


LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL GUIDE

1964



James L. Busey

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LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL GUIDE

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LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL SUMMARY

During 1963, four Latin American republics (Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras) fell from their precarious positions in the democratic column. All of them are now ruled by extra-constitutional military or civilian *juntas*. Argentina and Peru have now inaugurated constitutionally elected presidents, and so it may be fair to list them, along with Venezuela and Colombia, as precarious semi-democracies. Because of evidence of her emergence as a political democracy, El Salvador was also listed in the 1963 *Guide* as a precarious semi-democracy. In a genuinely democratic election of March, 1964, El Salvador redeemed herself from consignment to the "modified authoritarian" status, and it is now with some optimism that the *Guide* lists her again as in 1963. Panama, despite violence associated with the canal question, continues to permit freedom of expression and party contest, and will probably go through with the elections scheduled for this year. It is with some trepidation that the *Guide* would now include Panama among the relatively stable democracies of Latin America.

Despite some disappointments during 1963 and early 1964, the number of clearly despotic Latin American governments did not increase. In the spring of 1964, the real dictatorships of Latin America are the same four that prevailed in January of 1962. Their degree of tyranny ranges from greater to lesser intensity in about the following order: Haiti (Duvalier), Cuba (Castro), Paraguay (Stroessner), and Nicaragua (the Somoza family and their puppet president). Early appearance of orderly, constitutional and representative government in any of these republics seems as unlikely now as it did two years ago.

During the past decade, the following dictators have fallen from power: Perón of Argentina (1955); Odría of Peru (1956), who is attempting a come-back; Rojas Pinilla of Colombia (1957), who is also returning to prominence; Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela (1958); and Trujillo of the Dominican Republic (1961). Also there was the original Somoza of Nicaragua (1956), but he was replaced in power by his two sons and their ally-president, Dr. René Schick Gutiérrez.

Bolivia and Mexico seem caught on dead center, with some press freedom and some small but ineffectual opposition activity, but without any real hope for genuine political contest. Though opposition groups do exist in these countries, they can entertain no real hope of competing in an effective way in elections, much less ever win the presidency. The emergence in Bolivia of Juan Lechín as a factional MNR contender for the presidency may change this pattern, but it is too early to say that this is more than a passing phenomenon. In Mexico, the apparent unwillingness or inability of the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) to prepare for evolution toward attainment of meaningful political democracy, has brought the country into an impasse which encourages some internal strife and violence. Political conditions in Bolivia under the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), except for the recent serious split in that party, are not significantly different from those of Mexico.

President Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela did successfully complete his full five-year term. Furthermore, the country performed another phenomenon in electing his successor, Raúl Leoni. Leoni was inaugurated without incident, but the future of his administration is extremely precarious. Colombia seems to be moving toward a show-down regarding the continued system of 50-50 partition of all public offices between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Factions of those parties are strongly challenging these arrangements, and followers of the very improbable ex-dictator, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, are increasing. In both Venezuela and Colombia,

as also in Argentina and Peru, the norms of western-type democracy are far from firmly established, and there is grave danger of turbulence and of deep political tension. Dangerous chaos can still erupt in all of them.

In four countries—Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica, and possibly Panama—comparatively stable, democratic government seems to be rather well established, and likely to prevail. Freedom of speech and press, and free and vigorous opposition, are regular features of their political life. Opposition as well as governmental parties participate in a meaningful way in public and legislative debates. During recent years, Brazil has experienced some political setbacks, such as presidential suicides and resignations, and finally the overthrow of demagogic but constitutional President João Goulart, April 2, 1964. Because his succession was handled in a constitutional manner, and other democratic elements are still present, the *Guide* persists (perhaps erroneously) in including Brazil among the democratic republics. Panama, despite outbreaks of violence and considerable political turbulence, manages to avoid political suppression and to hold elections in a pattern of multi-party politics. There can be no doubt of the strongly established democratic practices of Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica.

If the above analysis is valid, one might range the republics of Latin America in about the following manner:

Tyrannical or authoritarian regimes (Haiti, Cuba, Paraguay, Nicaragua)	4
Unsettled, with strongly authoritarian tendencies (Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras)	4
Modified authoritarian regimes (Bolivia, Mexico)	2
Precarious semi-democracies (Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Venezuela, Peru)	5
Relatively stable democracies (Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica, Brazil, Panama)	5
	20

At this point, it may be well for the *Guide* to present its concept of democracy. It is often contended that democracy has so many meanings to so many different people, that it cannot be defined. The *Guide* strongly disagrees with this view. The *Guide* conceives that tyranny is the negation of all the features of democracy, that the idea of democracy has now evolved for over two thousand years and should not defy clear definition, and that democracy, as understood in Western thought and practice in 1964, is definable in the following terms:

A social-political condition where the maximum possible numbers of people enjoy (1) individual rights and freedom of choice, (2) security under the rule of law, and (3) meaningful participation in decision-making, during the maximum possible time.

Principal requirements for development of Latin American political democracy would include:

(1) **Education of populations and leaders.** In many Latin American republics, half or more of the population is totally illiterate. Not only are citizens unable to participate with comprehension in the political process, but their leaders are often very imperfectly educated, and are guided by many of the same prejudices that afflict their less educated followers. In terms of social and economic development, it is notable that the overwhelming majority of inhabitants of city slums, of those

without employment or human levels of subsistence, are illiterate. Their education would contribute in a marked way to the over-all development of their countries.

(2) **Land distribution, termination of feudalism, emergence of a large middle class of independent proprietors in agriculture, trade, and manufacture.** Land ownership in many Latin American countries is still dominated by holders of huge estates, who run their domains like feudal fiefs. Owners refuse to work, to invest, or even to personally manage their own affairs. It would be hard to say which is the more obstructive to economic and social development: The abject poverty of masses of inefficient or unemployed *peones* or their offensively ostentatious, wealthy, non-productive and socially unconscious masters. The emergence in Latin America of multitudinous middle class proprietors would indeed constitute an effective social revolution. It may be argued, in fact, that by comparison with both feudalism and collectivism, distributed proprietorship would be quite profoundly revolutionary. Some urban centers are undergoing a change in these directions, but medieval practices still dominate much of the countryside and even the mentalities of urban dwellers.

(3) **Economic, social, ethnic, geographic integration.** Because of their division by many deep gulfs, it is difficult for Latin Americans to agree on basic rules of the political process. Emergence of middle class elements, education, linguistic and cultural assimilation, and improvement of transportation and communications, are contributing to the internal integration of several Latin American republics. Many observers would agree that the pace must be quickened if turbulence is not to cancel out the recent gains.

(4) **More self-disciplined, responsible, socially conscious leaders.** These must be people with a sense of perspective for the past and future, who can provide their countries with actual experience for an appreciable time in stable self-government, and who have the good sense to leave office at the ends of their constitutional terms. Men who have the wit and conscience to lay the groundwork for forthcoming liberties, are more revered than are the corrupt, decadent tyrants who ill-prepare their peoples for popular government. A Batlle y Ordóñez is more loved by subsequent generations than is a Venancio Flores; the memory of a Rómulo Betancourt will be more cherished than that of a Vicente Gómez or a Marcos Pérez Jiménez; a Sarmiento is more revered than is a Perón. People do not tear down monuments to a Benito Juárez.

What Latin America does *not* need are more ignorant military dictators or civil demagogues; or emotional, adolescent rioters; or so-called "revolutions" that simply shift power from feudal *patrones* to new political masters, and deliver whole nations into the arms of Russian imperialism.

-J.L.B.

Boulder, Colorado,
April 15, 1964

NORTHERN LATIN AMERICA



MEXICO

Area: 760,000 sq. mi.

Population: 37,000,000.

President: Adolfo López Mateos, civilian, took office December 1, 1958, for a six-year term.

Since 1920, Mexico has gone through the formalities of electing her presidents in an increasingly orderly manner, though with no hope for opposition candidates. Since 1928, presidential terms have been for six years, with no re-election of an incumbent under any circumstances.

The **Partido Revolucionario Institucional** (PRI) is dominant, though a rightist opposition party, **Partido Acción Nacional** (PAN) does exist, offers presidential candidates, and usually elects a handful of deputies to the Congress. A tiny **Partido Nacionalista de México** can hardly be said to be a true opposition party. The illegal Communist Party, and Marxism in general, have made effective use of the naïveté of influential General Lázaro Cárdenas (president, 1934-1940), and have formed the so-called **Movimiento de Liberación Nacional**. The most prominent legal exponent of the pro-Communist position is the small **Partido Popular Socialista**, under leadership of Vicente Lombardo Toledano.

For elections of July, 1964, the PRI has put forward the very un-charismatic Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, 54, Secretary of the Interior (Gobernación) under López Mateos. PAN is running lawyer José González Torres. A far-left **Frente Electoral del Pueblo** (FEP) has put forward Ramón Danzós Palomino. Díaz Ordaz is by no means the most glamorous man in Mexico, but his election is assured.

Dominance by the PRI results in part from use of public facilities and funds for propaganda purposes, from some restrictions which small-time officials impose on opposition candidates, and from integration of labor, agrarian and popular organizations into the PRI. Miscounting of votes and intimidation of voters are no doubt widespread, especially in the countryside, but may be unnecessary.

The PRI considers itself to be the true inheritor of the 1910-1917 Revolution. The aims of that movement—at least as the Constitution of 1917 expressed them—were effective suffrage, no re-election, thoroughgoing agrarian, labor, and general social reform, anti-clericalism, and mass education. The regime of Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928) pursued a vigorous anti-clerical program. The administration of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) stressed agrarian reform, nationalization of oil resources, betterment of working conditions and bargaining powers of laboring people, and an educational program designed to lift Mexico out of illiteracy. Though other administrations (notably those of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, 1952-1958, and Adolfo López Mateos, 1958-1964) have undertaken important programs of education, construction, and industrialization, it would not be correct to say that they have all devoted themselves to realization of the radical ideals of the Revolution. Some, such as that of Miguel Alemán (1946-1952) have been notoriously corrupt. The forthcoming regime of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz may be more conservative than the norm. The López Mateos administration has stressed distribution of land to individual proprietors, and there has been nationalization of some foreign-owned companies such as Mexican Light and Power Company. However, López Mateos has vigorously suppressed real and alleged Communist elements.

