goulart was inciting the armed forces to mutiny against conservative officers, was bent on increasing trade and relations with the Communist blocs, was initiating measures for his own re-election to office, was proposing to legalize the Communist Party, and was planning to rule by decree.

In a series of lightning moves, March 30 - April 1, 1964, the governors of the most important states as well as commanders of Brazilian army divisions joined together to seize power. Goulart fled, and the Congress went through the motions of electing General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco to fill out a term which ran to March 15, 1967. The new revolutionary government ruled through a series of atos institucionais and atos complementares which effectively changed Brazil into at least a temporary dictatorship. Among other things, it was decreed that the revolution was itself a profound constitutional power, that political rights of recalcitrant Brazilians might be suspended for ten years upon determination by the government, that all political parties were "extinguished", with new ones to be organized under new laws, and that procedures and times for presidential, gubernatorial and congressional elections would be revised drastically.

The political rights of hundreds of persons (including ex-Presidents Kubitschek, Quadros, and Goulart) were suspended, thousands were dismissed from governmental and educational service, and thousands of alleged subversives, including many military personnel, were jailed. By these measures the opposition in the Congress was sharply reduced. Then, contrary to the constitutional requirement that the president be elected popularly, this truncated Brazilian Congress elected General Artur da Costa e Silva as President of Brazil, October 3, 1966, to serve for a four-year term beginning March 15, 1967. Afterwards, December 22, 1966, a newly elected Congress voted 200-127 for approval of a projeto de constituição, and the new Constitution of Brazil, a highly authoritarian document, was promulgated January 24, 1967.

After a modicum of constitutional order during 1967 and part of 1968, new disturbances broke throughout the republic. When the regime seemed unwilling to lift its repressive controls, and unable to solve pressing economic problems of inflation, unemployment, and productive chaos, students and some military elements, as well as members of Congress, broke into an uproar of denunciation and disturbance. Finally, December, 1968, the Congress (though dominated by the official party), voted against the demand of the government that it strip immunity from a critical deputy so he could be tried and punished for insulting the regime. Meanwhile, an opposition frente ampla had been formed among four unlikely collaborators -- Juscelino Kubitschek, João Goulart, Jânio Quadros, and Carlos Lacerda--the latter an acid opponent of all regimes to date, and former governor of Guanabara state.

Beginning with Ato Institucional N. 5, December 16, 1968, and subsequently in two more atos institucionais and a series of new atos complementares, President Costa e Silva put an end to

the short period of military-sponsored constitutional government, as well as to the Constitution of 1967. Congress is in recess, suspension of political rights of opponents is resumed, elections are postponed until further notice, constitutional guarantees are suspended, widespread arrests of political leaders are in progress, state legislatures are closed down indefinitely, and at least partial censorship of public expression is in force. Decrees have even deprived three members of the Supreme Court of their political rights. Brazil, in other words, is presently undergoing a severe military dictatorship, without even the entertaining demagoguery or popular appeal of a Getúlio Vargas.

Prior to the military revolt of 1964, there were three major parties and a plethora of smaller ones. Under present unsettled conditions, it can hardly be said that the present political arrangements will have any permanence. Supporters of the government form an Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA). The opposition, decidedly in the minority, calls itself Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB), and under present conditions can only be described as anemic. The Partido Comunista Brasileiro, and other communist groups, are of course illegal, but probably can count on the support of 200,000 or more sympathizers --and as long as the ham-handed military rule continues, can be expected to enjoy an increase in strength and popular support.

Brazil has been governed under six different constitutions: That of 1824, which established the constitutional monarchy; 1891, after formation of the republic; 1934 and 1937, instituted during the Vargas period (the latter never carried into effect); 1946, to reestablish constitutional government after the Vargas dictatorship; and that of 1967, which endured exactly 22 months.