Until now, the president has possessed what amounts to dictatorial power. The PRI has controlled virtually all seats in the two-house Congress. Debate has ordinarily been desultory and ineffective, with legislation being passed unanimously

to the chorus of paeans of praise. PRI leaders and deputies, as well as leading publications, have made it quite plain that they considered the PAN opposition to be unpatriotic and probably treasonable. Recent constitutional reforms, however, would guarantee that each party could earn a minimum number of seats, up to twenty, in proportion to its national vote (in addition to the seats in the Chamber of Deputies it might regularly win by majority vote in electoral districts). By this system, the PAN may obtain twenty seats in the Chamber. In proposing these constitutional revisions, the PRI leaders appeared to be genuinely concerned about the need to develop a "loyal opposition."

The relative stability under one-party rule shows signs of cracking. Since 1959, there have been outbreaks of bitter rioting, disorder, and violence in several of the Mexican states. In late 1962, there were outbreaks of terrorism, bombing, and attacks on city halls and military posts in several places from the northern boundary to the state of Oaxaca. During 1963 there was much unrest in Sonora, Durango, Chihuahua and Guerrero, as squatters seized land belonging to Americans and to big PRI leaders. Federal troops had to be called to quell the disorders. The exact nature and sources of the violent opposition could not be easily defined, and seemed to stem from a wide spectrum of impatience and disgust with the *continuismo* of the PRI regime.

Despite official pressures which are usually sufficient to assure that the opposition will win no more than a negligible percentage of the total vote, it is evident that there is an upsurge of support for the PAN. In the Federal District, where the vote is under some semblance of multiparty supervision, Congressional elections of July, 1961, yielded 30.05 per cent for the PAN. In July, 1962, a new record for opposition support was achieved when some 40 per cent of the popular vote in the municipality of Chihuahua was cast for PAN candidates for governor, deputies, and municipal *alcalde*.

Whether because of, regardless of, or in spite of the PRI, some aspects of Mexican life are improving. Mexico City has become cleaner and more modern, particularly under the continuing urban dictatorship of Ernesto P. Uruchurtú, Governor of the Federal District. Under the influence of Mexico City, several state capitals have undertaken programs of sanitation, electrification, and beautification. Some cities near the west coast of Mexico have experienced notable improvement.

Nevertheless, over forty years after the Revolution, Mexico still has far to go to realize the noble ideals of that movement. At least 45 per cent of the adult population is still illiterate. Poverty of no less than two-thirds of the population is still intense and appalling. Sanitation in most parts is still virtually unknown. Rural life can hardly be distinguished from that of El Salvador or Honduras. The almost unbelievable poverty of rural Mexico is matched only by the sickening display of wealth on the part of the new class of political leaders and the gentry who cooperate with the government. Large rural areas, and sometimes whole states, are dominated by *caciques* (chiefs) who rule in much the style of the oldtime feudal *patrón*. Where great *haciendas* have been turned into collective-type *ejido* farms, prominent political figures have in many instances turned them into medieval satrapies for their personal enrichment.

GUATEMALA

Area: 42,000 sq. mi.

Population: 4,000,000.

Presidency: Occupied provisionally by a military *junta* under direction of Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia; seized power March 31, 1963, to serve for an indefinite period.

Population of Guatemala is overwhelmingly Indian, but the Indians play but small part in Guatemalan politics. Rural *ladino* (*mestizo*) land owners and urban elements dominate political activity.

During 1930-1944, Guatemala was governed by the tyrannical dictatorship of Jorge Ubico, military; during 1944-1951, by the revolutionary, reformist regime of Juan José Arévalo; and during 1951-1954, by the extreme left-wing government of Col. Jacobo Arbenz. In June, 1954, Guatemalans under leadership of Col. Carlos Castillo Armas invaded from Honduras and overthrew the Arbenz regime. Absence of Guatemalan military support for Arbenz contributed more than did Washington to the collapse of the left-wing government. The United States, however, did its share by providing new arms to Honduras and Nicaragua. These republics, in their turn, let obsolete weapons fall into the hands of the Guatemalan revolutionaries. Also, there can be no doubt of the important rôle played by U.S. Ambassador John Peurifoy in facilitating emergence of Castillo Armas as president.

Arbenz is now in exile in Cuba, and has proclaimed that "Cuba will not be another Guatemala, but Guatemala will be another Cuba." The events in Cuba since 1959 reveal what would have probably occurred in Guatemala had not the Arbenz regime been overthrown.

In June, 1957, a personal guard assassinated "elected" President Castillo Armas. On January 20, 1958, after a period of confusion, Guatemala held her first relatively free and fair election in 137 years of independent political life. General Ydígoras, though once associated with Dictator Jorge Ubico, seemed determined to give popular government a whirl. To maintain his quasi-democratic regime, President Ydígoras had to quell multitudes of outbreaks of extreme violence. Guatemala has the dubious honor of sharing with Venezuela a prime place in the plans of Cuban-Russian imperialism in the western hemisphere. Finally, when Juan José Arévalo returned to Guatemala to lead his campaign for the presidency for the term 1964-1970, military elements deposed Ydígoras, suspended the Constitution and dissolved the Congress. Elections are to occur at some unspecified time. There is evidence that Ydígoras, who bitterly opposed Arévalo, was not altogether displeased with his own overthrow.

During times of constitutional government, Guatemala has a unicameral Congress and a multiparty system under a strong presidency. Parties which have been active in recent years and are likely to emerge with a return to democratic norms include **Partido de Democracia Cristiana de Guatemala** (Catholic, rightist), **Partido Revolucionario** (leading leftist, democratic, non-Communist opposition party), and some version of the **Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo** (Communist). In less dictatorial times, political leaders include Col. José Luis Cruz Salazar (conservative), Roberto Alejos (conservative), Juan José Arévalo (democratic leftist), Mario Méndez Montenegro (democratic leftist), and Francisco Montenegro Sierra (independent).

EL SALVADOR

Area: 8,200 sq. mi.

Population: 2,800,000.

President: Julio A. Rivera, military, took office July 1, 1962, for a five-year term.

El Salvador is the smallest country in Latin America, and is a very crowded, eroded, and monopolized land. A very few Salvadoran families have traditionally owned most of the national territory and are prominent in politics. Foreign ownership is negligible. Though living and cultural standards in El Salvador are very low, it is notable that despite extreme population density (about 350 per square mile) and an almost utter lack of resources, the economic and social problems of El Salvador are no more severe than are those of less thinly populated and much better endowed neighbors. Highway communications of the country are well developed.

Salvadoran politics are characterized by a combination of military rule, one-party control, and periodical adjustments in the patterns of power. Army rule was a feature of the harsh and bizarre dictatorship of Maximiliano Hernández Martínez (1931-1944). After a revolt in 1944, General Salvador Castañeda Castro came to power. Another *golpe de estado* introduced a period of one-party rule with reformist trimmings under the **Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Democrática** (PRUD) with Presidents Oscar Osorio (1950-1956) and José María Lemus (1956-1960), both military. On October 26, 1960, a bloodless *golpe* overthrew the Lemus regime. After a period of moderate confusion, which included promulgation of a new, socially conscious constitution, elections of April, 1962, brought Julio A. Rivera, military, to power.

During periods of revolutionary disturbance in El Salvador, it has been customary for several parties to struggle for political power. Upon settlement of the question of governmental control, the fruits of Salvadoran politics have been likely to fall into the hands of one official party. However, in congressional elections of March, 1964, President Rivera's dominant **Partido de Conciliación Nacional** (PCN) permitted a change in that order of things. The vote yielded 32 congressional seats for the PCN, but 14 for the **Partido Cristiano Democrático** (PCD), which is proclerical and conservative but not blind to need for social change. Six other opposition candidates won seats, and the PCD secured a most significant prize, the mayorship of San Salvador, the capital. Julio Rivera's PCN lost seats in the unicameral Congress, but the stature of President Rivera improved immensely. Until the 1964 elections, the PCN held all the legislative seats.

A small, moderate-liberal opposition party, **Partido Acción Renovadora** (PAR) has managed to survive from the period before the 1960 revolution. On the extreme right there is the **Partido Democrático Social** (PDS); and on the extreme left, the active, vociferous **Partido Revolucionario Abril y Mayo** (PRAM), which enjoys support from strident pro-Castro groups.

The present regime has taken many concrete steps to initiate social and economic reform. El Salvador is one of the few Latin American republics to set up and to effectively implement a meaningful program of broad reform under the Alliance for Progress.

HONDURAS

Area: 43,300 sq. mi.

Population: 2,000,000.

Presidency: Occupied provisionally by a military *junta* under direction of Col. Osvaldo López Arellano; seized power October 5, 1963, to serve until a constitutional assembly can establish a new governmental order.

Honduras, one of the least developed countries of Latin America, is notably plagued by poverty, illiteracy, and lack of internal communications. The government of Dr. Villeda Morales, **Partido Liberal**, tried desperately to extricate the country from feudalism. Important programs were in progress for education and land reform. As Honduras prepared for new elections, military elements overthrew the Villeda government, allegedly because of "intranquility, anarchy, violation of the Constitution and Communist infiltration." At the time he was deposed, President Villeda had recently signed an agrarian reform law and was attempting to put Alliance for Progress programs into effect.

During 1932-1948, the dictatorship of General Tiburcio Carías Andino, **Partido Nacional** (conservative), ruled Honduras. A moderate, conservative constitutional government of Juan Manuel Gálvez ruled during 1949-1954. The 1954 elections gave a plurality, but no majority, to Dr. Ramón Villeda Morales, **Partido Liberal**. The vice president, Julio Lozano Díaz, governed as "Chief of State" until his overthrow in October, 1956. In October, 1957, a constitutional assembly declared Dr. Villeda Morales to be president. It appears that the military *junta* is about to repeat this performance, but with a more acceptable candidate. The new constitutional assembly is to be elected February 16, 1965, and to be installed March 16, 1965. The peculiar device of letting the constitutional assembly name the next president may then be repeated in Honduras.