Normally, there is a two-house Congress, with a Chamber of Deputies of over 400 members, and a Senate with three members from each of the twenty-two states as well as from the federal district (Brasília). During most of the time since 1891, Brazil has presumably adhered to a federal system, but with authority over so many spheres vested in the central government that very little is left to the states. Also, the states are not of equal status; and states' rights that are enjoyed are more the result of size and regionalism than of any formal constitutional plan. Now, of course, all pretense at federalism is discarded, though the country continues to carry her new name, Federated Republic of Brazil (formerly, United States of Brazil).

Some social reform has been attempted by the regime. New highways are under construction, especially to the border of Peru, and land reform and colonization are being attempted. The runaway Brazilian inflation, which reached an annual 144 per cent during the Goulart period, has now been slowed down to about 25 per cent per year.

At present, prospects for Brazilian democracy are exceedingly dim, and it is quite unlikely that free presidential elections will be permitted in 1971. Many fear that Brazil may well turn from mindless armed force to social chaos.



LATIN AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Relations With the United States

During most of the century and a half since Latin American independence, U.S.-Latin American relations have included all the features that are typical of relationships between very powerful national states and their weaker neighbors. There have been diplomatic interventions and military occupations, exaggerated assistance to and support for U.S. investment interests, use of recognition as an instrument of internal interference, undue chumminess with hated tyrants, seizures of territory by aggression (Mexico, 1846-1848; Puerto Rico, 1898), and the like. U.S. interventionism reaches its peak from 1898 to 1934, with the Spanish-American War (1898); the Panama episode (1903); Roosevelt Corollary (1904); military occupation of Cuba (1898-1902, 1906-1909, and intermittently until 1922), Nicaragua (1912-1933), Haiti (1915-1934), and the Dominican Republic (1916-1924); and incursions into Mexico under direction of the morally inspired Woodrow Wilson (1914-1917).

By contrast, there were three periods during which the United States undertook to stress respect and forbearance in her relations with Latin America.

First, there was the period of Latin American independence and the Monroe Doctrine, 1810-1823, when the United States was still moved by her own stirring revolutionary ideas and was concerned about her weakness in face of foreign threats. During that epoch, United States policy and opinion demonstrated great sympathy and gave moral and some material assistance to the movements for independence in Latin America. The Monroe Doctrine (1823) was designed to preserve the national security of the United States from European encroachment in this hemisphere, and the independence of the new Latin American countries from the same danger.

Second, there was the era of the Good Neighbor Policy, 1933-1945. Idealism combined with alarm over Axis aggression to inaugurate this new epoch of good feeling. The policy was inexpensive and effective. It placed emphasis on mutual respect, Latin American self-determination, and non-intervention by the United States in Latin American internal affairs.

Third, there was the period of renewed interest, which began to a limited degree when the pro-Communist government of Jacobo Arbenz seemed about to deliver Guatemala to the Soviet bloc (1954), picked up momentum when a Venezuelan mob attacked Vice-President Richard Nixon in the spring of 1958 and the forces of Fidel Castro seized the government of Cuba in January, 1959, soared to a high pitch with announcement (October, 1962) of discovery of Soviet missile emplacements in Cuba, and was further sustained by the knowledge that Soviet and Chinese expansionism was being aided by a wave of subversion, terrorism, and propaganda designed to prepare the Latin American republics for incorporation into one or the other of the Communist blocs. With U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, April 28, 1965, it became clear that the current epoch of interest in Latin America also included elements drawn from past techniques; and that where it appeared that foreign elements might take advantage of political chaos at the doorstep of the United States, the old Roosevelt Corollary was back in full force.

The epoch since 1958 includes the Alliance for Progress (Alianza para el Progreso, ALPRO). The Alliance was drawn up at

Punta del Este, Uruguay, August 17, 1961, and commits the countries of the hemisphere (U.S., 20 per cent; Latin America, 80) to provide \$100 billion over the decade beginning in 1961, to be made available to those republics that prepare national programs for education, housing, land reform, taxation and fiscal improvement, economic integration, and inflationary control. Since 1961, the Alliance has disseminated statistics which reveal the thousands of classrooms constructed, health centers established, housing units built, systems of drinking water and sanitary disposal installed, special food and lunch programs organized, and so on. Much of this has been of undoubted benefit to the deprived people of Latin America. However, it is not clear how much basic social reform has been accomplished, or would be permitted by oligarchic elements; or how much of the Alliance program would have been accomplished anyhow, with or without the grandiose commitments of Punta del Este. Latin American governments stress that they have expended up to 50 per cent more financial assistance than they had promised. In many instances, however, they have simply moved over to "Alliance for Progress" columns the budgetary allotments which they would have made for social needs in any event.