The leading parties, **Liberal** and **Nacional**, have competed for power by force and by elections. During the last years of the Villeda administration, student groups became increasingly vociferous and *fidelista*. When possible, the **Frente de Juventud Democrática Hondureña** has taken a left-wing, anti-U.S., pro-Soviet position. Communists also attempted to infiltrate the **Partido Liberal**. Their partial success, or the allegation of it, prompted increasing party factionalism and the withdrawal of leading members, such as Roque J. Rivera.

During the period of his administration Dr. Villeda Morales faced interminable uprisings, bombings, and assaults. **Nacionalista** (right wing) and left-wing elements were quite determined to sow social chaos and to secure power by force.

Until recently, the capital, Tegucigalpa, was an unusually isolated city. It has now been linked to the inter-American highway, which cuts through a small portion of Honduras; and there is a dirt highway to the Caribbean coast. There is no meaningful railroad transportation in the country, and many towns of the country are notoriously cut off from land communication with each other. In this inhospitable environment, politics remains as underdeveloped and immature as the social and economic framework in which it must operate. Democracy does not come easily to Honduras.

NICARAGUA

Area: 57,100 sq. mi.

Population: 1,600,000.

President: René Schick Gutiérrez, civilian, took office May 1, 1963, for a six-year term.

Though a Somoza does not occupy the Nicaraguan presidency, the Somoza family still plays a predominant rôle in the patterns of Nicaraguan political power. In elections of February 3, 1963, Dr. René Schick was the candidate of the Somoza-dominated **Partido Liberal Nacionalista** (PLN). He was personal secretary to the late Anastasio Somoza, Sr., founder of the dynasty who was assassinated in 1956. Dr. Schick served as minister of education and minister of external relations under ex-President Luis Anastasio Somoza Debayle (1957-1963), son of Anastasio Somoza, Sr. In one form or another, the Somozas have ruled Nicaragua since 1933.

Principal opposition parties include the **Partido Conservador Tradicional** (PCT) and **Partido Liberal Independiente** (PLI). The PLI is a dissident, anti-Somoza offshoot of the Somoza party. Before the Somoza era, the Conservative and Liberal parties had been the traditional contenders for power—usually by force but occasionally by elections. Neither the PCT nor the PLI bothered to participate in the 1963 elections. However, some conservatives put forward the candidacy of Diego Manuel Chamorro, of a group called **Partido Conservador Nicaragüense**. Chamorro received an insignificant fraction of the votes.

Relationships between the United States and Nicaragua have done little to improve the U.S. image in Latin American minds. Partly to assure the security of loans by New York bankers, and partly for more laudable reasons such as the prevention of chaos, U.S. armed forces were stationed in Nicaragua during most of the period from 1912 to 1933. With their departure, the strongly U.S.-oriented Somoza rule began and Anastasio Somoza was officially inaugurated as president in 1937. The Somozas have collaborated so closely with the United States, and U.S. influence in Nicaragua has been so obvious, that at times it has been difficult to extricate the rôles of the two governments from each other.

An early act of the Kennedy administration was to replace Thomas Whelan, political appointee and close friend of the Somozas, with Aaron Brown, career diplomat, as U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua. The long period of Whelan's service in Nicaragua (1951-1961) and of his notoriously close affiliation with the Somozas, leaves deep anti-U.S. scars in the memories of many Nicaraguan people. In Nicaragua, the United States has made important contributions to the pro-Soviet, "anti-imperialist" explosion that is still to come.

Despite the heavy hand of the Somozas, opposition parties do function in a precarious manner. The PCT publishes a big opposition daily, *La Prensa*, which is outspoken against the regime. Journalists' lives are fraught with danger. They are in and out of prison, and it is said that the regime permits publication of *La Prensa* to maintain a democratic façade.

Nicaragua has the only bicameral Congress in Central America. As a device to keep the opposition under control, the Constitution provides that of forty-two seats in the Chamber of Deputies, the minority party may occupy exactly fourteen; and that of sixteen in the Senate, the minority will be awarded four, as well as a seat for its candidate in the last presidential election. The minority party, of course, is never the **Partido Liberal Nacionalista**.

COSTA RICA

Area: 19,700 sq. mi.

Population: 1,300,000.

President: Francisco J. Orlich, civilian, took office May 8, 1962, for a four-year term.

Costa Rica has enjoyed relatively stable government since 1889, and there were but few out-and-out dictators before that. The press is entirely unrestrained and rather irresponsible. Political contest is very hot. During this century, notably in 1953, 1958, and 1962, there have been some really honest elections. There have also been exceptions to this pattern, as when War Minister Federico E. Tinoco imposed an illegal dictatorship during 1917-1919; and when, in 1948, the clique of Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia tried to prevent elected Otilio Ulate from securing office. In the latter instance, José Figueres led a revolution which restored constitutional order.

The leading political party is **Partido Liberación Nacional** (PLN), a reformist-socialist party which follows the leadership of José Figueres, ex-president (1953-1958), and prominent in Latin America as leader of democratic, anti-dictatorial causes. President Orlich is of the PLN, and the party enjoys a majority position in the unicameral Legislative Assembly.

Partido Unión Nacional (PUN) is pro-democratic and conservative. President Otilio Ulate (1949-1953) was of the PUN, as was President Mario Echandi (1958-1962). **Partido Republicano Nacional** (PRN) is a mish-mash of right-wing and left-wing followers of Rafael Calderón Guardia, leader of the ousted faction of 1948 and president, 1940-1944.

Costa Rica has made a record for its civilian, non-military spirit. In her entire history, only three military men have occupied her presidency. Educational attainments are high, with about 80 per cent literacy. Highway and railroad communications are better developed than elsewhere in Central America. Until recently, economic standards have been notably above the Latin American norm.

When Costa Rica was first settled during the middle of the sixteenth century, Spanish colonists found no precious minerals. Indians were non-sedentary, untamed, and ferociously resistant to all attempts at enslaving them. Because little if any wealth could be secured from the region, Spain made no attempt at maintaining communications or trade with the colony. Because of lack of wealth or slaves, Spanish settlers had to perform their own labor. Under the circumstances, the colonists had to be content with the small plots of land they could manage for themselves, and very few great *haciendas* were established. To this day, the proportion of proprietors of land to the total population is higher in Costa Rica than in any other Latin American country. Though large *haciendas* occupy some 30 per cent of Costa Rica's cultivated surface, they are thinly populated and are outside the central plateau where most of the population lives.

One of the most distressing of recent Latin American events has been the continuous eruption of the volcano Irazú, which began in March of 1963 and still persists. The volcano is dumping a heavy layer of ashes over the central plateau, killing all vegetation, forcing removal of livestock to other sections of the country, and almost choking out all normal life from the capital city of San José and nearby towns. The volcano Irazú threatens to destroy the social fabric of the republic.

PANAMA

Area: 28,700 sq. mi.

Population: 1,100,000.

President: Roberto Francisco Chiari, civilian, took office October 1, 1960, for a four-year term.

Panama is as closely associated with the United States as is any country of Latin America. Though considerations of nationalism prevent most Panamanians from discussing the U.S. participation in the secession movement, Colombians and other Latin Americans point to the U.S. rôle in the events of 1903. The United States is almost singly responsible for completion of all railroad, highway, and water routes both across and along the length of the Panamanian isthmus. Economy and society of the Panama City-Colón strip are dominated by the Canal Zone, which provides a large share of employment and perhaps \$80 million in trade, wages, and purchases. Despite its slums, the section that adjoins the Zone enjoys higher standards of living and sanitation than are to be found in most other parts of northern Latin America. Away from the Zone, economic and social conditions deteriorate.

Col. José Antonio Remón, president, was assassinated in January, 1955. After a period of confusion, Ernesto de la Guardia, civilian, took office in 1956 and served a colorless term. In elections of May 8, 1960, wealthy Roberto Francisco Chiari (sugar and cattle), won over Ricardo Arias Espinosa, of the official bloc.

Panamanian parties, such as they are, are highly *personalista*, and politics is dominated by a few very wealthy families, who are often related to one another and are active in journalism. They are likely to own huge landed estates, complete with *peones*. One of these *encomiendas* covers most of the Pacific side of Panama, from a point a few miles east of the Canal Zone to the borders of Colombia in South America.

It is understandable that ambitious politicians, who are closely allied with the economic oligarchy, find attacks against the United States to be more useful to their purposes than are proposals for fundamental social reform. It is also understandable that the Canal Zone, cutting as it does through the very center of a presumably independent republic, would inevitably be the cause of deep friction between the two countries. Under the circumstances, it is little wonder that anti-U.S. agitation is made to order for sincere nationalists, demagogues, journalists, irresponsible political leaders, and pro-Soviet elements. The wildly leftist, nationalist **Federación de Estudiantes Panameños** demonstrates from time to time against the government, against the United States, against the Canal Zone, and against almost everything except Cuba and the U.S.S.R. Curiously enough, elements of the **Federación** attempted a diversionary revolutionary movement in western Panama just prior to the assault by Cuban military personnel against Panama in April of 1959.

In January of 1964, in response to a flag-raising controversy in which American students at Balboa Junior College had tried to take matters into their own hands, there were savage demonstrations by Panamanian mobs. There were twenty-five deaths, two hundred injuries, and a huge amount of sacking and destruction of everything near the Zone that smacked of U.S. involvement. Panama broke relations with the United States, charged the U.S. with aggression, and demanded renegotiation of the canal treaty of 1903.

CUBA

Area: 44,200 sq. mi.

Population: 6,700,000.

"Premier" and dictator: Fidel Castro Ruiz, civilian, seized power January 1, 1959, from previous dictator, Fulgencio Batista, military.

"President": Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, civilian, took office July 18, 1959, for an undefined term.

Cuba has never achieved constitutional order for any important period of time. Machado, Batista, Castro, and others, have served as strongmen, with intermittent civilian governments characterized by indescribable corruption and nepotism. Under Batista, a sort of official gangsterism promoted political racketeering and widespread vice.