There have been periods (as, during the last half of the nineteenth century, and from 1945 to 1958) when the United States has treated Latin America with ignorance and disdain. It is doubtful that even outright military occupations infuriate Latins more. After only three months of the administration of President Nixon, it would not be justifiable to state flatly that the United States is resuming a stance of disinterest in Latin America. But there are straws in the wind.

First, the Alliance for Progress is due to expire in 1971. On February 6, 1969, President Nixon stated that the U.S. must decide, not what it can do for Latin America, but what it can do with Latin America—but has offered no further clarification of that point. Second, the President is turning his major attention to Europe. Third, one cannot forget that President Nixon suffered his most humiliating experiences at the hands of unbridled Peruvian and Venezuelan mobs. One can be sure, however, that with the first signs of new foreign intrusions into Latin America, disinterest will evaporate instantaneously.

Except where the hemisphere is threatened by outside powers, and even occasionally when it is, the United States often considers Latin America as a rather insignificant step-child. Until a few years ago the Office of Inter-American Affairs of the Department of State had small prestige, and was inhabited by political hacks and unenlightened second-string career people; and the low calibre of several U.S. diplomats in Latin America reflected the U.S. attitude of disrespect toward her neighbors.

Now, in line with its general improvement throughout, the U.S. foreign service related to Latin America is of much higher quality than it was only a decade ago. An increasingly large proportion of U.S. diplomats in Latin America are drawn from the career service; and those who are not, are selected with a view to their perceptions and language skills.

In its policies with Latin America, the United States displays evidence of some enlightenment. But it still depends on occasional military action (Bay of Pigs, 1961; Dominican Republic, 1965), military training and aid under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and large doses of economic assistance. What is still missing from U.S. policy in Latin America is sufficient ideological and moral content, as well as interest, to inspire the hemisphere as we did during the years just after 1776.

Relations With the Communist Blocs

Whatever might be the more noble aspirations of mankind, the fact is that international relations are conducted among nation-states pretty much as each sees fit, and with little respect for either world organization or world law. The unending struggle for security and power goes on. Until citizens can build a less barbaric system for the world, they cannot avoid being participants in the contests that emerge out of disorderly world affairs.

In this international anarchy, each nation-state pursues its own national interest as it defines it and according to the methods most appropriate to its experience and abilities. It is, therefore, not out of any spirit of cheap criticism that the Guide makes the remarks that follow. The Communist countries are participants in the world struggle among insecure states, and they utilize the devices that are characteristic of their past experiences and their more recent revolutions. The responses of the Chinese and Russian blocs to the opportunities afforded them by world anarchy are pragmatic and Machiavellian, as befits the nature of international politics.

The Guide does hope that its comments will be helpful in (1) stripping the ideological disguise from great-power contests for security and hegemony, (2) encouraging the idea that, under conditions of world anarchy, the national interest of one's own country is not a goal to be despised, and (3) stimulating discussion of appropriate responses to devices of opponents.

Relations of the Communist blocs with Latin America are vigorous and aggressive, and occur in six different categories:

1. Official, diplomatic relations. Only eight countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay) carry on diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., only Cuba does so with Communist China, and only Mexico continues relations with Cuba. Latin American reluctance to exchange diplomats with the Communist countries does not result so much from antagonism to Communist ideas or concern over the reaction of the United States (which does recognize the U.S.S.R.) as from fear that they might not cope with subversive pressures that flow out of highly motivated Communist embassies. Communist diplomatic personnel make contact with local popular leaders, disseminate propaganda, assist revolutionary organizations in stirring social chaos, and in some cases (Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay) have been found to be passing out money to subversive groups, or otherwise intervening to help foment strikes, sabotage industrial production, stir up dissident students, and the like.

2. Unofficial political activity by proxy. The Communist countries have a ready-made constellation of native extremist parties, left-wing "nationalists", radical labor leaders, immature juveniles, ambitious politicians and demagogues, opportunists, and half-educated, terrorized or blackmailed "intellectuals" or other professional people to serve the interests of China, the U.S.S.R., or Cuba. From the mid-sixties to the present, almost identical student disorders have occurred in Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Panama, Mexico, and even in the United States. Their tactics have included the following: (1) Protest against real or imagined grievances, (2) provocation of violent encounters, (3) seizure of buildings and ransacking of papers belonging to administrations and faculty, (4) proclamation of escalating demands, (5) insistence upon full amnesty for all participants, and (6) provocation of police retaliation, accompanied by charges of police brutality to secure new allies and

whip up public fury for further demonstrations.

3. Use of the Cuban base of operations. Cuba is a forward base for this type of unofficial political activity. In this respect, though she receives massive economic aid from the Soviet Union, Cuban enthusiasm for terrorism and guerrilla warfare is much closer to the inspiration of Peking than to that of Moscow. Various Communist conferences in Cuba have proclaimed publicly their intention to overthrow every government in the Americas. Demonstrators throughout the hemisphere quite openly proclaim their enthusiasm for Cuban and Chinese leaders and concepts, unfurl Viet Cong flags, and display pictures of Mao Tsê-Tung, Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevara, and Fidel Castro. However, because they claim not to be "Communists" (meaning, Soviet variety) and occasionally criticize the Soviet Union, an uninformed public calls them "non-Communist" or even "anarchist".

4. Dissemination of literature and radio-TV propaganda. Books in Portuguese and Spanish are published in the U.S.S.R., China, and Cuba, and are made available to many schools that would otherwise be without reading materials. Communist propaganda journals of excellent physical quality and very low cost are distributed to newsstands throughout Latin America. Radio Moscow and Cuban and Chinese transmitters broadcast in Portuguese, Spanish, French, as well as in several Indian tongues. Prensa Latina, a subsidized fidelista news service, provides dispatches for news dissemination throughout Latin America. A similar service in the United States is called Liberation News Service.

5. Travel to the Communist countries. The U.S.S.R., China, and Cuba, invite thousands of persons, including students, to visit their countries each year, for attendance at conferences or festivals, for tours, and for training in subversion, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and the like. Lumumba University in Moscow, as well as institutions in Peking, Havana, and Sofia, are active in this type of educational activity. Prominent professional people and intellectuals are given expense-paid tours to Communist countries, and labor delegations attend trade union conferences through assistance of Communist regimes.

6. Violence, guerrilla warfare, terrorism. There is more evidence of Cuban than of Soviet involvement in direct violence and terrorism. In this instance, the activity is a reflection of the influence of Peking and of recent revolutionary experience on the thinking of Cuban leaders.

A Tri-Continental Congress meets periodically in Cuba, and has a permanent secretariat, known as the Organización de Solidaridad Popular Africa-Asia-América Latina, of which the Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad (OLAS) is designed to conduct activities in Latin America. OLAS, which calls for violent actions at variance with current wishes of orthodox Soviet-type Communists, proclaims its intention to foment "other Vietnams" in Latin America. OLAS directs its main attention to the "anti-imperialist" war against the United States. At its meeting in Havana in 1967, a principal participant was Mr. Stokely Carmichael of the United States. Authorities in various parts of Latin America find that arms, money, and guerrillas themselves are supplied by Cuba to foment destruction and disorder. From time to time Venezuela reports capture of personnel and caches of arms provided by Cuba as a kind of aid-program to Venezuelan guerrillas. For similar enterprises in Bolivia, see supra, p. 28. In the United States, after the excesses of the Joe McCarthy period, it would be a brash person indeed who would attribute similar activities to any kind of Communist source.