Since the Castro revolution, Cuba has moved rapidly into the Soviet sphere. Agrarian and other reform has from the first taken a collectivist turn, and there has been no move to encourage the multiplication of individual proprietorship. Despite a temporary appearance of difference over removal of Soviet missiles, wherein Castro showed incomprehension of his puppet rôle, foreign and domestic policy of Cuba is indistinguishable from that of the Soviet Union. Fully entrapped within the Soviet orbit, Cuba passed 1963 and early 1964 in the condition of spiritless calm that pervades most of the satellites of the Soviet Union. Even the Soviet-Chinese cleavage caused less of a ripple in Cuban loyalties than was anticipated in the foreign press.

There is no pretense at legality. The regime rules by decree, without any Congress, and there is no legal basis for either the "presidency" of Dorticós or the "premiership" of Castro. The regime has suppressed what little freedom of speech or press there was under Batista. All parties except the Communist have long since been abolished as "counterrevolutionary." The one official quasi-party is the so-called *Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas* (ORI), which is supposed to be preparing the way for the forthcoming *Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista Cubana* (PURSC), but is actually nothing more than the old Communist Party (*Partido Socialista Popular*, PSP) with a new name. Communist leaders occupy all the top governmental posts. Prominent Communists, many trained in the U.S.S.R., run the Agrarian Reform Institute (Carlos Rafael Rodríguez), the University of Havana (Juan Marinello), labor (Lázaro Peña), the military forces (Joaquín Odoqui) and the economy (again Carlos Rafael Rodríguez).

Before Castro, American investment was dominant in the economy, and many of the less admirable features of American "culture" were evident in Cuban life. U.S. Ambassadors collaborated with reactionary, corrupt regimes such as that of Batista. However, the responsibility of the United States for Cuba's misfortunes is often exaggerated. Other Latin American countries, with or without U.S. influence, have known deep poverty and political instability; and, the pre-Castro living and literacy standards in Cuba were among the highest in Latin America.

The Cuban experience is a frightening commentary on (1) the need for a sense of social conscience in U.S. foreign policy, (2) the failure of the U.S. to present a favorable image of its social and political system in its own backyard, and (3) the incredible naïveté or downright dishonesty of many U.S. "liberals" who have been unable or unwilling to comprehend the significance for the U.S. national interest of this forward position of the U.S.S.R. Finally, one is impelled to remark that we now know what would have occurred in Guatemala had there been no revolution in that country in 1954.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Area: 19,000 sq. mi.

Population: 3,200,000.

Presidency: Occupied provisionally by a civilian *junta* under direction of Donald J. Reid Cabral, to serve until a constitutional government can be installed on August 16, 1965.

When Generals Antonio Imbert Barrera and Luis Amiana Tío overthrew the elected government of Dr. Juan Bosch on September 25, 1963, they destroyed the optimism that many, including the *Guide*, had expressed for the future of Dominican constitutional government. Imbert and Amiana were the only two survivors of the group that assassinated Rafael Leónidas Trujillo, and there was evidence of bungling by the Bosch government. These factors did nothing, however, to soften the blow to Dominican democracy.

With assassination of "Generalísimo" Rafael Leónidas Trujillo, May 30, 1961, disaffected military elements brought to an end one of the most stifling, dreaded tyrannies on record. The self-glorification of Trujillo, "*benefactor de la patria*," was beyond belief. With the end of his regime, the glory of "*Dios y Trujillo*" evaporated into the vapid nothingness from whence it came. After a period during which Trujillo's improbable son Ramfis (colonel at the age of 3, brigadier general at 9) tried to retain power, and a Trujillo protégé, Joaquín Balaguer, tried to retain the presidency, a new constitution was proclaimed in September, 1962, elections were held in December of the same year, and Juan Bosch was inaugurated as president in February of 1963.

Many democratically-minded individuals held high hopes for the Bosch administration and for the Dominican Republic. A combination of ineptitude on the part of Bosch and incomprehension of democratic processes on the part of inexperienced Dominicans brought his term to an abrupt close after only seven months in power.

After the *golpe*, the military soon turned the government over to a civilian *junta*. Now, the ruling triumvirate (Donald J. Reid Cabral, Ramón Tapia Espinal and Manuel Tavares Espaillet) promises that there will be elections for a new constitutional assembly and for Congress at the end of 1964, and for president on July 15, 1965. The *junta* says it plans on inauguration of the new elected constitutional government on August 16, 1965. There is little reason to hope that Dominican democracy will be any stronger then than it was last September.

After Trujillo was overthrown, it was hard to know which was the more inspiring—the resumption by "Ciudad Trujillo" of its old name, Santo Domingo, or the struggle of a recently subjugated people to adapt themselves to the unfamiliar practices of freedom. Now it appears that Dominican democracy is to be achieved by more than changes in names, and that the struggle for freedom is not to be won by so brief an effort. This is, of course, what all the political history of Latin America should make clear.

The civilian *junta* has not imposed anything like the Draconian tyranny of Trujillo. The following parties continue active: Unión Cívica Nacional (moderate, democratic, led by Dr. Viriato Fiallo), Alianza Social Democrática, Demócrata Cristiano, and Demócrata Cristiano Progresivo; and more recently, the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (leftist democratic, led by Juan Bosch) has been permitted to return to the political scene. Apparently the far-left and *fidelista* parties, including *Movimiento 14 de Julio*, are still outside the pale.

HAITI

Area: 10,700 sq. mi.

Population: 3,700,000.

President: François Duvalier, civilian, first took office October 22, 1957. In 1961, declared himself re-elected for a six-year term, and was re-inaugurated in May, 1963. He has now proclaimed himself president for life.

Of all the countries of Latin America, Haiti is next to the smallest in area (El Salvador) and is the most densely populated. Illiteracy is about 90 per cent. Poverty is as intense as anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. A small, parasitic aristocratic class is moderately educated and dominates political affairs. Haiti shares these economic and social conditions with several other Latin American republics. The country differs from the others in being overwhelmingly African in ethnic origin, with an overlay of French cultural veneer. The official language is French, but people who are not in the aristocratic classes generally speak a Creole language that combines early Norman French with elements of Spanish and African.

Political parties in the usual sense are unknown in Haiti. At times of presidential contest, groups will form around leading contenders. Meaningful elections are unknown, and presidents such as Duvalier will often not even trouble themselves with normal electoral formalities. Two years before his first term was to expire, Duvalier's name was obscurely slipped into a Congressional election. On that basis, he declared himself re-elected for his present term. In May, 1963, as his first term was presumably drawing to a close, dissident elements stirred the Haitian political cauldron and the regime suffered difficulties with the Dominican Republic and the United States. However, Duvalier managed to get himself installed again. In March, 1964, he proclaimed himself to be president for life.


Haiti has never known orderly, constitutional or democratic government. Chaos alternating with short dictatorships has been the political rule. The present regime followed a year of unspeakable anarchy subsequent to the end of the government of Paul Magloire, 1950-1956. Magloire tried to extend his term beyond its legal end. Opponents overthrew him. Turbulence during October 1956-October 1957 included a short presidency by a supreme court judge, a one-week presidency by a wild demagogue, periods without any government at all, and others under a military dictatorship.

By employing a system of private thugs to enforce his rule, Duvalier has broken from army surveillance. Duvalier's sadistic hoods are greatly feared by the terrorized Haitian population. The government, whose policies and conduct are entirely unpredictable, has accused high Catholic prelates of being in league with Communists, and has itself toyed with Communist propaganda against the so-called "Yankee imperialists."

Haiti has had nineteen different constitutions. The present document hedges individual rights by several limitations. The fact is that the so-called Constitution is a meaningless scrap of paper, there is no freedom of expression, and illiteracy is so widespread that few could write or read political views if their publication were permitted.

The Constitution grants sweeping powers to the president, and by legal or illegal means his complete domination over the Congress is assured.

Haiti, which is located within the very shadow of the United States, is a republic that seems to be utterly without hope. When one views the political condition of all the Caribbean republics, one is led to wish that the force and prestige of the United States could have moved them to a better fate.



BRAZIL

Area: 3,288,000 sq. mi.

Population: 75,000,000.

President: Humberto de Alecar Castelo Branco, military, took office April 15, 1964, as congressionally elected interim president to fill out five-year term which began with Jânio Quadros January 31, 1961, and was filled by João Goulart from September, 1961, to April 2, 1964.

In the western hemisphere, Brazil is exceeded in population only by the United States and Canada. Yet, the real development of Brazil, as of much of Latin America, has hardly begun. Though the nation possesses great mineral and agricultural resources, she is plagued by accelerating inflation, and faces serious problems of unemployment, poverty, inadequate communications, underdeveloped health standards, labor turbulence, poverty, and political demagoguery.

On September 7, 1822, Brazil glided almost imperceptibly into independence from Portugal. In 1889, after a period of constitutional monarchy (Pedro I and the great Pedro II), the republican form was adopted. The first few years of the republic (1891-1894) were particularly stormy. From 1922 to 1930 there were numerous unsuccessful uprisings. During 1930-1945, Getúlio Vargas, in the style of European dictators of the time, established himself as strongman over *O Estado Novo*, but popular and military pressure finally forced him from office. In 1950 Vargas returned to power as an ineffectual constitutional president, and committed suicide in 1954. The long shadow of Vargas still lies upon the Brazilian political scene, and there are many who cherish his memory.

The resignation of Jânio Quadros, August 25, 1961, and the quick transformation of Brazil to a parliamentary system to make Vice President João Goulart acceptable to conservative and military elements, narrowly averted a serious crisis. On January 6, 1963, a lopsided vote (9,236,515 to 1,922,447) favored return to the presidential system. Thereafter, Goulart moved steadily to the left. In late 1963 and early 1964, in addition to pushing for basic changes which Brazil needs in some form (land distribution, tax overhaul, fiscal reform), Goulart also propounded measures that had nothing to do with improvement of social conditions. He proposed to expropriate the thriving, Brazilian privately-owned petroleum distributing industry and domestic airlines, to rule by decree, to legalize the Communist Party, to expand trade with Communist countries, and to revise the Constitution to permit his own re-election. Conservative and moderate elements interpreted these moves as designed to perpetuate himself in power and to deliver Brazil to the Eastern bloc. In a series of lightning moves, during March 30-April 1, 1964, governors of the most important states as well as commanders of three of the four Brazilian army divisions demanded he leave office. Goulart fled to Uruguay. Under great military pressure, the Congress went through the constitutional forms of electing General Humberto de Alecar Castelo Branco to serve the remainder of the term. The Congress granted him broad powers to rule in a highly authoritarian manner.

It is of importance that Brazil is not Spanish. She is in Latin America, but not entirely of it, and tends to live and stew within her own world. It is frequently commented that Brazil is more flexible, more relaxed, less histrionic, than are most parts of Spanish America.

Beneath the surface, however, Brazil seethes. During the Goulart period, for example, there were numerous crippling strikes, there were unrest and dissension among top military leaders, non-commissioned officers attempted revolts (as on September 3, 1963), the air was filled with violent denunciations, and the presi-

dent and his opponents charged each other with attempting reciprocal murder. Governors hurled earth-shaking epithets at each other, and extremist organizations combined to do battle against the established order, if any.

The forms of Brazilian government are established in the Constitution of 1946. Supposedly, the president holds office for five years, and may not be immediately re-elected. There is a bicameral Congress, in which a Chamber of Deputies is apportioned according to population and a Senate includes three members from each state as well as from the federal district (Brasília). Deputies serve for four-year terms, and Senators for eight. Though the Brazilian president is potentially powerful, Congressional debate is vigorous, and the president cannot always be sure of enjoying a legislative majority. In the Brazilian system, the military stands behind the government as a watchful omnipresence, generally available to "preserve the constitutional order," and ready to take overt action in the event of extreme presidential radicalism.

There are now 22 states in the Brazilian federal union. In addition to the usual powers which a national government in a typical federal system may exercise, the Brazilian has authority over so many spheres that very little is left to independent state authority. Also, the states are certainly not of equal status. Over one third of the Brazilian population is in the states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro city). Ten per cent of the people occupy two thirds of the national territory. Two states—São Paulo and Guanabara—account for about 75 per cent of the national income. States of the northeast and the Amazon basin are poverty-stricken. The governments of the more vigorous states of the south exercise a degree of autonomy from the national government.

Political contest is lively, and the press is free but often irresponsible. Leading parties are:

Partido Social Democrático (PSD), which despite its name has no definable program. It is strongly influenced by big industrialists, rural aristocracy, and administrative hierarchy. The party was formed in 1945 as one outgrowth of the Vargas tradition. During 1946-1951 (Eurico Gaspar Dutra) and 1956-1961 (Juscelino Kubitschek), it held the presidency. The PSD collaborated with João Goulart.

Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), led by João Goulart, is a nationalist, pro-labor, populist, often demagogic party which has borrowed from the extremists of both left and right. The PTB was also founded in 1945 and is the other offshoot from the Vargas period. The leadership of the PTB holds the Vargas memory in high regard.

União Democrática Nacional (UDN), a generally 19th-century-liberal type of party which stresses democratic concepts. An important, dramatic leader of UDN is Carlos Lacerda, presently governor of Guanabara state (city of Rio de Janeiro). Lacerda and Goulart are bitter enemies.

Partido Social Progressista, a personalist party led by ambitious Adhemar de Barros, second-time governor of the influential state of São Paulo. Has no definable program, except generally anti-leftist.

There are numerous smaller parties, including **Partido Republicano**, **Partido Democrático Cristão**, **Partido Socialista Brasileiro**, **Partido Trabalhista Nacional**, **Partido Libertador**, **Partido de Representação Popular** (neo-fascist), **Partido Trabalhista Social**, **Movimento Trabalhista Renovador**, **Partido Republicano Trabalhista**, and **Partido Comunista Brasileiro** (theoretically illegal).

A **Frente Parlamentar Nacionalista** is a bloc of left-wing deputies and senators. A particularly active movement is the Peasant League, in northeast Brazil, under leadership of fire-breathing pro-Communist Francisco Julião. Marxism exerts a strong influence in intellectual circles and among labor syndicates.

ARGENTINA

Area: 1,073,000 sq. mi.

Population: 21,000,000.

President: Arturo H. Illía, civilian, took office October 12, 1963, for a six-year term.

Regime of Juan Domingo Perón took power in 1945 and was overthrown in September, 1955. After a short period during which General Eduardo Lonardi served as provisional president, General Pedro E. Aramburu continued in that capacity from November 13, 1955, to the inauguration of elected Arturo Frondizi, on May 1, 1958. Because he permitted *peronistas* to gain several congressional and gubernatorial victories in elections of March 18, 1962, Frondizi was arrested by the army on March 29, 1962. José María Guido, president of the Senate, replaced Frondizi. Elections of July 7, 1963, followed by vote of the electoral college on August 31, gave victory to (medical) Dr. Arturo H. Illía, a leader of the *Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo*. *Peronistas* did surprisingly poorly in the elections, gaining only about 15 per cent of the vote.

Parties in the election of July 7 were: *Unión Conservador del Pueblo* (Pedro Eugenio Aramburu), *Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente* (Oscar Alende), *Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo* (Arturo Illía), *Frente Nacional y Popular* (*peronista*; candidate Vicente Solano Lima withdrew and called for blank ballots), *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (Horacio Sueldo), *Partido Socialista Democrático* (Alfredo Ongaz), and *Partido Socialista Argentina* (Alfredo Palacios).

Argentina is presumably governed by provisions of the Constitution of 1853, as revised in 1866, 1898, and 1957. The document is among the most brief in Latin America, and is in large measure copied from that of the United States.

Even in bad times, Argentina enjoys one of the highest standards of living in Latin America. Her literacy (about 86 per cent) is the highest south of the Río Grande. Though there are distressing slums (inhabited in part by Paraguayans), Buenos Aires gives the appearance of being one of the most affluent, vigorous and glittering capitals in the hemisphere.

Even so, Argentina suffers from serious disabilities. First, there is the problem of the military, which during this generation has got into the habit of intervening into political affairs. Second, there is the problem of political irresponsibility and corruption. During almost this entire century, political parties have seldom proposed candidates who could give Argentina experience in responsible, enlightened self-government. If the old *Unión Cívica Radical*, traditional liberal party of Argentine politics, could get itself united, it could probably win a resounding majority of votes and solve the problem of recurring crises. Third, there is the problem of *peronismo*—the heritage of demagoguery, nepotism, disrespect for the law, moral turpitude, and flagrant embezzlement of public funds, which were standard procedures of government during ten years of Argentine political life. Fourth, this huge and richly fertile country, nearly the size of India, contains only 21 million inhabitants because the families who monopolize the rural land are satisfied to use it inadequately for extensive cattle grazing. The Argentine *pampa*, which occupies a great arc to the north, west and south of Buenos Aires, contains some of the finest black soil in the world. Yet, the countryside is only sparsely occupied and Buenos Aires contains almost one third of the population of the country.

URUGUAY

Area: 72,200 sq. mi.

Population: 2,550,000.

Presidency: National Council, a plural executive of nine members, last elected, 1962, for a four-year term. *Blanco* Party, the six majority seats; *Colorado* Party, the three minority seats.

There can be no doubt that Uruguay is a democratic country. A unique feature of Uruguayan government is the plural executive, which was adopted in 1952 to mitigate the bitterness of political contest over the presidency. The chairman of the Council serves as *presidente* for ceremonial functions. The chairmanship is passed around among majority party members on a one-year-term basis. There are also nine heads of departments, or ministers. These are chosen by the National Council. Individual ministers may be removed by joint congressional vote of censure. The congress is bicameral.

In what was perhaps the most sensational recent electoral upset in Latin America, the conservative *Partido Blanco* (or *Unión Nacionalista Blanquista*), in the minority for over ninety years, was elected in 1958 to a majority position on the National Council. In 1962 elections, the *blanquistas* repeated this phenomenon insofar as the National Council was concerned, but by a very narrow majority (466,263 to 458,601 for the opposition *colorados*). The *colorados*, on the other hand, won a small congressional majority.

Both parties are badly torn by factional disputes, and the various portions of the *Partido Colorado* are real political parties in all but name. *Colorado* factions are led by Luis Batlle Berres, ambitious nephew of the famous José Batlle y Ordóñez, and by César Batlle Pacheco, son of the same Batlle y Ordóñez. Generally speaking, the *colorados* favor programs involving a large degree of state participation in the economy; the *blancos* represent conservative land owners of the countryside, as well as city elements displeased with inflation, excessive bureaucracy, and other features they associated with recent *colorado* administrations.

The Blanco Party is divided between leadership by Benito Nardone and by Eduardo Víctor Haedo. Under a complex voting system, party factions pool their votes and deliver them to that faction which enjoys a plurality. On the National Council, a faction which obtains at least one sixth of the total majority party vote is awarded one of the six seats. The three minority seats are distributed according to the proportional support enjoyed by the various minority factions. However, even this arrangement is criticized on the grounds that it fails to accurately reflect the many Uruguayan party factions.

Parties in addition to the Blanco and Colorado are the *Unión Cívica* (Christian Democrat, Catholic); *Socialista*; *Comunista*; and *Unión Democrática Radical*.

There can be no doubt of the profound contribution of José Batlle y Ordóñez to the institutions of Uruguayan democracy. He held office during 1903-1907 and died in 1933. He may be held singly responsible for Uruguayan stress on social legislation, and for eventual adoption of the plural executive system, as well as for the habits of stable, constitutional government which evolved after the beginning of the century. Before Batlle, Uruguayan political history was a record of almost unrelieved chaos. José Batlle y Ordóñez provides a prime illustration of the contribution that may be made to democratic stability by responsible, self-disciplined leaders. The hope is that contemporary Uruguayan politicians will be worthy of a valuable heritage.

CHILE

Area: 287,000 sq. mi.

Population: 8,000,000.

President: Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez, civilian, took office November 3, 1958, for a six-year term.