Latin American Foreign Policies

In the anarchy of international relations, the weaker nation-states are badly buffeted and are treated with small respect by the stronger powers. Many Latin American republics have been invaded, intervened, insulted, cajoled, threatened and knocked about, first by European powers and later by the United States. At the same time, their own internal weaknesses and instabilities have done little to strengthen the defenses that might be provided by their military arms or by their arts of diplomacy.

Out of this unhappy amalgam have arisen certain features which in one degree or another are common to the foreign policies of most of the republics of Latin America.

1. Nationalism. As in many developing nations, those of Latin America are heavily imbued with large doses of nationalism. Among intellectuals, labor leaders, professional and middle-class people, the tendency to cling to strong mexicanismo, panameñismo, bolivianismo, and so on, provides a strong credo to substitute for bad historical memories and other inadequacies.

2. Self-determination and non-intervention. After their experiences at the hands of European powers, and (in northern Latin America) at the hands of the United States, most of the republics of Latin America stress self-determination and non-intervention to the point of fanatic over-emphasis. Innumerable inter-American pacts, including the Charter of the Organization of American States and many others, make pointed and repetitious reference to Latin American rejection of all intervention. For understandable reasons, the foreign policy of Mexico is especially emphatic on this point. Non-intervention means, specifically, non-intervention by the United States; consequently, it is only recently that some republics have demonstrated comprehension that intervention might come from other quarters, and in subtle forms unlike the landing of the marines.

3. Recognition. Though plagued by an urge to withhold recognition from loathsome tyrannies, most Latin American republics (with the notable exception of Venezuela) follow variants of the Estrada Doctrine (from the Mexican foreign minister, Genaro Estrada, 1930), which would insist that recognition or non-recognition not be used as a device to bring internal pressure to change the policies or forms of Latin American regimes.

4. Nationalization. In their zeal to eject all vestiges of foreign interposition, several Latin American republics have undertaken the nationalization or governmental expropriation of resources and industries held by elements from abroad, especially from the United States. Nationalization, which replaces the foreign owner with government ownership, does not necessarily distribute title among native proprietors, and may in fact result in a worse economic condition for the nation; but nationalization is an emotional policy, not to be argued on rational grounds.

5. Asylum. The instabilities of Latin American governments create favor in their chancelleries for the concept of political asylum, whereby the refugees from governmental changes secure protection and succor in the embassies and territories of other Latin American republics.

6. International law and peaceful settlement. Latin American nations have little force upon which they can rely. Hence, they put great store by the strengthening of international law and the devising of instrumentalities for peaceful settlement. International juridical and organizational devices stand high in their regard. We will summarize these in our next section.

Inter-American Cooperation

The inter-American system of collaboration had its first concrete inspiration in the Panama Congress, called by Simón Bolívar in 1826. Since then, there have been ten regular inter-American conferences (1889-1954), meetings of consultation of ministers of foreign affairs (1939-1969), several special conferences, and a multitude of specialized conferences on matters of technical, social, educational, juridical, and general humanitarian interest. The inter-American system includes many institutions and organs that are subsumed under the OAS tent, as well as several new efforts at economic and political integration.

Organization of American States. The Organization of American States, with its seat in Washington, provides an umbrella which covers many different efforts toward juridical collaboration, economic and social welfare, pacific settlement of disputes, and collective security. Though recent controversies have reduced the effectiveness of the organization, it is not paralyzed by anything corresponding to the Big Power veto in the Security Council of the United Nations. Significant decisions of the OAS organs require no more than a two-thirds approval by its members.