Chile has a reputation for achievement of a degree of orderly democracy. However, violent uprisings have occurred, particularly in 1851, 1859, 1891, 1924, and 1931. Until recent decades, government was a plaything of members of the parasitic landed aristocracy, who monopolized public office but more or less adhered to constitutional forms.

During 1927-1931, Carlos Ibáñez del Campo ruled as dictator and, though the Chileans overthrew him in 1931, they returned him to office by election in 1952. During 1952-1958 he served as constitutional president, and in 1958 turned over the office to elected Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez, son of famous two-term President Arturo Alessandri Palma. During his term, President Alessandri has pursued a conservative but socially conscious program.

A recent land reform measure attempts to create a new class of many proprietors. However, monopoly of the land continues to hamper full development of Chilean democracy. Despite the fine appearance of much of Santiago and of Valparaíso and even of many of the rural towns, there is widespread poverty. Even so, the Chilean social scene is surprisingly varied, and illiteracy affects only about 20 per cent of the population. It would probably be correct to say that Chilean democracy is about on a par with that of Costa Rica, though more equitable land distribution in the latter country may stimulate more political participation by rural elements.

As in Costa Rica, the president is not the dominant figure that he is in several other Latin American republics. His powers of appointment and removal are limited by the requirement of congressional approval, and he cannot be assured of control of the Congress. The press is entirely free.

Because of the possibility of a left-wing victory, forthcoming presidential elections of September 4, 1964, are most important. Parties in the pro-government coalition, from right-wing conservative to moderate, are the **Conservador**, **Liberal** and **Radical**, of which the Radical is the largest. For purposes of the next election, they are grouped together in the **Frente Democrática** (FD). A left-wing coalition, or **Frente de Acción Popular** (FRAP) includes the **Partido Comunista** (legal), **Partido Socialista** (more pro-Communist than democratic), and **Partido Democrático Nacionalista** (nationalist, neo-Nazi)—a combination that seems odd only to those who do not understand the common bond of affection for despotism and disrespect for constitutional government that often link Communist and Fascist elements. FRAP is proposing the candidacy of the popular Dr. Salvador Allende, and poses a real threat to the established order. A presidential victory by FRAP would subject Chilean democracy to a severe test.

An increasingly important party in Chile is the **Partido Demócrata Cristiano**, which takes a socially conscious, pro-clerical position. For the next elections, the PDC candidate is Sen. Eduardo Frei. In the 1963 municipal elections, PDC won about 23 per cent of the total. It now appears that the FD will support Frei's candidacy.

VENEZUELA

Area: 352,100 sq. mi.

Population: 7,600,000.

President: Raúl Leoni, civilian, took office March 11, 1964, for a five-year term.

Because of (1) oil resources, (2) location relative to the Panama Canal, (3) easy access across the Caribbean to Cuba, and (4) key position as a gateway to political subversion in Central America, the Caribbean, and South America, Venezuela is a special target of Cuban-Russian expansion in the Americas. For the same reasons, Venezuela is for the United States among the most vitally important countries in Latin America.

After its inauguration in early 1959, the pro-Western, democratic government of Rómulo Betancourt and his Democratic Action Party engaged in a desperate struggle with extremist, left-wing elements whose leaders wittingly or unwittingly serve as advance agents of Russian imperialism in this hemisphere. Politically immature, naïve secondary and university students participated in wild riots and senseless violence, and the Betancourt government had to put down left-wing uprisings by young, dissident military elements. At the close of the Betancourt regime and the beginning of the Leoni administration, as a consequence of vigorous action by Betancourt, terrorist violence by the so-called **Frente Armado de Liberación Nacional** had been brought under control.

Venezuelan history, like that of Paraguay, has been characterized by long periods of brutal dictatorship interspersed by very short-lived confusion or fleeting democracy. The dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez was overthrown on January 23, 1958, after three weeks of disturbance. Pérez Jiménez (1952-1958), was only the most recent of many tyrants who have imposed their wills on Venezuela, including the infamous Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935). After elimination of Pérez Jiménez, a seven-man *junta* led by Rear Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal paved the way for elections—themselves a rarity in Venezuelan political history. In elections of December 7, 1958, Venezuelans chose Rómulo Betancourt over Larrazábal. In response to mob protests, Larrazábal insisted that the election returns be respected—another political phenomenon for Venezuela. The country turned another corner when, on December 1, 1963, and in the face of threats of terrorism from the left wing, the country elected Raúl Leoni to the presidency, this time by only a 32 per cent plurality. When Leoni was inaugurated on March 11, 1964, it was the first time in one hundred fifty-two years of Venezuelan political history that one elected president had peaceably followed a previous one.

To stay in power, President Leoni will need all the ingenuity and courage he can muster. His **Partido Acción Democrática** (AD) does not enjoy a majority in the congress, and his reluctance to continue in coalition with the **Partido Social Cristiano** (Christian socialist; called COPEI because of earlier name, **Comité Organizador Pro Elección Independiente**) may expose his regime to fatal weakness. Leader of the Christian Socialists is Dr. Rafael Caldera. Another important party is **Unión Republicana Democrática**, which may or may not cooperate with Leoni. A dangerous party is the **Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria**, which began as a dissident left-wing faction of AD, and is now working with Communists, *felistas*, the **Frente Armado**, and other anti-democratic groups. Another AD faction is **Acción Democrática Independiente**.

In the bewildering Venezuelan political scene, there are not many reasons to be optimistic about the five-year term of President Raúl Leoni.

COLOMBIA

Area: 440,000 sq. mi.

Population: 15,000,000.

President: Guillermo León Valencia, civilian, took office August, 1962, for a four-year term.

During 1900-1945, the mountainous republic of Colombia enjoyed a relatively stable quasi-democracy, under oligarchical supervision, with free press and competing Liberal and Conservative parties. During 1946-1953, Conservative governments beginning with President Mariano Ospina Pérez and ending with that of Laureano Gómez displayed increasingly dictatorial, semi-fascist features in an environment of mounting tension, bitterness and violence. In July, 1953, while President Gómez was trying to establish a fascist-type constitution, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla overthrew the government. It soon became clear that Rojas Pinilla had no more intention than did Gómez of restoring democratic government. A combination of military, business and labor leaders overthrew his regime in May, 1957.

Under leadership of General Gabriel París, a provisional military *junta* reestablished political freedoms. A plebiscite of December 1, 1957, secured popular approval for a 50-50 Liberal-Conservative participation in all important legislative and executive organs of government. Even the presidency would alternate between the two parties. Alberto Lleras Camargo, renowned scholar and Liberal, served during 1958-1962. Guillermo León Valencia, Conservative, is to serve during 1962-1966.

During 1946-1957, violence between Liberals and Conservatives reached appalling proportions, and brought death to over 100,000 persons. Despite some pacification, violence continues to flare in the countryside. It has now lost all political meaning, and has degenerated (as violence usually does) into senseless, sadistic killing and banditry by organized rural gangsters.

Also, it has been impossible to maintain the fiction of a united front between Conservatives and Liberals. Both parties have split into pro-government and anti-government factions. The government coalition is known as *Frente Nacional*, and is led by Carlos Lleras Restrepo (L), Alberto Lleras Camargo (L), Guillermo León Valencia (president and C), and Mariano Ospina Pérez (C). Part of the opposition is headed by Alfonso López Michelson (L), who leads a so-called *Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal*, and by Alvaro Gómez Hurtado (C) of the Laureano Gómez faction of the Conservative Party. The Conservatives are further split by followers of Lucio Pabón Núñez. Amazingly enough, none other than General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla has now come forth with an *Alianza Nacional Popular*, to win twenty-seven seats in the Congress. It has become common for the various groups in opposition to the *Frente Nacional* to occupy about 40 per cent of the congressional seats. However, they are not able to coalesce into an effective anti-government bloc.

Certainly the Colombian political scene provides vivid evidence of the operation of the *personalista* phenomenon in Latin America, wherein it is virtually impossible to form supporters around two or three general systems of ideas, or even to maintain a cohesive defense of the constitutional system itself. The new popularity of Rojas Pinilla, who was so convincingly thrown out of office in 1957, raises important questions about the future of responsible democracy in Colombia.

ECUADOR

Area: 105,000 sq. mi.

Population: 4,500,000.

Presidency: Occupied provisionally by a military *junta* under leadership of Navy Captain Ramón Castro Jijón; seized power July, 1963, and expelled President Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy, civilian, who as vice-president had taken office November 7, 1961, to fill out the four-year term of Dr. José María Velasco Ibarra.

Ecuador, an Andean republic, is largely Indian and *mestizo*. Cultural assimilation between European and Indian elements is still not complete. Educational and economic progress has been slow, and poverty is still widespread.

Before 1948, Ecuador's history was one of unrelieved chaos alternating with occasional periods of dictatorial rule. Dr. Enrique Galo Plaza Lasso, Liberal, became president after an unusually fair and free election. The preceding government of Acting President Mariano Suárez Veintimilla deserves much credit for this unlikely turn of events. The moderate but firm administration of Galo Plaza stabilized the country and prepared the way for new elections. The phenomenon of free, fair electoral contest was repeated three more times with the election in 1952 of Dr. José María Velasco Ibarra; in 1956, of Camilo Ponce Enríquez; and in 1960, again of Velasco Ibarra.

This orderly pattern seems now to have collapsed. Velasco tended to demagoguery and extreme nationalism. His most recent term was short-lived. The majority of the Congress was anti-Velasco, and was strongly influenced by Vice President Arosemena, who was president of the Senate. During October, 1961, there were violent disorders both inside and outside the Congress. President Velasco resigned, and with the help of a Congressional resolution and a show of strength by the Air Force, Vice President Arosemena took office.

It now seems that Arosemena was not the final answer to the problems of Ecuador. He indulged in irresponsible demagoguery and his policies *vis à vis* foreign relations seemed capricious and unpredictable. But, more notoriously, it became obvious that Arosemena was an alcoholic, unlimited. Finally, after several distressing escapades and public appearances in a drunken condition, he became very inebriated at a diplomatic dinner, hurled invectives at the United States Ambassador, vomited on the table, and lurched out of the room. Not altogether without reason, military officers announced that Arosemena had "besmirched the national honor." In mid-July, 1963, they forced him to leave the country, canceled elections which had been set for June, 1964, and announced a military *junta* would rule for two years. The military regime has not been unduly harsh, and there are signs that an attempt will be made to restore the constitutional order.

Political parties combine traditional and *personalista* elements. Principal ones are the *Partido Liberal Radical*, *Movimiento Social Cristiano*, and *Partido Socialista*, as well as the *Partido Conservador* and a *falange*-type group called the *Asociación Revolucionaria Nacional de Ecuador*. Electoral activity is confined to a minority of the population. Despite military rule, the press is still moderately outspoken.

During the Velasco-Arosemena regimes, Ecuador reopened an old dispute with Peru over possession of a large tropical rain-forest region to the east of the Andes. Mediation by the United States, Brazil, and Argentina, was thought to have settled the issue in favor of Peru, and in a Rio Treaty of 1942 Ecuador agreed to forego her claims.

PERU

Area: 500,000 sq. mi.

Population: 11,000,000.

President: Fernando Belaúnde Terry, civilian, took office July 29, 1963, for a six-year term.

Peru, like Ecuador and Bolivia, contains an ethnically divided population. At least 50 per cent of her people are Indian, and most of these have not been effectively assimilated into the Spanishized Peruvian culture. From the physical standpoint, Peru is also badly divided, between a desert coast, a high Andean *sierra*, and the eastern jungle lowlands, called the *montaña* region of the country. Peru, like many of her sisters, is plagued by extreme poverty, low levels of production, and high illiteracy (at least 60 per cent).

Peru has seldom enjoyed more than short periods of political freedom or constitutional order. After the dictatorship of General Manuel Odría (1948-1956), it seemed that elected President Manuel Prado y Ugarteche, civilian, would be allowed to serve his six-year term and deliver the presidency to the victor in the elections of June 10, 1962. However, when it appeared the Congress might approve of plurality-winner Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, of the *apristas*, the military occupied the presidency and prevented President Prado from completing the last two weeks of his term. A military *junta*, first under direction of General Ricardo Pérez Godoy and later of General Nicolás Lindley López, ruled for one year. Elections of June 9, 1963, gave victory to Fernando Belaúnde Terry, a civilian reformist of the so-called Partido de Acción Popular. Since his inauguration on July 29, 1963, Belaúnde has been trying to promote social (particularly agrarian) reform within the framework of Western democracy.

Peruvian parties, except for the *Aprista*, tend to be non-ideological and non-traditional, and to group around the figures of leading personalities. The most famous is the Partido Aprista Peruano (from APRA, or Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana), long the terror of Peruvian governments. Years of exile and mature reflection seem to have moderated the fury of formerly fire-breathing Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, now 78. APRA, which began in the 1920s as a left-wing movement of university students, has long advocated democracy, education, socialist-type economic policy, improvement of Indian conditions and assimilation of Indians into Peruvian life, as well as inter-American internationalization of the Panama Canal and anti-imperialism, whether U.S. or Soviet.

A Partido de Acción Popular is a recent creation, and follows the leadership of President Belaúnde. The PAP, prior to elections of 1963, displayed left-wing tendencies and flirted with *fidelistas* and Communists. Power seems to have sobered Belaúnde and the PAP, so that today the party is dedicated to much the same kind of program that the *apristas* have long advocated. However, curiously enough, the *apristas* in the Peruvian Congress are not allied with PAP, but with the very *personalista* Partido Nacional Odrista, whose reason for existence is an affection for General Manuel Odría—the very dictator who during 1948-1956 drove the *apristas* underground. Because of this *aprista-odrista* alliance in the Congress, Belaúnde's PAP does not enjoy a majority.

In the countryside, a determined peasant movement for land reform is being captured by violent, *fidelista* elements. Organized labor, led by the Confederación de Trabajadores Peruandos, is generally pro-*aprista*.

BOLIVIA

Area: 420,000 sq. mi.

Population: 3,500,000.

President: Víctor Paz Estenssoro, civilian, took office August 6, 1960, for a four-year term.

No one should envy the job of the president of Bolivia. The republic is in all respects among the most backward in Latin America. The population, which is overwhelmingly Indian, has been exploited and kept in numbed poverty and ignorance by generations of *conquistadores*, *patrones*, tin barons and ignorant military thugs. If not subjected to the medieval peonage of the great estates of the lower altitudes, the Indians have been abused and de-humanized in the tin mines of the high, barren plateau. Politics is the specialty of a small clique of non-Indian leaders. Bolivian history is a tale of a bewildering succession of revolts, and in some cases of incredible depravity in public office. Until 1952, elections were generally without meaning, and it cannot be said that as yet they play a significant rôle in determining access to political power.

In 1952, the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) overthrew a government which had allegedly denied to MNR the fruits of election victory. The 1952 episode climaxed a particularly violent period in Bolivia's generally very unstable political history. Víctor Paz Estenssoro served as president, 1952-1956; Hernán Siles Suazo, a singularly courageous individual, 1956-1960. Paz Estenssoro is now concluding his second term, and has secured a constitutional revision which would permit him to be re-elected this year. His ambitions, however, are being challenged by Juan Lechín, demagogic labor leader, currently the vice president, and now the central figure in a dissident, left-wing faction of the MNR. Lechín, much like João Goulart of Brazil, represents a dangerous and irresponsible element in Bolivian politics.

The MNR has permitted some democratic processes, with limited press freedom for opposition expression. In elections of 1956 and 1960, opposition candidates received from one-fourth to one-third of the votes. Notable acts of MNR governments have included nationalization of tin mines and drastic agrarian reform. A rather thoroughgoing distribution of land to numerous new proprietors was partly inspired by the MNR revolution, but was put into effect by agrarian reformers regardless of action by the MNR government. Recent reports contend that these measures of land reform are finally having their inevitable effects, and that Bolivian standards of living are beginning to rise.

Soon after the 1952 MNR revolution, the United States began to partially subsidize the Bolivian government, and has made direct financial aid available to Bolivia since that date. Unless the effects of creation of a new class of many small landed proprietors can take firm root in Bolivia, even the large U.S. effort may be to no avail. The Soviets are working vigorously to take advantage of Bolivia's chronic social distress. Because of incessant demonstrations, strikes and violence, Paz Estenssoro has kept the country under an intermittent state of siege. The tin miners under Juan Lechín are armed, unpredictable, and powerful. Bolivian administrative structure and process are primitive, and are as chaotic as is Bolivian society in general.

PARAGUAY

Area: 157,000 sq. mi.

Population: 1,800,000.

President: Alfredo Stroessner, military, took office August, 1963, for a third five-year term.

Paraguay shares with Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua, the dubious distinction of being a country where tyranny has thus far been the only alternative to chaos. Politics have been characterized by long periods of dictatorship punctuated from time to time by stimulating outbreaks of anarchic rebellion.

Elections of February 10, 1963, resulted in victory for General Alfredo Stroessner for a third five-year term. The *Partido Liberal*, a nineteenth-century type of party, was permitted to run a candidate, Dr. Ernesto Galiván, but there was never any question as to the outcome. Members of opposition parties are hampered by the fact that they are either in exile or in jail. The *Partido Colorado* supports Stroessner. Opposition parties, in addition to the ineffectual *Partido Liberal*, are the *Partido Febrerista Revolucionario* (democratic left, *aprista*-type), *Movimiento Popular Colorado* (dissident faction of Colorado Party), *Movimiento 14 de Mayo para la Liberación Paraguaya* (youthful, leftist, confused), and *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (Christian democratic, divided on the Stroessner question).

The Stroessner dictatorship is probably not as brutal as the gangster regime of François Duvalier in Haiti, or the Communist despotism in Cuba. But Paraguay's rulers, including Stroessner, have done nothing to promote democracy. Her first tyrant was the austere, cruel Dr. José Gaspar Tomás Rodríguez Francia, to whom Thomas Carlyle, admirer of dictators, devoted one of his books. Dr. Francia's rule was absolute, and Paraguay was a virtual prison. He shut the republic off from the world, and prohibited commerce or even the exchange of mail. Dr. Francia reigned for almost thirty years, from 1813 to 1840. After a short period of unspeakable chaos, Carlos Antonio López served as a rather more humane and progressive dictator until 1862. For eight years after that, López' corrupt, debauched and sadistic son, Francisco Solano López, systematically ruined Paraguay. The tyrant involved Paraguay in war with Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The destruction of the war and the indescribable tortures perpetrated by the mad tyrant almost wiped out the entire male population of the country. It is said that as a result of the infamous Paraguayan war, the population of the country was reduced from 525,000 to 221,000; and that of these, there were only 28,746 men. Paraguay's subsequent political history is one of almost unrelieved turbulence, tyranny, and violence.

Paraguay is particularly primitive, and suffers from the extremes of poverty and wealth that are characteristic of such places. Modern capitalism is virtually unknown and a parasitic, non-investing medieval type of aristocracy monopolizes the land. Less than one per cent of the land is in production. There are rich iron deposits and great timber resources, both almost entirely unused. The capital, Asunción, only installed running water in 1961, and there is still no sewer system. Illiteracy is about 90 per cent, there are few roads, and disease (tuberculosis, hookworm, malaria, typhus, leprosy) is rampant. Graft and corruption are the order of the day, and about \$75 million in U.S. aid has made no apparent dent in the social or economic conditions of the country. Paraguay continues to suffer, well into the twentieth century, from the paralyzing effects of persistent feudalism and from the attendant elements of ignorance and political backwardness.

LATIN AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

United States Relations With Latin America

There have been three periods during which the United States, either because of its own weakness (1810-1823), or by exercise of its will (1933-1945), or under considerable pressure (1958 to the present), has undertaken to stress respect, equality, and forbearance in its relations with its Latin American neighbors.