Since 1959, however, the cleavage between friends and opponents of Cuba, certain lesser disputes between various Latin American republics (e.g., Bolivia vs. Chile), and a new movement for creation of a truly Latin American system (induced in part by presence of the United States, and now by admission of Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago) have almost brought the OAS system to collapse. Conferences held at Rio de Janeiro, Panama, and Buenos Aires during 1965-1967 attempted by structural legerdemain to correct some of the worst difficulties of the OAS, and get it functioning again. A conference of presidents, held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, during April 12-14, 1967, attempted to inject sufficient promise of Alliance for Progress aid to assure rejuvenation of the inter-American system. The Buenos Aires conference of February, 1967, proposed a reformed OAS Charter. Of the fifteen (out of twenty-two) ratifications required for it to go into effect, twelve have been secured.

Under the new arrangements, the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers is to continue to play an important rôle in the solution of disputes endangering hemispheric peace. The Inter-American Conference, which under the old plan was to meet once each five years (but has not convened since 1954), is now to get together annually, and be called a General Assembly. As before, the sites of its meetings will be rotated among the various hemispheric capitals. The Council of the OAS, whose members now serve in Washington as "Ambassadors to the Organization of American States", is to become a Permanent Council without governing authority over the OAS, but with continued deliberative duties related to maintenance of peace in the absence of the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers. Other councils of the OAS, for social, cultural, and economic affairs, are to be raised to the level of the Permanent Council. The Secretary General of the OAS is to have a five-year rather than ten-year term, thus making more frequent the exciting and bitter struggles revolving around selection of a new one. The last election of this luminary consumed three months of wrangling and six ballots, but finally came up, February 13, 1968, with the name of the distinguished Dr. Enrique Galo Plaza Lasso, ex-President of Ecuador.

At present, the principal instruments of OAS organization and

procedure are the OAS Charter of 1948, whose reform should be ratified soon, and the Rio Pact (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), formulated in 1947 and ratified in 1948. The Rio Pact requires that members submit controversies to peaceful settlement; and provides that in case of armed attack, the Organ of Consultation (either the foreign ministers' meeting or the Council) may by two-thirds vote take economic, diplomatic, or military measures against the aggressor. A reluctant state may not be compelled to contribute its own military forces, but there is no arrangement whereby a veto may negate the whole effort.

The Inter-American Development Bank, founded in 1959, is the principal institution for channelling of financial assistance to the countries of the hemisphere, including most Alliance funds.

Economic and Political Integration. The Treaty of Montevideo (February 18, 1960) established the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA; ALALC in Spanish or Portuguese). Mexico and all the republics of South America are now members. The purpose of LAFTA is to reduce and ultimately eradicate all barriers to intra-Latin American trade, thus (1) creating more economic specialization and more vigorous trade within Latin America, and (2) posing a viable defense against the European Common Market. LAFTA was undertaken with high hopes for its success, and with the expectation that free trade would prevail within the zone by 1972. At first, its members were able, with considerable difficulty, to negotiate tariff lists for reduction of charges on specified items by 25 per cent. Greater obstacles have now been encountered, and further reductions have been few and far between.

Ever since the disintegration of the Central American federation in 1838, attempts at the reunification of the five republics have been repeated, almost without interruption. Now, two approaches are being developed at the same time: (1) Through the Organization of Central American States (known everywhere by its Spanish initials, ODECA), a political structure is being built, and (2) through the sensational Central American Common Market, complete free trade is being achieved. The common market is tremendously successful, and inter-Central American trade has jumped from \$32 million in 1960 to over \$250 million in 1968. Economic integration is changing the faces of these five republics. A Central American Monetary Union (with a common Central American peso) and banks for economic development and integration are also established, and enjoying real success. Plans are afoot for a new Central American Court of Justice to replace the old one (1907-1918) that was torpedoed when it rendered a decision adverse to the interests of the United States.

As an antidote to the reverses suffered by the Latin American Free Trade Association, the republics of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile are now organizing an Andean Common Market, to be associated with an Andean Development Corporation. These institutions are designed to reduce the barriers to trade and hasten full economic integration in northern and western South America. The hope of the member-republics is that the new Andean arrangements will have more success than broader and more disparate LAFTA, which includes widely separated countries. If such efforts are admixed with doses of common sense and moderation, there is reason to be optimistic about the future of Latin American integration.

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