First, there was the period of Latin American independence and the Monroe Doctrine, 1810-1823. During that epoch, United States public opinion and policy demonstrated great sympathy and gave moral and some material support to the independence movements. The Monroe Doctrine (1823) was designed to preserve the national interest of the United States from European encroachment in this hemisphere, and the independence of the new Latin American republics from the same danger. It was not until the Roosevelt Corollary (1904) applied an imperialist twist to the Monroe Doctrine, that significant elements of Latin American opinion began to see the Monroe Doctrine in an unfavorable light. Whether called the Monroe Doctrine or by some other name, the national interest of the United States still requires that external imperialist powers be denied access to the western hemisphere.

Second, there was the era of the Good Neighbor Policy, 1933-1945. Idealism combined with alarm over Axis aggression in Europe to inaugurate this new epoch of good feeling. The policy was inexpensive and effective. It simply placed emphasis on mutual respect, Latin American self-determination, and non-intervention by the United States in Latin American internal affairs.

Third, there is the present period of renewed interest, which began with the Venezuelan mob attack on Vice President Richard Nixon in the spring of 1958, picked up momentum with the Castro victory in Cuba in January, 1959, and soared to a high pitch with announcement (October, 1962) of discovery of Soviet missile emplacements in Cuba.

This new epoch includes the Kennedy-sponsored Alliance for Progress. The Alliance commits the United States to provide 20 per cent of a total of \$100 billion over the next decade (from 1961), to be made available to those republics that prepare effective national programs for education, housing development, land reform, taxation and fiscal improvement, economic integration, and inflationary control. Because oligarchical elements in most of the republics resist social reform, countries have been slow to prepare meaningful national programs, and the Alliance for Progress has not gone into effect as speedily as had been hoped. In November, 1963, the Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States agreed that the affairs of the Alliance for Progress should be placed in the hands of a seven-member Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress (ICAP), to provide multilateral representation and coordinate and promote its endeavors. The United States is a permanent member of ICAP, and the remaining six are elected by the Economic and Social Council for two-year periods.

The remaining periods of U.S.-Latin American affairs have included all the features that are typical of relationships between very powerful national states and their weaker neighbors. There have been diplomatic interventions, exaggerated assistance to and support of U.S. investment interests, use of recognition as an instrument of internal interference, actual military occupations and seizures of territory by aggression, and the like.

In U.S. foreign policy, Latin America has often been considered to be a rather insignificant step-child, and stress has been placed on relations with Europe. Until recently, the Office of Inter-American Affairs of the State Department has had little prestige, and there have been occasions when its policies and personnel have been dominated by political hacks or by unimaginative and unenlightened second-string career people. The appearance of U.S. support for hated tyrants (Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela, Odría of Peru, Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, the Somozas of Nicaragua, Batista of Cuba, etc.) has arisen more out of miscellaneous factors of ignorance, social preferences of politically appointed ambassadors who have fallen under the spell of local ruling satrapies, business connections, and lack of social consciousness, than out of any coherent, set policy. It is also apparent that the U.S., and U.S. policy makers, are so affluent and non-revolutionary that it requires a real effort for them to comprehend or sympathize with movements for social reform.

In recent years, steps have been taken to rectify many of these blunders. Beginning with the Kennedy administration, the calibre of our diplomatic personnel in Latin America has notably improved. President Johnson made a point of selecting the very distinguished Thomas C. Mann to the headship of the Office of Inter-American Affairs, and raised the post to rank of Under Secretary of State.

Puerto Rico

Area: 3,400 sq. mi.

Population: 2,360,000.

Governor: Luis Muñoz Marín, civilian, took office 1960 for a fourth four-year term.

Though from 1898 to 1952 Puerto Rico occupied a typically territorial position in the constellation of U.S. dependencies, it has since that year been known as an *Estado Libre Asociado*, which has been rendered in English as "Commonwealth." Puerto Rico exercises full authority over her internal affairs, including constitutional formulation and revision, election of all legislative bodies, and election of her governor (granted in 1948). The U.S. collects the customs but deposits them in the Puerto Rican treasury. There are no other federal taxes. The United States handles the foreign relations of Puerto Rico, and United States currency circulates in the commonwealth. Puerto Rico shoulders many costs for internal improvements that are a federal expenditure in the United States.

Much of Puerto Rico's internal progress may be attributed to the guidance of dynamic Governor Luis Muñoz Marín, who has held office since 1948. Economic measures have been designed to encourage investment, break up *latifundia*, promote low-cost housing and extend communications. Political reform has brought free, honest elections, vigorous political contest, civic vitality, and integrity in public office. While living standards are still very low by comparison with U.S. levels, they are among the highest in Latin America.

In election returns of 1960, Puerto Rican parties were supported by the following popular percentages: **Popular Democrático** (Muñoz Marín), 58; **Estadista Republicano** (for statehood), 32; **Acción Cristiana** (Catholic), 7; and **Independientista** (raucously nationalistic, for independence), 3.

The Canal Zone

Area: 550 sq. mi.

Population: 41,000.

Government: A Governor, a military officer appointed for a four-year term by the President of the United States with advice and consent of the Senate. Both the Canal Zone Government (for political matters) and the Panama Canal Company (for economic affairs) are substantially under the direction of the Governor.

Under provisions of the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty of 1903, the Canal Zone is leased in perpetuity from the Republic of Panama. Cutting through the heart of the republic, the Zone was destined to be a cause of controversy and a theme for political agitation. Principal issues: (1) **Sovereignty.** In the hastily drawn 1903 treaty Panama granted to the United States "all the rights, power and authority within the Zone. . . . which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign. . . ." thus leaving the question extremely vague and open to controversy. From this have arisen the flag controversies. (2) **Payment.** Panama now receives an annual payment of \$1,930,000. She always seeks more, and some agitators insist that Panama should receive 50 per cent of *gross* returns from the operation. Gross runs around \$80 million per year. Net ranges about \$2 million annually, and is all put back into canal improvements. (3) **Discrimination.** The United States has practiced discrimination, in part because of military and Southern influence at the Canal and in part because of pressures from local business elements who fear the impact of high wages on their own exploitive levels. This problem is now being corrected. For further data, including events of 1963-1964, see entry on Panama, p. 13, *supra*.

Soviet Relations With Latin America

Soviet relations with Latin America have been vigorous and aggressive, and have occurred in four different areas:

1. **Official, diplomatic relations.** Though Soviet satellites maintain official relations with some Latin American countries, only five republics (Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay) actually exchange diplomats with the U.S.S.R. On some occasions, as in Argentina and Mexico, Soviet representatives have been caught red-handed at subversive activities, payment of dissident groups to sow social chaos, and the like. Latin American reluctance to conduct diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. has not resulted so much from antagonism to Communist ideas or concern over the reaction of the United States as from the fear that governmental authorities could not cope with the aggressive pressures that flow from the highly motivated activities of the Russian embassies.

2. **Unofficial political activity by proxy.** Quite outside the sphere of official diplomatic activity, the U.S.S.R. has a ready-made constellation of native Communist parties, extreme left-wing nationalists, emotional juveniles, ambitious politicians and demagogues, sensational-newspaper editors, and half-educated, frustrated or black-mailed intellectuals and other professional people to serve the interests of the Russian national state. There is no doubt that their numbers are very great, and that in some cases (as in Mexico and Brazil) they are in a position to influence policy of their countries toward the United States.

3. **Use of the Cuban base of operations.** The political and military implications of the Cuban satellite are related to and an adjunct of the unofficial political activity

which we described above. Cuba has become a center of operations for the promotion of Russian interests in the Western Hemisphere.

4. **Dissemination of literature and radio propaganda throughout Latin America.** Books in Spanish and Portuguese are published in the U.S.S.R. and Cuba and are made available to many schools that would otherwise be without reading materials. Communist propaganda journals, of excellent physical quality and at low cost, are distributed throughout Latin America. Radio Moscow and Cuban transmitters broadcast continuously in Spanish, French, and Portuguese, and also make their programs available to local radio stations that are willing to cooperate.

The United States can also utilize diplomatic relations, friendly associated republics, and propaganda devices for the promotion of its interests in the western hemisphere. The quality of U.S. Information Agency and particularly of Voice of America efforts has recently undergone marked improvement. However, by comparison with the Soviet effort, unofficial political activity from U.S. sources is notoriously feeble.

Institutions of Inter-American Cooperation

The Organization of American States, with its seat in Washington, provides an umbrella which covers many different inter-American efforts toward juridical collaboration, economic and social welfare, pacific settlement of disputes, and collective security. The OAS organs are hampered by deep political cleavage between Cuba, her friends, and her opponents; by an underlying suspicion of the United States; and by a certain lack of realism (partly born of left-wing pressures in the various countries) concerning the Russian version of imperialism. Yet, the OAS is not paralyzed by anything corresponding to the Big Power veto in the Security Council of the United Nations. Significant decisions of the OAS organs require no more than two-thirds approval of its members.

The principal instruments of OAS organization and procedure are (1) the **OAS Charter** of 1948, and (2) the **Rio Pact** of the same year (formulated 1947, ratified 1948). The OAS Charter provides for **Inter-American Conferences**, which are supposed to meet each five years (the eleventh conference has now been delayed for four years by deep controversies arising out of the Cuban issue); a **Council**, comprised of one delegate from each member republic, and in continuous session in Washington; a **Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers**, to convene quickly in urgent situations, particularly under provisions of the Rio Pact; and the **Pan American Union**, which is the secretariat for the organization. There are also numerous special committees, councils, conferences, as well as semi-autonomous specialized organizations.

The **Rio Pact (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance)** requires that members submit controversies to methods of peaceful settlement; and provides that in the case of armed attack by any state against an American state, the **Organ of Consultation** (usually the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, though it may be the Council) may by a two-thirds vote take economic, diplomatic, or military measures against the aggressor. A reluctant state may not be required to contribute its own military forces to the enterprise, but there is no arrangement whereby a veto may negate the whole effort.

The **Inter-American Development Bank**, founded in 1959, is the principal institution for the channelling of financial assistance to the countries of the western hemisphere, including most Alliance for Progress funds.

With all its weaknesses and despite tensions over the Cuban question, the overall OAS system is among the most effective international organizations in the world.